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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
SARAH JOHNSON,    ) 
      ) Supreme Court No. 42857 
             Petitioner/Appellant,   ) 
                                            )  
vs.                                             )            
      )   
STATE OF IDAHO    ) 
      )  
             Respondent/Respondent   ) 
_______________________________________ )   
  
 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Case: CV-2014-0000353  Current Judge: G.  Richard BevanPage 1 of 2
Sarah M Johnson, Plaintiff  vs  State Of Idaho, Defendant
Sarah M Johnson, Plaintiff  vs  State Of Idaho, Defendant
DNA and successive petition for post-conviction relief G.  Richard Bevan4/9/2012
Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in support of DNA and successive petition
for post-conviction relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief G.  Richard Bevan1/22/2014
New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief G.  Richard Bevan5/19/2014
Other party: State Of Idaho Appearance Kenneth K Jorgensen G.  Richard Bevan
Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings    Paid by: Johnson, Sarah M
(subject)  Receipt number: 0003170  Dated: 5/19/2014  Amount: $.00
(Cash) For: Johnson, Sarah M (subject)
G.  Richard Bevan
Change Assigned Judge G.  Richard Bevan
Order on Pending Motions G.  Richard Bevan
Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Order Appointing Public Defender Public
defender Keith Roark
G.  Richard Bevan
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith /  Mtn Express Receipt number:
0003247  Dated: 5/23/2014  Amount: $2.00 (Cash)
G.  Richard Bevan5/23/2014
Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan6/18/2014
Order for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan6/27/2014
Motion to Take Judicial Notice G.  Richard Bevan7/18/2014
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended
DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Notice Of Hearing G.  Richard Bevan8/21/2014
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  09/18/2014 10:00 AM)  for Summary
Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal G.  Richard Bevan8/25/2014
Second affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian G.  Richard Bevan9/3/2014
Motion to Continue Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of
Petitioner's Amend DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan9/16/2014
Order Continuing Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction
Relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Continued  (Motion  10/20/2014 01:30 PM)  for Summary Dismissal of
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction
Relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviciton Relief
G.  Richard Bevan10/10/2014
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 10/20/2014 01:30 PM:   Court
Minutes  for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief HELD IN TWIN FALLS
G.  Richard Bevan10/20/2014
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Case: CV-2014-0000353  Current Judge: G.  Richard BevanPage 2 of 2
Sarah M Johnson, Plaintiff  vs  State Of Idaho, Defendant
Sarah M Johnson, Plaintiff  vs  State Of Idaho, Defendant
Hearing result for Motion scheduled  on 10/20/2014 01:30 PM:   District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:  less 100; HELD IN
TWIN FALLS for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief
G.  Richard Bevan10/20/2014
Case Taken Under Advisement G.  Richard Bevan
no longer u/a G.  Richard Bevan10/27/2014
Order granting motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA
and successive petition for post conviction relief
G.  Richard Bevan
Judgment G.  Richard Bevan
STATUS CHANGED:  Closed G.  Richard Bevan
Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Other Party; Johnson, Sarah
M, Subject.  Filing date: 10/27/2014
G.  Richard Bevan
Memorandum in support of Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment G.  Richard Bevan11/6/2014
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment G.  Richard Bevan
Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice G.  Richard Bevan
Notice Of Appeal G.  Richard Bevan12/3/2014
STATUS CHANGED:  Inactive G.  Richard Bevan
Appealed To The Supreme Court G.  Richard Bevan
Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender G.  Richard Bevan
Response to Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment G.  Richard Bevan12/8/2014
Notice and Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender in Direct
Appeal
G.  Richard Bevan12/9/2014
Notice Of Hearing G.  Richard Bevan12/10/2014
Hearing Scheduled  (Motion  02/20/2015 03:00 PM)  Twin Falls County
Courthouse
G.  Richard Bevan
Continued  (Motion  03/02/2015 03:00 PM)  Twin Falls County Courthouse G.  Richard Bevan12/17/2014
Amended Notice Of Hearing G.  Richard Bevan
Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Appearance Dennis A. Benjamin G.  Richard Bevan2/23/2015
Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Appearance Deborah Whipple G.  Richard Bevan
Notice of Association of Counsel G.  Richard Bevan
Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment G.  Richard Bevan3/4/2015
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Sarah Johnson brings this action pursuant to LC. §§ 19-4901, 4902(b) and 4908, and 
alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
1. Petitioner Sarah Johnson is currently incarcerated at the Pocatello Women's 
Correctional Center in Pocatello, Idaho. 
2. Sarah is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 
State of Idaho, County of Blaine, the Honorable R. Barry Wood, presiding. 
3. The Blaine County Court number for that case is CR-2003-18200. 
4. Sarah was charged with two counts of first degree murder in the deaths of her parents 
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Alan and Diane Johnson. 
5. Sarah was convicted following a jury trial. 
6. Sarah was represented at trial by attorneys Robert Pangburn and Mark Rader. 
7. The State was represented by Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Jim Thomas and 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Justin Whatcott. 
8. On June 30, 2005, the District Court sentenced Sarah to two fixed life terms. (The 
term on Count One was fixed life; the term on Count Two was life plus a fifteen year firearm 
enhancement with a minimum term of life.) 
9. Trial counsel Pangburn and Rader failed to file a timely notice of appeal. 
10. On April 19, 2006, Sarah filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief. 
11. Stephen D. Thompson was appointed to represent Sarah. 
12. On July 3, 2006, a new appeal period was granted and the remaining post-conviction 
proceedings were stayed. 
Sarah. 
13. An appeal was taken with Sara Thomas and Jason Pintler of the SAPD representing 
14. The issues on appeal were: 
1) Did the district court constructively amend the Amended Indictment by giving 
an aiding and abetting instruction violating Sarah's rights under both the Federal 
and Idaho constitutions requiring Sarah's conviction to be vacated? 
2) Did giving the aiding and abetting instruction constitute a fatal variance 
violating Sarah's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process requiring Sarah's 
conviction to be vacated? 
3) Did the district court deny Sarah her constitutional and statutory rights to a 
unanimous jury verdict when it failed to give the jury a unanimity instruction? 
2 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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4) Did the district court deny Sarah's constitutional rights to a jury trial and to a 
fair trial when, after juror number 85 candidly confessed that he could not follow 
all of the court's instructions, the court failed to either remove the juror from the 
jury pool or obtain an unequivocal assurance from the juror that he would in fact 
follow all of the district court's instructions? 
15. On June 27, 2008, the Supreme Court denied appellate relief. State v. Johnson, 145 
Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) is attached as Appendix A to this petition. 
16. On August 4, 2008, the Remittitur was entered. 
17. The stay of the remaining post-conviction proceedings was lifted and Christopher 
Simms was appointed to represent Sarah. 
18. On September 15, 2009, the case was reassigned from Judge Wood to Judge G. 
Richard Bevan. 
19. On January 12, 2010, a second amended petition was filed. 
20. Some of the claims for relief were ultimately conceded by Sarah, some were 
dismissed on summary judgment, and some were denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
21. The specific claims and resolutions are as follows: 
1) Sarah is innocent. This claim was denied in summary judgment on the basis 
that factual innocence is not a ground for post-conviction relief. 
2) The district court lacked jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence Sarah. This 
claim, based upon the exercise of district court adult jurisdiction without a wavier 
hearing, was denied in summary judgment on the ground that no waiver hearing 
was required. 
3) Sarah's constitutional rights to due process were violated. This claim was 
based upon an assertion that the trial judge had conducted an independent 
investigation and therefore was not neutral and unbiased. In addition, it was 
alleged that the court had violated the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 
of the Idaho constitution by impermissibly limiting the cross-examination of 
Bruno Santos. This claim was dismissed based in part upon a concession that it 
was without merit (as to the conduct of an independent investigation) and in part 
3 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
7 of 352
• 
upon summary judgment on the grounds that it could have been raised on appeal. 
4) Sarah's state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of 
counsel were denied. Sarah asserted that the specific allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel stemmed from an overall lack of diligence, failure to 
investigate the facts and law, chronic tardiness, and unpreparedness for court 
proceedings which resulted cumulatively and individually in ineffective 
assistance. The specific instances of ineffectiveness asserted were: 
a) Ineffective assistance in failing to move for a continuance of the 
trial to investigate and prepare an adequate defense when the state 
delayed its disclosure of material evidence (that the comforter on 
the Johnsons' bed covering Diane's body had been discarded and 
not gathered as physical evidence). This claim was denied 
following an evidentiary hearing. 
b) Ineffective assistance in failing to prepare and investigate and 
cross-examine the state's witnesses including Matt Johnson, Alan 
and Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Walt Femling, Steven Harkin, 
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, 
Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu 
Robinson. Sarah later conceded that there was no ineffective 
assistance in the cross-examination of Matt Johnson. The 
remaining claims were denied following the evidentiary hearing. 
c) Ineffective assistance in failing to present the testimony of 
various neighbors regarding events they observed and heard prior 
to the offenses. Sarah withdrew the claim as to one neighbor and 
the claim as to the other neighbors was denied in summary 
judgment. 
d) Ineffective assistance in dealing with fingerprint issues, 
specifically in failing to adequately investigate all available 
fingerprint evidence, in failing to object to the untimely disclosure 
of fingerprint evidence, and in failing to move for a continuance 
based upon untimely disclosure. Sarah conceded that summary 
dismissal was appropriate for all claims related to fingerprint 
evidence except for the allegation that counsel was ineffective in 
failing to elicit from the defense expert his opinion that latent 
prints found on the tools of murder were fresh prints. That claim 
was denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
e) Ineffective assistance in failing to lay a proper foundation for 
4 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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psychological opinion evidence during the hearing to suppress 
Sarah's statements. Sarah conceded that summary dismissal of this 
claim was appropriate. 
f) Ineffective assistance in dealing with the aiding and abetting 
theory of guilt. Sarah conceded that summary dismissal of this 
claim was appropriate. 
g) Ineffective assistance in investigating the allegation of Steven 
Pankey. The district court found that this claim was time barred. 
h) Ineffective assistance in failing to utilize readily available 
psychiatric evidence. The district court dismissed this claim on the 
basis that the evidence would not have been admissible at trial. 
I) Ineffective assistance due to violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. This claim was dismissed in summary 
judgment. 
j) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise the 
issue of error in denying the motion to suppress statements and in 
failing to raise the issue of insufficient evidence to support an 
aiding and abetting instruction. This claim was partly conceded 
and partly dismissed in summary judgment. 
5) Newly discovered evidence that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the 
rifle, the rifle scope, and an insert from the ammunition box required a new trial. 
This claim was denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
22. The final judgment in the original post-conviction case was entered on April 8, 2011. 
23. A timely appeal was taken and remains pending. 
24. Dennis Benjamin and Deborah Whipple represent Sarah on that appeal. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Requests DNA Testing On Evidence Secured In 
Her Trial Which Was Not Subject To The Testing Now Requested Because That Testing Was 
Not Then Available. 
25. Sarah's parents, Diane and Allen Johnson, were shot with a rifle belonging to their 
renter, Mel Speegle, around 6:20 a.m. on September 2, 2006. 
5 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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26. The only question at trial was identity -- whether Sarah or someone else killed her 
parents. 
27. The State's theory was that Sarah wore a bathrobe backwards while shooting her 
mother at contact or near contact range as her mother slept, and shooting her father from a short 
range as he came out of the shower. 
28. At the time of the original testing, the State had a DNA reference sample from Bruno 
Santos who had been dating Sarah. 
29. Well after the trial, the State obtained a DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill 
after it discovered that his fingerprints were on the murder weapons. 
30. The robe, the rifle, Bruno Santos' pants, and other evidence were seized, analyzed 
and tested for blood spatter and DNA. 
31. The evidence was sent to Orchid Celmark for testing, and a report was issued on May 
13, 2004. A copy of the Celmark STR Analysis report is attached as Appendix B to this Petition. 
A copy of the Celmark mtDNA analysis is attached as Appendix C. 
32. An adequate chain of custody of the evidence is established by the fact that the 
evidence was held admissible at trial and has remained in state custody since. 
33. There exists new technology for testing which was not available at the time of trial. 
34. The testing done in 2004 was inconclusive in the following respects: 
a) Bloodstain 2 from the robe contains a mixture of at least three individuals 
including an unknown individual. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample 
from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be 
submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
6 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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b) The tissue from the left collar area of the robe is from an unknown male. Alan 
Johnson and Bruno Santos are excluded as potential contributors. This evidence may now be 
compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of 
trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
c) Bloodstain C on the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and 
Bruno Santos. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the state 
and federal CODIS databases. 
d) No conclusions could be reached due to insufficient amounts of DNA 
concerning bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue 
from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left sleeve of the robe, the stain 
from Bruno Santos' pants, the fibers imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, 
and bloodstain G from the rifle. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA 
amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial and to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at 
the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage 
columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
e) Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may now be subjected to DNA 
analysis. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification 
techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial and to a 
7 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new 
DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal 
CODIS databases. 
f) The results from Robe sample 34, if any, are not listed on the Celmark DNA 
report. This evidence may now be tested using advanced amplification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are 
available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include 
post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. 
The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
g) DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item# 14) may now 
be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CO DIS databases. 
h) DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnson's bedroom door (Items# 15-16) may now be tested using advanced techniques not 
available at the time of trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and after 
8 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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and submitted to a CODIS database. 
I) DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) may now be tested using 
advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CO DIS databases. 
j) DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 12-1) may now be tested 
using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic 
labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup 
with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may 
be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
k) One of the two hair samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle could 
not be matched to Sarah or any of her maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA testing. This 
hair can now be compared to a DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not 
available at the time of trial. 
1) Two of the three hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater were excluded as 
coming from Sarah and could not be identified as coming from a particular maternal line. These 
hairs can now be compared to a new DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill. One of the 
9 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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hairs also had a small root and could be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial 
to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new 
DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal 
CODIS databases. 
m) DNA from an unknown contributor found on the inside of the latex glove can 
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are 
available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include 
post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. 
The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
n) low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were found on the leather glove 
from the garbage can. That DNA can now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial 
to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not fully available at the time of trial. 
The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and 
others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low 
Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and 
federal CODIS databases. 
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o) A bloody handprint was found on the sheet under the pillow beneath Diane. 
DNA from that handprint can now be amplified using new fingerprint DNA analysis to determine 
whether the handprint was made by Alan or some other person after Diane was shot. See T Tr. 
Vol. 6, p. 4238, In. 25- p. 4239, In. 12. 
35. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as the results were not compared 
with Christopher Hill's DNA profile which is now available with an appropriate chain of custody 
as documented in the Blaine County Sheriffs Office Supplemental Report 6 showing that four 
buccal swabs were obtained from Mr. Hill on April 7, 2009. 
36. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as the results were not compared 
with Matthew Johnson's DNA profile. 
37. The requested testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative 
evidence that Sarah is innocent. 
38. The testing method requested will likely produce admissible results under the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
Why Relief Should Be Granted On This First Cause Of Action 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) allows a petitioner to file at any time a petition for the 
performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing that was secured in relation to the trial which 
resulted in the conviction but which was not subject to the testing that is now requested because 
the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial. 
The petitioner must present a prima facie case that: 1) identity was an issue in the trial; 
and 2) that the evidence has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that such 
evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect. I.C. 
11 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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§ 19-4902( c ). This has been established in this case per the above allegations. 
Testing is to be allowed upon a determination that: 1) the result has the scientific 
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than 
not that the petitioner is innocent; and 2) the testing method requested would likely produce 
admissible results under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. LC. § 19-4902( e ). 
The testing requested does have the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative 
evidence that would show it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. When Sarah's 
parents were shot, even according to the State's expert witness, blood spatter and human tissue 
were broadcast in a very wide area, even out of the room and across the hallway into Sarah's 
bedroom. However, Sarah had absolutely no blood or any other debris anywhere on her person, 
which made it highly unlikely that she could have been the shooter. If the testing of the 
previously untested and/or unidentified DNA on the robe, rifle, round, doorknob, palm print, hair 
on the rifle, Bruno's sweater, latex, and/or leather glove arc shown to match Christopher Hill, 
Matthew Johnson, or other known persons it would go to show that person committed the crimes, 
not Sarah. 
Further, the State's theory of the case was that Sarah did not have blood on her because 
her mother's head was covered with a comforter which the State discarded. If Alan's DNA is in 
the bloody handprint on the sheet, it will go to show that Alan pulled the comforter up over 
Diane's body after she was shot. This will undermine the theory that Sarah could have 
committed these crimes without getting any blood or other debris on herself and will show it is 
more probable than not that she is innocent. 
Additionally, as set out in Dr. Hampikian's affidavit which will be filed within 14 days, 
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the testing requested will likely produce admissible results under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
See IRE 702. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel At 
Trial And On Appeal In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, 
Section 13 Under Strickland v. Washington 
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Ji1le A Motion To Dismiss 
Pursuant To Arizona v. Youngblood Following The State's Denial Of Due 
Process In Discarding The Comforter From The Johnsons' Bed 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
39. One of the major weaknesses in the State's case was the fact that Sarah had no blood 
anywhere on herself except on the bottom of her socks. 
40. The State's expert, Mr. Englert, explained this lack of blood by positing that Diane 
Johnson's head was covered with a comforter at the time she was shot, that the shot was fired 
through the comforter and the comforter stopped blood from getting on Sarah. 
41. The comforter was found tucked in tightly over Diane's head; however, the State 
presented no evidence to explain how Diane managed to so tightly tuck her own body under it. 
42. There was evidence presented that Alan Johnson moved from the bathroom to the 
side of the bed next to Diane's head before he died. 
43. From this it appeared possible that Alan had tucked the comforter over Diane's head 
after the shooting. 
44. If the comforter was pulled over Diane's head after the shooting, it absolutely could 
not have protected the shooter from blood exposure per the State's theory. 
45. The State discarded this comforter after having already formed the hypothesis that 
Sarah was the shooter despite the lack of blood on her. 
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46. Officer Kirtley testified that he observed the comforter and did not see any bullet 
holes in it. 
4 7. The comforter would have provided exculpatory evidence if it had either a hand or 
fingerprint consistent with Alan having pulled it up over Diane's head or if it did not have a 
bullet hole it in. 
48. The failure of the State to preserve this evidence was the basis for a valid motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). See US. v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 
928 (1993); Griffin v. Spratt, 768 F.Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1991),judgment rev'd in part, 969 F.2d 
16 (3rd Cir. 1992); Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1994). 
49. The failure to move for dismissal was deficient performance of counsel because such 
a motion would have been successful and there can be no strategic purpose for not seeking 
dismissal of the charges against the Petitioner. 
50. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on This Basis 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 44, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to effective counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; LC. § 19-852. Further, these 
rights apply to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967). 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
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federal constitutions, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different 
result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 (1984), the Supreme 
Court held that the government violates a defendant's right to due process if evidence it failed to 
preserve possessed "exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and 
(is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means." Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333,337 
(1988), adds the further requirement that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the 
potentially useful evidence. The presence or absence of bad faith turns on the government's 
knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-57 ftnt. *, 109 S.Ct. at 336-337, ftnt. *. 
In this case, the State discarded the comforter that they claimed was over Diane's head at 
the time she was shot. At the time the evidence was discarded, the State had focused on Sarah as 
a suspect and also knew that Sarah did not have any blood spatter or tissue on her body or 
pajamas which was extremely inconsistent with its theory that she had killed her mother with a 
contact shot to the head. Thus, the State knew that it would have to explain this lack of evidence 
to prove Sarah guilty and that the comforter would be a key element of this explanation. The 
State's officer also knew that he had looked at the comforter and seen that it did not have a bullet 
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hole in it and further, state officers knew that the comforter had been tucked in firmly over 
Diane's head. 
Thus, the comforter was of apparent exculpatory value. Its lack of a bullet hole would go 
to prove Sarah could not have fired the fatal shot and its condition of being firmly tucked in over 
Diane's head showed that it had been placed there after her death, not before, again going to 
prove that Sarah was not the shooter. 
However, knowing this, the State nevertheless discarded the comforter. 
Further, Sarah would not be able to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means. Once the comforter was destroyed, there was no way for Sarah to show that it 
did not have a bullet hole in it. 
Under these conditions, if counsel had moved to dismiss pursuant to Youngblood, the 
motion would have been granted. Youngblood, supra. See also, U.S. v. Cooper, supra; Griffin v. 
Spratt, supra; Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1994). 
Failure to move to dismiss was deficient performance. Further, the deficiency was 
prejudicial because filing the motion to dismiss would have resulted in dismissal. 
On these grounds, post-conviction relief must be granted. 
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Evidence Regarding 
Janet Sy/ten's Parole Status At The Time Of The Johnsons' Murders 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
51. At trial, evidence was presented that Sarah had stated that a cleaning woman had 
been accused of stealing (and most likely had stolen) some expensive lotion from the Johnson 
house. 
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52. Evidence was presented that this cleaning woman was Janet Sylten and that she had 
committed a theft from the Johnsons. 
53. Evidence was further presented that Sarah said that the cleaning woman had 
telephoned Diane Johnson (who was planning on going to the police regarding the thefts), and 
that Diane found the communication frightening, threatening, and upsetting. 
54. Additionally, evidence was presented that Sarah said people were outside the 
Johnson home in the early morning hours on the day of the murders and that Diane Johnson 
recognized the voice of one of the people present as the cleaning woman. 
55. The State's theory at trial was that Sarah's statements were false and intended to 
divert suspicion from herself. 
56. At trial, Ms. Sylten testified that she never took anything from the Johnson house, 
never spoke with Diane, was not at the house in the early morning of the day of the murders and 
was not connected in any way with the murders. 
57. However, at the time of the Johnsons' murders, Ms. Sylten had just been released 
from prison on parole on a charge of aggravated battery against a correctional officer. ROA 
attached as Appendix D. 
58. Ms. Sylten's parole status provided a motive for her to threaten Diane when she 
knew that Diane might go to the police about the theft of her lotion, provided a motive for her to 
harm or kill the Johnsons, and provided a motive for her to lie at trial about her involvement with 
the Johnsons. 
59. However, trial counsel never presented this evidence to the jury. 
60. The failure to present evidence to impeach Ms. Sylten and demonstrate her motives 
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to lie and harm the Johnsons, especially Diane Johnson, was deficient performance of counsel as 
the information on Janet's parole status was readily available to counsel and there could be no 
possible strategic purpose in not presenting evidence in support of the defense theory of alternate 
perpetrators. 
61. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should Be Granted On This Basis 
As discussed above, Sarah had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington. To demonstrate ineffective assistance, deficient performance and 
prejudice must be shown. 
The failure to present evidence of Ms. Sylten's parole status was deficient performance 
because the evidence was readily available and admissible. Even if the evidence was construed 
to be evidence of other crimes, it would nonetheless be admissible to prove motive to lie and to 
harm the Johnsons, most especially Diane, because if Diane contacted the police with allegations 
of theft by Ms. Sylten, it would have endangered Ms. Syltcn's parole status. IRE 404(b). 
Moreover, failure to present this evidence could not have been strategic because there was 
absolutely no advantage to Sarah in not presenting the evidence, while presenting the evidence 
would have had the clear advantage of supporting Sarah's statements that Ms. Sylten had 
threatened the family and was at the house the morning of the killings. McKay v. State, 148 
Idaho 567,225 P.3d 567 (2010). 
Lastly, the failure to present this evidence was prejudicial. When questioned about who 
might have had a motive to harm her parents, Sarah repeatedly stated that her mother was having 
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a dispute with a cleaning woman who had made threats and who had been in the yard early in the 
morning the day of the crimes. The State's theory of the case was that Sarah had made up this 
story to divert attention from her and Ms. Sylten's denial at trial that she had ever threatened 
Diane, been at the house on the day of the murders, or had anything to do with the murders 
supported the State's theory of the case. However, had the jury known of Ms. Sylten's parole 
status, it could have concluded that Ms. Sylten did have a motive to stop Diane from reporting 
her theft, that she did make threats to Diane, and that she was at the house and even that she had 
something to do with the murders. At the very least, the jury would have concluded that Sarah's 
statements that Diane was having a dispute with Ms. Sylten and that Ms. Sylten had said 
something that scared Diane were accurate. Such a conclusion would have resulted in a 
reasonable probability of a different result because as noted above, the physical evidence in the 
case was inconsistent with Sarah's guilt; Sarah had no blood or tissue on her even though blood 
and tissue was propelled throughout the room when Diane was shot. Had the jury also known 
that Sarah was not lying about Ms. Sylten's contact with the family, it is reasonably likely that 
Sarah would not have been convicted. 
C. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Object To Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Throughout The Trial 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
62. Throughout the proceedings, prosecutorial misconduct occurred without defense 
objection. 
63. In pretrial proceedings, Mr. Thomas, the prosecuting attorney volunteered to the 
Court that he had told all state officials involved in the case that they could not talk to the 
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defense without him or his agent present. T Tr Vol. 2, p. 840, In. 12-p. 844, In. 18. 
64. The State began its opening statement by telling the jury that although the case was 
State ofldaho vs. Sarah Johnson, it was about "a whole lot more. It's about these two people, 
Alan and Diane Johnson. Hard-working, honest, good, decent people, whose murder left a 
grieving son, a brother, sisters, parents, and a host of good friends." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1471, In. 19-
22. 
65. This argument was misconduct because it played upon the sympathies of the jury and 
urged them to return a verdict based on information other than the properly admitted relevant 
evidence. 
66. In closing argument, the State committed misconduct by shifting the burden of proof. 
The State's argument was based, in part, on the theme that the defense had not proven that 
someone besides Sarah had committed the murders. T Supp. Tr. p. 175-218. 
67. Defense counsel did not object to the above-noted misconduct. 
68. The failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct was deficient performance because 
the misconduct was readily apparent and because there could be no strategic purpose in allowing 
any of this misconduct. 
69. The failure to object at trial prevented a claim of prosecutorial misconduct from 
being raised on appeal. 
70. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should Be Granted On This Basis 
As discussed above, Sarah had state and federal constitutional rights to effective 
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assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra. 
The law on prosecutorial misconduct has long been established: 
... A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." 
It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the 
conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial 
circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to 
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not, 
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce him to endeavor 
to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the 
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same .... 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with 
favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts 
which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a particular 
case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of 
the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which 
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and 
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give 
to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent 
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against 
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them 
from considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also State v. 
Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 
253,268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 (1915). 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct in seeking a conviction based not upon 
the evidence, but rather upon the jury's sympathies for the Johnsons and upon a shifting of the 
burden of proof to Sarah. 
Had counsel objected, his objection would have been sustained, the misconduct would 
21 • DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
25 of 352
• 
have ceased, and a curative instruction would have been given. 
The failure to object was deficient performance. 
Moreover, the deficiency was prejudicial. As discussed above, the physical evidence was 
inconsistent with Sarah's guilt. If Sarah was guilty, she would have had blood residue or tissue 
somewhere on her. The test for blood residue is extremely sensitive (parts per 100,000), and 
shortly after the murders, Sarah (who had not showered) was thoroughly swabbed for blood 
residue, from her face, nostrils, behind her ears and on her hair. These tests were all completely 
negative for blood residue. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the prosecutors who were clearly 
intelligent and powerful advocates for the State would have resorted to misconduct had they not 
entertained fears that a conviction could not be obtained without the misconduct. Lawyers of 
their caliber likely would not have risked the validity of a conviction in this case by foolish 
misconduct in the absence of fears that the evidence alone was not sufficient to gain a conviction. 
Given this state of the evidence, it is reasonably probable that had the prosecutorial misconduct 
been objected to, Sarah would not have been convicted. 
D. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance In Failing To Object To The 
Jury's Trip From Ada County To Bellevue, Idaho To Visit The Johnson House 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
71. During the trial, the jury was taken on a day long bus trip to visit the Johnson house. 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2158, ln. 1-p. 2167, ln. 9. 
72. The Court repeatedly instructed the jury that the trip to the house was not evidence 
and it was not to consider anything it saw there in its deliberations. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2361, ln. 7-p. 
2265, ln. 15. 
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73. Defense counsel waived Sarah's presence during the jury view after the State argued 
that having her at the house would be prejudicial to its case against her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1920, ln. 
13- p. 1922, In. 10. 
74. Sarah did not learn until after the jury had been taken to Bellevue that the viewing 
had occurred. 
75. Defense counsel did not object to the jury trip to the house, nor did counsel object to 
waiving Sarah's state and federal constitutional rights to be present during the proceedings 
against her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1920, ln. 13-p. 1922, ln. 10. 
76. The failure to object to the trip to the house was deficient performance of counsel. 
The trip presented the jury with information that the Court repeatedly told the jury was irrelevant 
to its deliberations, further the trip was highly prejudicial. Had defense counsel objected 
pursuant to IRE 401,402, and 403, the Court would have denied the trip, or in the alternative, the 
issue would have been preserved for appeal where the appellate court would have found non-
harmless error. 
77. Counsel was further deficient in waiving, without her consent, Sarah's constitutional 
rights to be present at the proceedings against her. The State itself noted that Sarah's presence at 
the house would have "prejudiced" its case - i.e., would have made it harder for the State to 
prove its case against Sarah. Yet, Sarah had an absolute right to be present. 
78. The failure of counsel to object prevented the claims from being raised on appeal. 
79. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
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Why Relief Should Be Granted On This Claim 
As discussed above, Sarah had state and federal rights to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland, supra. 
Counsel's performance in not objecting to the jury trip to the Johnson house was deficient 
performance because it was repeatedly stated to counsel by the Court that the trip was not going 
to produce relevant evidence and at the same time, it was obvious that the trip would promote the 
return of a guilty verdict on the basis of matters besides the evidence in case. If counsel would 
have objected pursuant to IRE 402 and 403, the objection would have been granted and the jury 
would not have visited the house, because "evidence" with no probative value cannot possibly 
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Further, this deficient performance was prejudicial. As noted before, the physical 
evidence was not consistent with Sarah's guilt. It was impossible that Sarah could have shot her 
mother and father and not have gotten any blood residue or tissue anywhere on herself. Given 
the state of the physical evidence, it is reasonably probable that had the jury not been taken on the 
trip to the Johnson's home, Sarah would not have been convicted. 
Each Of These Instances Of Deficient Performance of Trial Counsel Was 
Individually and Cumulatively Prejudicial. 
80. As set out above, each of these instances of deficient performance was individually 
prejudicial. 
81. In addition, the cumulative effect of these instances of deficient performance was 
prejudicial insofar as but for the cumulative deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome insofar as it is reasonably probable that the State would have 
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been unable to obtain a conviction when the physical evidence was inconsistent with Sarah being 
present at the time her parents were killed. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel In 
Violation Of The Sixth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 Under 
United States v. Cronic When Her Appointed Counsel Labored Throughout The Proceedings 
Under An Actual Conflict Of Interest 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
82. Sarah was represented at trial and sentencing by Robert Pangburn and Mark Rader 
pursuant to Mr. Pangburn's contract with Blaine County for the provision of indigent criminal 
defense. 
83. Throughout the proceedings, Mr. Pangburn was involved in disputes with the county 
over the interpretation of the contract and whether or not he would be paid. 
84. These disputes began just ten days after Sarah was charged, as documented in the 
hearing held on November 11, 2003. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 1-20. 
85. Even at that early date, Mr. Pangburn alerted the Court that the county contract 
conflicted with the Rules of Professional Conduct in requiring him to provide reports to the 
Court and the County Prosecutor to support his applications for payments of additional fees. T 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 10, ln. 16-p. 11, ln. 8. 
86. Disputes over the county contract continued throughout the representation and two 
years later, at the end of the trial, but prior to the filing of post trial motions and the sentencing, 
the chair of the Board of County Commissioners sent the Court a letter which resulted in the 
Court issuing a "show cause" hearing notice to Mr. Pangburn on April 15, 2005. T Supp. Tr. p. 
406, ln. 11-22. 
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87. At the show cause hearing, the Court revoked the appointment of co-counsel Rader 
and all defense investigators for the remainder of the proceedings against Sarah. T Supp. Tr. p. 
407, ln. 14-16. 
88. At the show cause hearing, Mr. Pangburn alerted the Court that he had concerns that 
information about his reports was being improperly shared from a sealed file. T Supp. Tr. p. 411, 
ln. 20-p. 412, ln. 9. 
89. The State argued that it should have access to all Mr. Pangburn's reports because, 
even though Sarah had not yet been sentenced and was facing the possibility of two terms of 
fixed life being imposed, there were no more strategic decisions to be made in the case. In the 
State's words, "Obviously, that's over." T Supp. Tr. p. 411, ln. 11-18. 
90. Mr. Pangburn alleged at the show cause hearing that the statements in the County's 
letter to the Court were defamatory and wrong. T Supp. Tr. p. 414, ln. 12-17. 
91. Mr. Pangburn further alleged that the County Commissioners had "mounted other 
attacks against me in this case," including not renewing his contract. T Supp. Tr. p. 415, ln. 6-8. 
92. In response, the prosecutor representing the County Commissioners argued to the 
Court that the County's position was that "enough is enough," that the bills submitted to date 
were excessive and that Mr. Pangburn had billed over 1000 hours of attorney time for January 
and February alone. T Supp. Tr. p. 416, ln. 21-p. 417, ln. 5. 
93. In response to these arguments, the Court interpreted the county/public defender 
contract, noting that the disputes had been existent since the beginning of the case, citing a date 
in December of 2004, when Mr. Pangburn interrupted the taking of a verdict in another trial, to 
move to withdraw from representing Sarah due to a contract issue. T Supp. Tr. p. 418, ln. 4-p. 
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421, In. 22. 
94. The Court further commented that Mr. Pangburn had been billing for advice to Sarah 
in the PSI process that the Court did not feel was warranted, including advice and assistance in 
filling out the PSI questionnaire. T Supp. Tr. p. 421, ln. 23-p. 425, ln. 3. 
95. In reviewing and commenting on Mr. Pangburn's work for Sarah between conviction 
and sentencing, the Court noted that it was not making a personal attack on Mr. Pangburn, but 
that this was a matter of fiscal responsibility and the Court's duties under I. C. § 19-850 et. seq. T 
Supp. Tr. p. 423, ln. 14-24. 
96. The Court also noted that there was a long running dispute as to what the rate of 
compensation was. T Supp. Tr. p. 425, In. 4-2. 
97. At that point, the Court also officially opened the sealed file ofreports from Mr. 
Pangburn for inspection by the county with the offer to allow him to seek non-disclosure of 
certain items on an individual basis. T Supp. Tr. p. 427, In. 15-p. 428, In. 5. 
98. The contract disputes generated several memorandums from both the State and 
defense counsel and resulted in two more hearings before Sarah's sentencing hearing on June 29, 
2005. See T Supp. CR Vol. 2, pp. 310-340. 
99. At the hearing on May 3, 2005, the prosecutor referred to undisclosed ongoing 
correspondence between the County Commissioners and Mr. Pangburn. T Supp. Tr. p. 436, In. 
6-13. 
100. In response, the Court stated that it simply was not going to authorize any more 
payments to the defense until after the prosecutor had reviewed Mr. Pangburn's reports on May 
17. T Supp. Tr. p. 436, ln. 24-p. 437, ln. 9. 
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101. On November 2, 2005, the Court entered a 37 page order governing further 
proceedings on claimed attorneys fees and expenses. T Supp CR Vol. 2, pp. 341-378. 
102. This order documents the history of fee and billing disputes that continued 
throughout Mr. Pangburn's representation of Sarah. Id. 
103. Yet another hearing was held on payment for Mr. Pangburn and the defense team on 
November 23, 2005. T Supp CR Vol. 2, pp. 382-3. 
104. On January 31, 2006, the Court entered its final order regarding attorneys fees. In 
this order, the Court required Mr. Pangburn to immediately return to Blaine County any sums 
over $65.00 per hour that it had paid him; reduced his bill for time spent preparing billings and 
for time billed for his associate attorney; and reduced Mr. Pangburn's billing in other ways (for 
example deducting time Mr. Pangburn billed for researching the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
T Supp CR pp. 401-410. 
105. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not raising this conflict as part of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the original petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, § 13, guarantee the right to counsel. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-96 (1963). This right to counsel 
contemplates that counsel's assistance shall be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order 
requiring that one lawyer simultaneously represent conflicting interests. Glasser v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 60, 69-70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464-65 (1942), superseded on other grounds as stated 
in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987), and Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 313-20, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). The right to assistance ofunconflicted counsel is so 
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fundamental that prejudice from its denial need not be shown. Id., 315 U.S. at 75-76, 62 S.Ct. at 
467-468. See also, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (1980) (prejudice is 
presumed when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest); and United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648,662, n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2049, n. 31 (1984). 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (2002), holds that in order to 
demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential 
conflict of interest based upon prior representation of the victim of the current criminal charges a 
petitioner must establish that the conflict adversely affected the representation. The question of 
whether a government created conflict through the payment system established for appointed 
counsel requires a showing of adverse impact or not has not been resolved by the Supreme Court. 
In this case, Sarah's counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest which had an adverse 
impact on her representation. 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2) states that a concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if there is a significant risk that the representation of a client will be materially limited by a 
lawyer's responsibilities to a third party. Comment 13 to the Rule states that a lawyer may be 
paid by a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the 
arrangements does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the 
client. 
In this case, there was a conflict under RPC 1.7(a)(2) because there was no evidence that 
Sarah was informed and consented to the payment scheme established by Blaine County and her 
attorney, and further, and most importantly, the arrangement did compromise her lawyer's duty 
of loyalty insofar as in order to be paid, her counsel made reports to the county in violation of 
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RPC 1.6 regarding confidentiality of information. In assessing this, it is important to note that 
Sarah's lawyer did not just send the county a bill setting out the hours spent and seeking 
compensation; rather, he sent detailed reports explaining what was done during each billed hour. 
Such was a violation of the duty of confidentiality. 
At least one other conflict of interest existed in the fee arrangement between the county 
and Sarah's attorney. The arrangement resulted in a violation of RPC 1.8(f) which provides: 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
than the client unless: 
(1) the client gives informed consent; 
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by 
Rule 1.6. 
Sarah did not give informed consent; there was an interference with the client-lawyer 
relationship insofar as her counsel was tom between his duty to refrain from revealing 
confidential information to the county, his desire to be paid, his duty to zealously represent Sarah 
and his time spent arguing with the county about his billings. Also, much of the information 
relating to his representation of Sarah was not protected, but rather was revealed to the county 
and to the judge. 
There was a conflict and there was an adverse impact on Sarah's representation insofar as 
confidential information was revealed to the county throughout the proceedings. Therefore, post-
conviction relief should now be granted. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel On 
Direct Appeal As Guaranteed By The Sixth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Article I, 
Section 13 
A. Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise the District Court Error in Denying 
The Motion to Suppress the Testimony of Malinda Gonzales was Ineffective. 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
106. Trial counsel moved to suppress statements Sarah allegedly made to her cellmate 
Malinda Gonzales (while Sarah was being illegally held in the Blaine County adult jail with an 
adult cellmate) on the grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of her constitutional 
rights to remain silent and upon the grounds that the State should not be allowed to profit by 
using statements obtained during Sarah's illegal detention in an adult jail with convicted and 
charged adult prisoners. Motion To Suppress Defendant's Statements to Jail Inmates, T CR Vol. 
2, p. 360. 
107. Following a hearing, the District Court found that Sarah's detention violated Idaho 
law, but that the remedy is not the exclusion of the alleged incriminated statements, as that would 
not further the object of the state statutes prohibiting the incarceration of juveniles with adults. 
Order on Defendant's Motion To Suppress Defendant's Statement To Jail Inmates, Ex._ Vol. 
3, p. 455. 
108. Petitioner appealed from the judgment and sentence. 
109. The State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Petitioner on 
appeal. 
110. Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal. 
111. Had the issue been raised on appeal, relief would have been granted. 
112. The failure to raise this issue was deficient performance. 
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113. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this 
successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on This Claim 
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the direct appeal of the conviction. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985). 
With regard to Sarah's motion to suppress statements allegedly made to Malinda 
Gonzales, the district court found that Sarah's pre-trial incarceration with adult offenders was 
illegal, but held that the remedy was not suppression of her statements. Appellate counsel did 
not raise the issue on appeal. 
The question of whether suppression of statements of juveniles illegally held in adult jails 
is proper is an open question in Idaho. However, as noted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47: 
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the 
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably 
trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable 
expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They 
tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege 
reflects the limits of the individual's attomment to the state and - in a 
philosophical sense - insists upon the equality of the individual and the state. In 
other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which 
prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because 
coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes 
is to prevent the state, whether by force or psychological domination, from 
overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him 
of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction. 
In illegally confining Sarah in an adult jail and then using statements she allegedly made 
to her adult cellmate against her at trial, the State violated Sarah's constitutional right against 
self-incrimination because Sarah spoke to the adult inmate only through the force and 
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psychological domination of the State in illegally imprisoning her. Moreover, the statements, if 
any were actually made, were untrustworthy as they were the fruit of fear and coercion - the fear 
and coercion experienced by a sixteen year old girl in an adult jail in direct contact with male and 
female adult prisoners - induced by the State's clear violation of the law. 
The district court found that the proper remedy would not be exclusion of the statements 
because "it would not further the essential object of these statutes." However, the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter illegal state conduct. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968), 
stressing that the exclusionary rule's major purpose is to deter lawless police conduct. The rule 
also serves the purposes of "the imperative of judicial integrity" in keeping courts from becoming 
accomplices to willful disobedience of the constitution and laws they are sworn to uphold. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960). And, finally, the 
exclusionary rule serves to assure the people - all potential victims of unlawful government 
conduct - that the government will not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk 
of seriously undermining trust in government. See State v. Koivu, 3 8106, 2012 WL 665990 * 5 
(Idaho Mar. 1, 2012); ("In [State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43,254 P. 788 (1927)] the Court made it 
clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because it was obtained in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 
(197 4) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
Indeed, the federal courts and other state courts have held that suppression is the proper 
remedy for evidence obtained as a result of police violation of state statutes in the handling of 
those accused of crimes. See State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586,593,586 P.2d 671,678 (1978) 
(suppression appropriate remedy for violation of the "knock and announce" statute); United 
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States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (suppression required where police violated 
statute which required giving defendant opportunity to post collateral for minor offense); State v. 
Caldera, 929 P .2d 482 (Wash. App. 1997) ( suppression required where police violated a statute 
requiring the officer to read an arrest warrant and allow the defendant an opportunity to post 
bail); People v. Greenwood, 484 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1971) (suppression required where officer 
erroneously advised defendant as to amount of bond he would have to post for automobile 
violations). 
The district court erred in its determination of the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Had 
the court analyzed the suppression decision under the actual purposes of the rule - deterrence of 
illegal police conduct, the imperative of judicial integrity, and the assurance to the public that the 
state will not profit from illegal conduct - the statements obtained from Sarah while she was in 
the Blaine County jail in violation of Idaho law would have been suppressed on the grounds 
raised by trial counsel. Reasonable appellate counsel would have raised this claim on appeal. 
Appellate relief would have been granted because the district court erred in not suppressing the 
statements and the error was not harmless as Malinda Gonzales' testimony was the only 
testimony in the entire case that could have been construed by the jury as any sort of a 
confession. In light of the lack of any blood residue on Sarah, the case for conviction was thin 
and it cannot be said that use of the statements at trial was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S.18(1967). 
B. Appellate Counsel's Failure to Argue that the Fixed Life Sentences Were 
Both Excessive and Unconstitutional was Ineffective. 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
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114. Petitioner was sentenced to two terms of fixed life even though she was sixteen 
years old at the time the offenses were committed. 
115. Appellate counsel did not argue on appeal that the fixed life sentences were 
excessive given the facts of the case or that the sentences constituted unconstitutional cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteen Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 6. 
116. The failure to raise these claims on appeal was deficient performance. 
117. Had appellate counsel raised either argument, the Idaho Supreme Court would have 
granted her sentencing relief. 
118. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not raising an ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claim for failing to argue the excessive and unconstitutional sentence claims in 
the original petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
Sarah's counsel in direct appeal also rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue 
that her sentences were excessive and unconstitutional. In particular, counsel was ineffective in 
not arguing that the two fixed life terms with a fifteen year enhancement were excessive as, given 
Sarah's youth and her previously non-existent criminal record, the sentences were excessive 
under any reasonable view of the evidence. The terms of confinement clearly exceeded that 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). See also, State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48, 53,266 P.3d 1153, 
1158 (Ct. App. 2011). 
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At age 16, Sarah was still a child. She had no prior crimes of any sort. A fixed term 
short of her entire life would certainly be sufficient to insure public safety. In a number of years, 
after she reached adulthood, the parole board could examine her record in prison and determine if 
and when she would pose no danger to society if released from prison. 
And, deterrence is equally well served by a fixed sentence followed by an indeterminate 
term of life, as a fixed life term. 
Likewise, any rehabilitative programs most surely can be completed well before the 
natural expiration of a 16-year-old' s life. 
And, while Sarah's family was indeed anxious for retribution on her, fixed life for a child 
is a sentence in excess of any rational and reasonable notice of retribution. 
Had Sarah's direct appeal counsel raised the issue of excessive sentence, appellate relief 
would have been granted. 
Moreover, appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising a claim that Sarah's sentences 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Idaho Const. Article I, § 6 which prohibit the 
imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. The question of whether a fixed life sentence 
imposed on a juvenile violates federal constitutional protections is currently pending before the 
United States Supreme Court in two cases: Miller v. Alabama, SCT Docket Number 10-9646, 
and Jackson v. Hobbs, Docket Number 10-964 7, argued March 20, 2012. 
Had Sarah's appellate counsel raised the constitutional claim, either relief would have 
been granted in the Idaho appellate court or certiorari would have been granted in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Therefore, post-conviction relief should be granted on this claim. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Due Process Of Law As Guaranteed 
By The Fifth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 When The State 
Withheld The Material Exculpatory Evidence That The Fingerprints Found On The Rifle, 
Scope, And Ammunition Box Insert Had Been Run Through AFIS And Matched To 
Christopher Hill - Brady v. Maryland 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
119. After the trial, the state matched previously unidentified fingerprints on the murder 
weapon, its scope and its ammunition to Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle who lived in 
the Johnson guesthouse. 
120. This evidence was exculpatory because it tended to show that Mr. Hill and not 
Petitioner was the one who shot Diane and Alan Johnson. 
121. The state did not tum over this evidence to Petitioner once it was discovered. 
122. Rather, a former employee of the Idaho State Police, Robert Kerchusky, learned of 
the information by informally inquiring of Maria Eguren, an employee of the state crime lab. 
123. Ms. Eguren later testified that she knew of the identification and had not told Mr. 
Kerchusky about it, but that the information accidently "slipped out" after "several 
conversations" with Mr. Kerchusky. EH T pg. 767, In. 14. 
124. The withholding of exculpatory information from Petitioner violated her right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and its progeny. 
125. Post-conviction counsel did not raise a Brady claim in the original petition. 
126. Instead he raised a newly discovered evidence claim based upon Mr. Kerchusky's 
discovery. 
127. This Court denied the claim because it found the newly discovered evidence was 
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not likely to result in an acquittal. 
128. It was ineffective of post-conviction counsel to fail to raise the claim as a Brady 
claim because the petitioner's burden of proof in a Brady claim is lower than the burden of proof 
in a newly discovered evidence claim. 
129. Had post-conviction counsel alleged a Brady claim, this court would have granted 
relief because there is a reasonable probability that the withheld evidence would have caused a 
different result. 
Why Relief Should be Granted as to this Claim 
Brady v. Maryland, supra, holds that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Brady 
doctrine has been expanded to include instances where the exculpatory evidence was never 
requested, or requested only in a general way. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part of the 
prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. The Supreme Court has 
written that "the rule encompasses evidence 'known only to police investigators and not to the 
prosecutor.' In order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this 
case, including the police."' Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,280 (1999), quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (internal citation omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so 
heavily on the police and other law enforcement authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady 
would be largely ineffective if those other members of the prosecution team had no responsibility 
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to inform the prosecutor about evidence that undermined the state's preferred theory of the 
crime." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 377 (61h Cir. 2009). Finally, the state's 
obligation under Brady continued past the trial and sentencing. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 
746, 749-750 (91h Cir. 1992) (Brady duty continues into post-conviction proceedings). 
In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: "The evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the 
defendant "ifthere is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 437 (1995). Sarah is only required to show that there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result. She is not required to show that it is more likely than not that she would have 
been acquitted, as she was during the newly discovered evidence proceedings. It is clear that 
Brady sets a lower bar than a newly discovered evidence motion because the "likely to result in 
an acquittal" standard was specifically rejected in Strickland in favor of the reasonable 
probability of a different result test found in Brady: "On the other hand, we believe that a 
defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome in the case." Id., pg. 693. Here, all three Brady requirements have been met. The 
withheld evidence regarding the fingerprint evidence was exculpatory. And, the withholding of 
that evidence from the jury undermines confidence in the jury's not fully informed verdict. 
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As Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel In The Original Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief, The Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims and the Brady Claim May Be 
Raised In A Successive Petition. Further, This Petition Is Timely. 
Relevant Facts 
130. Proceedings on Sarah's original petition for post-conviction relief have not been 
completed as the case remains pending in the Supreme Court. 
131. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood following the State's denial of due process by discarding the 
comforter was not raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
132. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence regarding 
Janet Sylten's parole status at the time of the Johnsons' murders was not raised in the original or 
amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
133. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct throughout the trial was not raised in the original or amended petition for post-
conviction relief. 
134. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury's trip from 
Ada County to Bellevue to visit the Johnson house was not raised in the original or amended 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
135. The claim that Sarah was denied effective assistance of counsel when her appointed 
counsel labored throughout the proceedings under an actual conflict was interest was not raised 
in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
136. The claim that Sarah was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in the 
direct appeal was not raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
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13 7. The claim that Sarah was denied due process when the State withheld the material 
exculpatory evidence that the fingerprints found on the rifle, scope and ammunition box insert 
had been run through AFIS and matched to Christopher Hill - Brady claim, was not raised in the 
original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
138. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these claims in the 
original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
Argument 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and indicates that 
successive petitions for post-conviction relief are generally not permissible unless the court finds 
a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended petition. 
Deficient representation by counsel in an initial post-conviction proceeding that causes a 
claim to be inadequately presented to the court, constitutions a "sufficient reason" to allow 
assertion of the claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. See, 
e.g. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct. App. 2008); Baker v. State, 
143 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P .3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). 
As set out in Schwartz: 
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an application 
for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the 
determination of a proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later. The 
appeal referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case. 
The failure to file a timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. 
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been 
concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year 
limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient 
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reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel 
may provide sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or 
allegations inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a 
subsequent post-conviction application. Additionally, when a second or 
successive application is presented because the initial application was summarily 
dismissed due to the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction counsel, 
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. This is so because failing to 
provide a post-conviction application with a meaningful opportunity to have his or 
her claims presented may be violative of due process. 
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The determination of what is a reasonable time for filing a successive petition is to be 
considered on a case by case basis. Id., at 190, 177 P.3d at 404, citing Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). 
When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a basis for 
bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is "whether the second [petition] has raised 
not merely a question of counsel's performance but substantive grounds for relief from the 
conviction and sentence." Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987). Thus, to 
overcome summary dismissal, a petitioner must allege that the claims raised in the successive 
petition were either not raised or inadequately asserted in the original post-conviction action due 
to the ineffective assistance of original post-conviction counsel and a valid underlying claim for 
post-conviction relief. Nguyen, 126 Idaho at 496, 887 P.2d at 41. 
This, Sarah has done. She has alleged that her original post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective. In particular, counsel was ineffective insofar as it was deficient performance to fail 
to raise the meritorious claims that Sarah is now raising in this successive petition and that 
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deficiency was prejudicial because had counsel raised these claims, post-conviction relief would 
have been granted. Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
Moreover, Sarah is raising these claims in a timely manner. The appeal from the denial 
ofrelief is still pending. It is not unreasonable in terms of timeliness to file a successive petition 
even before litigation has concluded on the original petition. Indeed, the language of Schwartz 
quoted above anticipates that a "reasonable time" will not expire until sometime after the 
proceedings in the original petition are concluded. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
1. That counsel be appointed to assist her in the prosecution of this action; 
2. That the judgment of conviction be vacated and that a new trial be granted; and/or 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this 6~ day of April, 2012. 
~~~1~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Pro Bono Attorneys for Sarah Johnson 
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VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Sarah Johnson, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and that the matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief. 
r the State of Idaho 
) .. . 
\ C,. 1 , 1 i l l \I i-\) 
My commission expires: u .. 1 ~ •.. 1 ·3 
D ELLY-;;~~:;---]· otary P11hltc 
ate of Idaho 
.,;;;:;;;;:::;;;;;.--ft~"'·;~.,_,."'~"ll!'!""=--=-=;;;:;: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6 ~day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jim Thomas 
Blaine Co. Prosecutor 
201 Second Ave S., Suite 100 
Hailey, ID E3333 
Jessica Lorello 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Ll,e~~~~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 33312 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, May 2008 Term 
) 
v. ) 2008 Opinion No. 89 
) 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, ) Filed: June 26, 2008 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State ofldaho, Blaine 
County. Hon. R. Barry Wood, District Judge. 
District court conviction of first-degree murder, affirmed. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jason 
Curtis Pintler, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. 
Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General argued. 
BURDICK, Justice 
Appellant Sarah Marie Johnson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. 
Johnson appeals her conviction. We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 2, 2003, Alan and Diane Johnson (the Johnsons) were shot and died in 
their home. Subsequently, the Johnsons' sixteen year old daughter, Sarah Johnson (Johnson), 
was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. A jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree 
murder of both Alan and Diane Johnson. The district court sentenced Johnson to concurrent life 
sentences, plus fifteen years under I.C. § 19-2520 for a firearm enhancement. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Johnson raises four issues on appeal. Johnson argues that because aiding and abetting 
was not charged in the charging document, the district court's instruction to the jury on aiding 
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and abetting constructively amended the charging document and resulted in a fatal variance. 
Johnson also argues she was deprived of her constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict 
because the district court did not instruct the jury it must unanimously agree on whether Johnson 
actually killed the Johnsons or whether she aided and abetted in the killing of the Johnsons. 
Finally, Johnson argues her constitutional rights were violated when the district court failed to 
remove a certain juror from the jury pool or obtain an unequivocal commitment that the juror 
would follow all of the court's instructions. We address each issue in turn. 
A. Constructive Amendment and Variance 
Johnson asserts that the charging document did not support a jury instruction on aiding 
and abetting, and that consequently, the jury instruction constituted an impermissible variance or 
a constructive amendment. 1 Whether there is a variance or constructive amendment is a question 
of law over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565, 
861 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ct. App. 1993). 
A variance between the charging document and the verdict is fatal when "the record 
suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or 
presentation of his defense." State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418, 716 P .2d 1182, 1190 (1985) 
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935)). Johnson argues there is a variance 
because the facts the jury would have to find to convict Johnson of aiding and abetting differ 
from the facts alleged in the indictment. Johnson further argues this variance was fatal because it 
prejudiced her in the preparation and presentation of her defense. 
A constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the charging document 
have been altered literally or in effect. United States v. Dipentino, 242 F .3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2001). The constructive amendment doctrine springs from the Fifth Amendment right to 
indictment by a grand jury. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960). The Fifth 
Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury is not a due process right that applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972). 
Nonetheless, the Idaho Constitution contains a provision with similar wording to the Fifth 
Amendment, on which the constructive amendment prohibition is based.2 See Idaho Const. art I, 
I 
On appeal, Johnson does not argue there was insufficient evidence to support the giving of the aiding and abetting 
instruction. 
2 Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
2 
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§ 8. The Idaho Court of Appeals has appropriately applied the constructive amendment analysis 
to this Idaho constitutional provision. See Colwell, 124 Idaho at 566, 861 P .2d at 1231. 
Johnson argues that in Idaho the charging document must contain facts showing the 
defendant aided and abetted, and that the failure to charge aiding and abetting in the indictment 
was a violation of due process. 
1. Idaho Code § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) are not in conflict. 
Johnson asserts there was a constructive amendment because the jury was asked to 
determine whether the State proved an element not charged in the indictment. Johnson argues 
that aiding and abetting contains a separate mens rea element-a community of purpose in the 
unlawful undertaking-and a separate actus reus element-proof that the defendant participated 
in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. However, this argument overlooks 
Idaho's statutory abolition of the distinction between accessories and principals. 
Idaho Code § 19-1430 provides: 
Distinction between accessories and principals abolished. - The 
distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between 
principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all 
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit 
the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not 
present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no 
other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are 
required in an indictment against his principal. 
Thus, Idaho, consistent with many other jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction 
between principals and aiders and abettors, and instead treats aiding and abetting as a theory 
under which first-degree murder can be proved and not as a separate offense or a crime of a 
different nature. See State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 25, 211 P .2d 142, 145 (1949) (holding the 
Prosecution only by indictment or information.-No person shall be held to answer for any 
felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on 
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate, except in cases of 
impeachment, in cases cognizable by probate courts or by justices of the peace, and in cases 
arising in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; provided, that a grand 
jury may be summoned upon the order of the district court in the manner provided by law, and 
provided further, that after a charge has been ignored by a grand jury, no person shall be held to 
answer, or for trial therefor, upon information of public prosecutor. 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment ofa Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... 
3 
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information charges one offense (involuntary manslaughter) and that it was sufficient to put 
defendant on trial upon either the theory that he was a principal or the theory that he was an aider 
and abettor); see also, e.g., United States v. Ginyard, 511 F.3d 203, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
("Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense; it is only a theory of liability-one ground upon 
which the jury may find him liable for the charged offense."); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 
377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense); 
Londono-Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 699 F.2d 475, 476 (9th Cir. I 983) 
("[T]he aiding and abetting statute does not define a separate offense but rather makes 
punishable as a principal one who aids or abets another in the commission of a substantive 
offense."). 
However, Johnson argues the last clause of I.C. § 19-1430, which states that it is 
unnecessary to allege facts other than what is required in a charging document against a 
principal, is procedural, is in conflict with I.C.R. 7, and thus, is of no effect. Idaho Criminal 
Rule 7(b) provides that "[t]he indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." 
When a statute and rule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict 
between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a 
conflict." See State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 543, 700 P.2d 942, 946 (1985) (Bakes, J., 
dissenting). 
Here, the statute and the rule, I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7, can be reasonably interpreted 
so that there is no conflict between them. Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b) requires the charging 
document be "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged." Idaho Code § 19-1430 then provides that in the case of aiding and 
abetting, the "essential facts" are only those facts that are required in charging the principal. 
Thus, the rule and the statute can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between 
them. 
Furthermore, even if a conflict did exist between I.C.R. 7 and I.C. § 19-1430, the statute 
would prevail. When there is a conflict between a statute and a criminal rule, this Court must 
determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance; if the conflict is 





Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between 
what is substantive and what is procedural, the following general guidelines 
provide a useful framework for analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for 
societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, 
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the 
essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive Jaw, rights, 
and remedies are effectuated. 
Id. at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93 (emphasis removed) (quoting Currington, I 08 Idaho at 541, 
700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wash. 1974))). "[L]egislation is 
a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact substantive law [and] that legislation 
is to be given due deference and respect." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 
P .2d 614, 623 (1995). 
Johnson argues that although the first part of LC. § 19-1430 is substantive, the last clause 
stating "no other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are 
required in an indictment against his principal," is procedural. However, the last clause pertains 
more than to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts; it is defining and regulating the 
mechanism for giving the defendant notice when that defendant committed a felony as an 
accessory. The statute abrogates the distinction between principals and accessories and 
mandates the defendant "be prosecuted, tried, and punished as [a] principal[] .... " LC. § 19-
1430. A conclusion that the entire statute is substantive is further supported by LC. § 18-204, 
which defines principals as: "[a]II persons concerned in the commission of a crime ... whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission .... " 
Together, I.C. § 18-204 and I.C. § 19-1430 show a legislative intent to consider defendants as 
principals whether they directly committed the crime or aided and abetted in the commission of 
the crime. The Legislature's definition of principal and abolishment of the distinction between 
principal and accessories does not pertain to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature 
is creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive and does 
not overlap with this Court's power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I.C. § 19-1430 
and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail. 
In conclusion, we hold that there is no conflict between J.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b ), 
that I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive, and that in Idaho, it is unnecessary to allege any facts in the 
charging document other than what is required in a charging document against a principal. 




Johnson also asserts her due process rights were violated by the lack of reference to 
aiding and abetting in the charging document. 
First, relying on Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F .3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), Johnson argues the notice 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment must come from the charging document itself. Gault 
recognizes the Sixth Amendment's and Fourteenth Amendment's right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the charges made in order to adequately prepare a defense. Id. at 1002-03. 
The Ninth Circuit expressed doubt that sources outside the charging document could provide the 
necessary notice. However, Gautt does not actually hold sources outside the charging document 
cannot ever provide the necessary notice. Id. at 1010 ("[F]or purposes of our analysis today, we 
will assume-without deciding-that such sources can be parsed for evidence of notice to the 
defendant .... "). 
Moreover, in Gault, the Ninth Circuit was looking at notice of the actual underlying 
charge and not a theory of liabilty; the Ninth Circuit observed that a court can look to sources 
outside the charging document to determine whether a defendant had adequate notice of a 
particular theory of the case. Id. at 1009 (citing Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 953-54 
(9th Cir. 2001), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant charged with first-degree 
murder was provided constitutionally sufficient notice to support a felony murder jury 
instruction). Here, aiding and abetting was not the actual underlying charge, it was a theory of 
liability. 3 See Ayres, 70 Idaho at 25,211 P.2d at 145. 
Second, Johnson argues the facts constituting the cnme of aiding and abetting are 
elements, and thus, must be charged in the charging document in order to meet due process 
requirements. Johnson asserts the charging document must contain the elements of the offense 
and that a defendant must be put on notice of all of the elements of the crime essential to the 
punishment sought to be inflicted. For support Johnson cites to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 510-18 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,232 
(1999), where the Court stated: "Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an 
3 Therefore, Johnson's reliance on Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) is misplaced. In Cole, the Court held the 
Fourteenth Amendment was violated when the defendants were charged with violating a certain subsection of a state 
act but had their conviction upheld based on a different subsection of the state act. Id. at 198-99. However, there 
the Court held the two subsections created separate offenses. Id. at 201 n.4. That is not the case here where the 




offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt." 
The Tenth Circuit considered and rejected the same argument Johnson makes here. See 
United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 315 
(2006). In Alexander the Tenth Circuit considered Jones and Apprendi and held that "a charge 
of the predicate crime puts defendant on notice that the jury may be instructed on aiding and 
abetting, thus satisfying any due process concerns." Id. at 1299; see also United States v. 
Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding Apprendi does not upset the long-standing 
practice of giving aiding and abetting jury instructions even when that theory is not charged in 
the indictment; thus, there is no Fifth Amendment violation). Johnson asserts Alexander is 
unpersuasive because it distinguishes Jones and Apprendi on the basis that those cases addressed 
what is required to increase a punishment. However, Alexander's holding did not depend upon 
that distinction; it held that due process was satisfied because the defendant had notice of the 
predicate crime and because aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but is a variant of the 
underlying offense. 44 7 F .3d at 1299. 
In Idaho there is no distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and it is 
unnecessary the charging document allege any facts other than what is necessary to convict a 
principal. l.C. § 19-1430. Johnson contends that in light of Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Ayres and its progeny should be overruled because Ayres, which bases its ruling 
on LC. § 19-1430, "in essence, holds that the Idaho Legislature can legislate away the rights of 
individuals protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Many jurisdictions have held that it is unnecessary to charge aiding and abetting in the 
charging document and that there is no due process violation when a court gives an aiding and 
abetting jury instruction even when aiding and abetting is not charged in the charging document. 
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We have also held a 
number of times in different contexts that aiding and abetting is embedded in every federal 
indictment for a substantive crime."); United States v. Dodd, 43 F.3d 759, 762 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(stating it is not necessary to plead an aiding and abetting charge because that charge is implicit 
in all indictments for substantive offenses); United States v. Clark, 980 F .2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 
1992) ("It is well established that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting even 




count, whether implicit or explicit.") (citation omitted); United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 
1528 (11th Cir. 1990) ("One who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence 
showing only that he aided and abetted the offense."); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F .2d 1107, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 1980) ("[T]he giving of an aiding and abetting instruction does not violate due process 
where the state has abolished the distinction between principals and accessories, and where there 
is evidence before the jury to support the instruction."); United States v. Beardslee, 609 F.2d 
914, 919 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the argument that defendant's due process rights were 
violated by an aiding and abetting instruction when the indictment did not explicitly charge him 
with aiding and abetting); Glass v. United States, 328 F .2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1964) (holding 
there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not 
charged with aiding and abetting because "[a]iders and abettors ... are chargeable directly as 
principals."); People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 433 n.12 (Cal. 1989) ("[I]n California the 
definition of a principal has historically included those who aid and abet ... and notice as a 
principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider or abettor."); Hoskins v. State, 441 
N.E.2d 419,425 (Ind. 1982) ("One can be charged as a principal and convicted on proof that he 
aided or abetted another in committing the crime."); State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 
1994) (holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of 
aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting); 
State v. Pennington, 869 P.2d 624, 629 (Kan. 1994) (holding defendant's due process rights were 
not violated by a jury instruction on aiding and abetting; it is unnecessary for the State to charge 
aiding and abetting in the charging document in order to pursue that theory at trial); People v. 
Rivera, 646 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (N.Y. 1995) ("Traditionally, it has been permissible to charge 
and admit evidence convicting a defendant as an accessory where an indictment charges only 
conduct as a principal"); State v. Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 304, 305 (S.D. 1978) ("It is settled law 
that a conviction may be supported by proof that the defendant was an aider and abettor even 
though the charging instrument charges him as a principal."). 
Therefore, because Idaho has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and 
abettors, and because it is well-established in Idaho that it is unnecessary to charge the defendant 
with aiding and abetting, we hold there was no variance, constructive amendment, or due process 
violation. Moreover, even if there were a variance, Johnson was not prejudiced in the 
preparation of her defense. First, the State did not introduce evidence of a possible third party 
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shooter; rather, it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter. 
Second, the State's proposed jury instructions submitted before trial included a jury instruction 
on aiding and abetting. Thus, Johnson was not misled or embarrassed in the preparation of her 
defense. 
B. Unanimity Instruction 
Johnson contends the district court erred in failing to give an instruction requiring the 
basis for the jury's verdict (aider and abettor or principal) be a unanimous decision.4 Johnson 
acknowledges she did not request this instruction below but contends the issue can be raised on 
appeal because the absence of the instruction was fundamental error. 
Though I.C.R. 30(b) requires objections to jury instructions be made below, this Court 
reviews fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence of an objection below. State 
v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, _, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). To determine whether there was 
fundamental error, the Court must first determine whether there was any error. Id. at _, 170 
P.3d at 891. In this case, as there is no error, there can be no fundamental error. 
"When reviewing jury instructions, this Court must determine whether 'the instructions, 
as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law."' State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003) (quoting Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 
136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002)). An erroneous instruction is reversible error only 
when "the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Id. 
In all felony cases, the jury's verdict must be a unanimous verdict. Idaho Const. art I, § 
8; State v. Scheminisky, 31 Idaho 504, 508, 174 P. 611, 612 (1918), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 62, 383 P.2d 326, 333 (1963). 
Johnson relies on a line of cases from the Idaho Court of Appeals which hold that "[a] 
specific unanimity instruction is required ... when it appears ... that a conviction may occur as 
the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts." State v. 
Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004); see also State v. Montoya, 140 
Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-68, 
16 P.3d 937, 943-44 (Ct. App. 2000). However, these cases do not support Johnson's argument. 
In those cases the defendants were charged with various sex crimes. In each case there was 
4 The district court did instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. 
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evidence of more than one criminal act on each count. Thus, the court required that when 
"several distinct criminal acts support one count, jury unanimity must be protected by the state's 
election of the act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying instruction requiring 
the jurors to unanimously agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Gain, 140 Idaho at 173, 90 P .3d at 923 ( emphasis in original). This is not a 
case where there was "evidence of more criminal acts than have been charged." See Montoya, 
140 Idaho at 167, 90 P.3d at 917; see also Miller, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. Here, only 
one criminal act was charged-first-degree murder-and there was no evidence presented of 
additional criminal acts. 
Schadv. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), a United States Supreme Court plurality opinion 
as to the unanimity issue, supports a conclusion that a specific unanimity instruction was not 
necessary. Schad challenged his first-degree murder conviction because the jury was not 
instructed to unanimously agree on the alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder. 5 
Id. at 630. The plurality recognized that jurors need not reach agreement on the preliminary 
factual issues underlying the verdict. Id. at 632. To determine whether the absence of the 
specific unanimity instruction violated the defendant's due process, the plurality looked at 
whether there was "an immaterial difference as to mere means" or whether there was "a material 
difference requiring separate theories of crime to be treated as separate offenses subject to 
separate jury findings." 6 Id. at 633. The plurality noted: 
[W]e are not free to substitute our own interpretations of state statutes for those of 
a State's courts. If a State's courts have determined that certain statutory 
alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than 
independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at liberty to ignore that 
determination and conclude that the alternatives are, in fact, independent elements 
under state law. 
Id. at 636. Here, the Idaho legislature has abolished all distinction between principals and aiders 
and abettors, LC. § 19-1430, and this Court treats aiding and abetting as a theory and not as a 
5 The plurality noted this right can be analyzed under the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict or under 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. at 635 n.5. The plurality concluded "the right is more 
accurately characterized as a due process right than as one under the Sixth Amendment." Id. 
6 In a majority opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court later cited Schad with approval to support the proposition that "a 
federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a 
particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime." 
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 ( 1999). 
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separate offense with distinct elements, see Ayres, 70 Idaho at 25,211 P.2d at 145. Thus, there is 
no basis for a specific unanimity instruction. 
Likewise, several other jurisdictions have held that it is unnecessary to provide a specific 
unanimity instruction when a defendant can be convicted of an offense based on actions as a 
principal or as an aider and abettor. 7 Garcia, 400 F .3d at 819-20; United States v. Horton, 921 
F.2d 540, 545-46 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d 959,961 (8th Cir. 1987) 
("Even if the jury was divided on whether [the defendant] committed the principal crime or aided 
or abetted in its commission, there can be no question that the illegal act was murder."); People 
v. Maury, 68 P.3d 1, 59-60 (Cal. 2003); State v. Martinez, 900 A.2d 485, 494-95 (Conn. 2006); 
Simms v. United States, 634 A.2d 442, 445-46 (D.C. 1993); State v. Allen, 453 S.E.2d 150, 159-
60 (N.C. 1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. 1997); 
Holland v. State, 280 N. W .2d 288, 292-93 (Wis. 1979). 
Therefore, we conclude it is unnecessary to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as 
to the theoretical basis for committing the offense (aider and abettor or principal) because aiding 
and abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive crime. Consequently, the district 
court's failure to instruct the jury to the contrary was not error. 
C. Juror 85 
Johnson argues that the district court's failure to remove Juror 85 from the jury pool or its 
failure to obtain an unequivocal assurance from Juror 85 that he would follow all of the district 
court's instructions was error. 
During voir dire, Juror 85 expressed a concern that "if evidence was presented by a 
specialist, and then for some reason [the court] would tell [the jury] to completely disregard that, 
and [he] felt that it was good evidence, then [he] [doesn't] know if [he] could completely 
disregard it." 
The State argues Johnson has waived her right to raise this issue on appeal because she 
did not make a challenge below. Johnson responds that the information regarding Juror 85 did 
not come forth until after she had already passed the panel for cause and that, in any case, this 
Court can consider the issue because it constitutes fundamental error. 
7 Johnson argues cases from other jurisdictions are not persuasive because they do not analyze the right to a 
unanimous jury verdict provided by the Idaho Constitution. However, these cases reiterate the applicable principle 
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This Court has held that the failure to challenge a juror for cause "indicates a satisfaction 
with the jury as finally constituted." State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 243, 460 P.2d 374, 378 (I 969). 
Furthermore, on appeal a defendant cannot claim dissatisfaction with the jury panel when the 
defendant "failed to exhaust the means available to her to exclude unacceptable jurors .... " See 
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493,501,660 P.2d 1336, 1344 (1983). 
Johnson argues she had passed the panel for cause before Juror 85 revealed he might 
have difficulty disregarding certain evidence. It is true that Johnson passed the panel for cause 
just prior to Juror 85's statement. Nonetheless, after Johnson passed the panel for cause, the trial 
court asked the potential jurors whether there was any reason they could not sit as fair and 
impartial jurors. Juror 85 then voiced his concern, as did several other jurors. The trial court 
communicated those jurors' concerns with the attorneys and gave them the opportunity to again 
question the jurors who had voiced concerns. This questioning was to take place outside of the 
presence of the other jurors. Counsel for both sides stated that they did not wish to further 
question Juror 85. Counsel then questioned other jurors and after further questioning had the 
opportunity to object to those jurors remaining on the panel. Thus, both attorneys were given the 
opportunity to again challenge for cause those jurors who had expressed concern. Nonetheless, 
Johnson chose not to further question or challenge Juror 85 after he stated he was unsure whether 
he could disregard certain evidence. 
However, this Court will consider issues raised for the first time on appeal if there is 
fundamental error. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P.2d 260,262 (1971) ("In case of 
· · · I case the Supreme Court may consider the same even though no 
fundamental error m a cnmma 
ob'ection had been made at time of trial.") . 
~ . t be such error as goes to the foundation or 
Error that is 'fu~damental mus o to the foundation of the case or take from 
basis of a defendant s nghts or must g . l t his defense and which no court could 
· ht which was essentla O · d h a rule the defendant a ng . E h case will of necessity' un er sue , 
or ought to permit h~m to wa}~~·e f:~ts in each case will arise the law. 
stand on its own men ts. Out o 6 779 ( 1994) ( quoting State v. Knowlton, 123 
Lewis 126 Idaho 77, 80, 878 P.2d 77 ' . hether there was fundamental error, 
State v. , 261 (1993)). To determine w 
916 918 854 P.2d 259, 
Idaho , ' 
. . the crime charge an 
. . n alternative means of c:~;}~;!ant's \iabi\ity is the same. 
·d·ng and abetting is a an aider and abettor, 
. this case: a1 \ a principal or as 
tn . d the acts as 12 
comm1tte 
d d whether the defendant 
61 of 352
the Court must first determine whether there was any error. Anderson, 144 Idaho at_, 170 P.3d 
at 891. 
"The determination of whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 298, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (2000). 
The trial court's determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. To determine whether 
an abuse of discretion occurred this Court uses a three-part test: (1) whether the lower court 
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
Johnson first argues an expression of an inability to follow instructions is analogous to a 
juror expressing a bias towards a party and cites to State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 
(Ct. App. 2006). However, Hauser is distinct from this case in that Juror 85 did not admit to a 
bias and here neither attorney nor the court attempted, unsuccessfully, to elicit an unequivocal 
assurance that the juror would act with impartiality. 
In any case, the record does not show the judge acted erroneously in allowing Juror 85 to 
remain on the panel. The judge asked follow-up questions to Juror 85 and responded with an 
appropriate explanation addressing Juror 85's concern. Moreover, Johnson has failed to 
demonstrate she was prejudiced by Juror 85's presence on the panel. Juror 85's concern was that 
he may have difficulty completely disregarding evidence from a specialist. Johnson has pointed 
to several instances where the judge instructed the jurors to disregard certain information. 
However, in most of those instances either the evidence did not come from a specialist or after an 
appropriate foundation was laid, the evidence was allowed. The only relevant instance of any 
such instruction Johnson pointed to occurred when the judge instructed the jury to disregard 
testimony by an expert witness that it was possible during the manufacturing process of making 
the latex glove, someone's DNA could have gotten inside the gloves. This single instance of the 
judge instructing the jury to disregard evidence presented by a specialist is insufficient to show 
Johnson sustained any prejudice by Juror 85's presence on the panel. 
We conclude that below there was no error, therefore there was no fundamental error. 




We hold there was no variance or constructive amendment. We also hold it was not 
necessary to give a specific unanimity instruction. Finally, we hold Johnson has waived the right 
to object to Juror 85 remaining on the panel. We affirm the decision of the district court. 
Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, HORTON and TROUT, Pro tern, CONCUR. 
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1. Evidence Received 
Accession# 
Blaine County Sheriffs Office 
FOR4035A 
030900016 
Jim J. Thomas 
Alan Johnson 
Diane Johnson 
Sarah Marie Johnson 
May 13, 2004 
Sample Description 
Receipt Date 
Method of Delivery 






















Pants & shirt- Sarah Johnson by S. Harkins 
Socks - Sarah Johnson 
Carpet from hallway 
White sandals 
Tissue from left collar area of pink robe 
Tissue from right side below right pocket of 
pink robe 
Tissue from lower left side of pink robe 
Tissue from left front pocket of pink robe 
Tissue from top of sleeve near left shoulder of 
pink robe 
Tissue from inside lower back of pink robe 
Tissue from inside left sleeve of pink robe 
Tissue and bone from blood pool in bathroom 
Tissue from blood pool in bathroom 
Two hairs removed from barrel of rifle 
Pair of brown leather shoes- Bruno 
Hairs removed from Bruno's blue sweater 
Cutout from Bruno's pants containing stain 
Fibers imbedded in unknown material 
.264 Cal. "Winchester" Magnum rifle 03/03/04 - Federal Express 
00? Presumptive testing for blood was negative for the stains on the pants from Sarah Johnson. 
019 Presumptive testing for blood was negative for the stains on the right and left brown leather shoes. 
DNA: 
DNA from the above specimens, except FOR4035-005 (pants & shirt - S. Johnson), FOR4035-008 (white 
sandals). FOR4035-0l 8 (two hairs removed from barrel of rifle), FOR4035-0l 9 (brown leather shoes), and 
FOR4035-020 (hairs removed from Bruno's blue sweater), was amplified and typed using PE Applied 
Biosystems' Profiler Plus and Co filer Kits. The results are listed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
!' ,· ,"·, n 1 7 . - ; , .. } 
FOR40JS.A 
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DNA results were obtained using Short Tandem Repeat analysis. Procedures used in the analysis of this case 
adhere to the standards adopted by the. DNA Advisory Board on DNA analysis methods. 
3. Conclusion 
Based on these results, Diane Johnson is identified as the donor of the DNA profile obtained from bloodstain 
#8 from the pink robe, bloodstain #9 from the pink robe, bloodstain #10 from the pink robe, bloodstain #1 J 
from the pink robe, bloodstain # 14 from the pink robe, bloodstain # 15 from the pink robe, bloodstain #16 from 
the pink robe, bloodstain #17 from the pink robe, bloodstain #18 from the pink robe, bloodstain #20 from the 
pink robe, bloodstain #22 from the pink robe, bloodstain #23 from the pink robe, bloodstain #1 from sock A, 
bloodstain #1 from sock B, the bloodstain from carpet from hallway, the tissue from right side below right 
pocket of pink robe, the tissue from left front pocket of pink robe, the tissue from top of sleeve near left 
shoulder of pink robe, the (predominant profile) bloodstain #5 from the pink robe and the (predominant profile) 
bloodstain #25 from the pink robe. 
Alan Johnson is identified as the donor of the DNA profile obtained from the tissue and bone from blood pool 
in bathroom, the tissue from blood pool in bathroom, bloodstain A from the Winchester rifle, bloodstain E from 
the Winchester rifle, bloodstain H from the Winchester rifle, the (predominant profile) bloodstain D from the 
Winchester rifle and the (predominant profile) bloodstain F from the Winchester rifle. 
The DNA profiles obtained from bloodstain #1 from the pink robe and bloodstain #3 from the pink robe are 
mixtures. The major DNA profile is consistent with Diane Johnson, and the minor alleles are consistent with 
Alan Johnson. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain #2 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least three individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Sarah Johnson. Diane Johnson, Alan Johnson and an unknown individual 
cannot be ex.eluded as being potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain #4 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Diane Johnson. Sarah Johnson is included as being a potential contributor 
to this mixture. Alan Johnson cannot be excluded as being a potential contributor to this mixture. 
The DNA profiles obtained from bloodstain #6 from the pink robe and stain #34 from the pink robe are 
mixtures of at least three individuals. Sarah Johnson, Diane Johnson, and Alan Johnson are included as being 
potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain #7 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Sarah Johnson. Diane Johnson and Alan Johnson cannot be excluded as 
being potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profiles obtained from bloodstain #12 from the pink robe and bloodstain #19 from the pink robe are 
mixtures of at least two individuals. The major DNA profile is consistent with Diane Johnson. Sarah Johnson is 
included as being a potential contributor to this mixture. Alan Johnson cannot be excluded as being a potential 
contributor to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain # 13 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. 
Diane Johnson and Sarah Johnson are included as being potential contributors to this mixture. Alan Johnson 
cannot be excluded as being a potential minor contributor to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain #21 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Diane Johnson . .Alan Johnson is included as being a potential contributor 
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The DNA profile obtained from stain #31 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. The major 
DNA profile is consistent with Sarah Johnson. Diane Johnson and Alan Johnson cannot be excluded as being 
potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from stain #32 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least three individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Sarah Johnson. Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson and an unknown individual 
are included as being potential contributors to this mixture. Diane Johnson cannot be excluded as being a 
potential contributor to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from stain #33 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least three individuals. Sarah 
Johnson is included as being a potential contributor to this mixture. Diane Johnson and Alan Johnson cannot be 
excluded as being potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain #35 from the pink robe is a mixture of at least two individuals. The 
major DNA profile is consistent with Diane Johnson. Sarah Johnson and Alan Johnson are included as being 
potential contributors to this mixture. 
The DNA profile obtained from the tissue from left collar area of pink robe is from an unknown male 
individual. Alan Johnson and Bruno Santos Dominguez are excluded as potential contributors to this profile. 
The DNA profile obtained from bloodstain C from the Winchester rifle is from unknown male individual #2. 
Alan Johnson and Bruno are excluded as potential contributors to this profile. 
Due to an insufficient amount of DNA, no conclusions can be reached concerning bloodstain #24 from the pink 
robe, the tissue from lower left side of pink robe, the tissue from inside lower back of pink robe, the tissue from 
inside left sleeve of pink robe, the stain from cutout from Bruno's pants, the fibers imbedded in unknown 
material, bloodstain B from the Winchester rifle, and bloodstain G from the Winchester rifle. 
4. Statistical Analysis 
Samples Compared: 
4035-004-8 (bloodstain #8 from pink robe) 
4035-004-10 (bloodstain #10 from pink robe) 
4035-004-14 (bloodstain #14 from pink robe) 
4035-004-16 (bloodstain #16 from pink robe) 
4035-004-18 (bloodstain #18 from pink robe) 
4035-004-22 (bloodstain #22 from pink robe) 
4035-006A- l (bloodstain #1 from sock A) 
4035-007 (bloodstain from carpet from hallway) 
4035-004-9 (bloodstain #9 from pink robe) 
4035-004-11 (bloodstain #11 from pink robe) 
4035-004-15 (bloodstain #15 from pink robe) 
4035-004-17 (bloodstain #17 from pink robe) 
4035-004-20 (bloodstain #20 from pink robe) 
4035-004-23 (bloodstain #23 from pink robe) 
4035-006B-l tbloodstain #1 from sock B) 
4035-010 (tissue from right side below right pocket of pink robe) 
4035-012 (tissue from left front pocket of pink robe) 
4035-013 (tissue from top of sleeve near left shoulder of pink robe) 
4035-004-5 (predominant profile - bloodstain #5 from pink robe) 
4035-004-25 (predominant profile - bloodstain #25 from pink robe) 
VM20032402-26 (bloodstain - Diane Johnson) 




l in 917 quadrillion 
l in 17 .2 quadrillion 
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Samples Compared: 
4035-016 (tissue and bone from blood pool in bathroom) 
4035-023A (bloodstain A from Winchester rifle) 
4035-023H (bloodstain H from Winchester rifle) 
VM20032402-22A (bloodstain - Alan Johnson) 
4035-017 (tissue from blood pool in bathroom) 
4035-023£ (bloodstain E from Winchester rifle) 





1 in 18. 7 quintillion 
l in 175 quadrillion 
1 in l O 1 quadrillion 
4035-023D {predominant profile- bloodstain D from Winchester rifle) 
VM20032402-22A (bloodstain - Alan Johnson) 





l in 168 quadrillion 
1 in 1.09 quadrillion 
1 in 2.21 quadrillion 
4035-023F (predominant profile- bloodstain F from Winchester rifle) 
VM20032402-22A (bloodstain - Alan Johnson) 





1 in 345 quadrillion 
1 in 5 .46 quadrillion 
1 in 4.74 quadrillion 
4035-004-7 (major profile - bloodstain #7 from pink robe) 
4035-004-31 (major profile - stain #31 from pink robe) 
VM20032402-27 A (bloodstain - Sarah Johnson) 




1 in 16 quintillion 
1 in 119 quadrillion 
1 in 474 quaclri11ion 
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5. Disposition of Evidence 
All evidence received in this case will be returned to the referring agency. 
Orchid Cellmark has maintained complete _chain of custody documentation from receipt of evidence to 
disposition. 
6. Technical Review 
The results and conclusions described in this report have been reviewed by the individuals below. 
OwP».b.~ 
Amber G. Moss - Supervisor, Forensic Casework 
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Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
FOR4035B 
030900016 
Jim J. Thomas 
Alan Johnson and Diane Johnson 
Sarah Marie Johnson 
June 15, 2004 
Sample Description·\, 
Pink robe Jtr'~t:~'*;r~w~,~ 
~ a • ~'.i' t'j\ Pants and shirt- Sarah Johriscih ,. 1 . 
i .. Jf ., i ' Socks - Sarah Johnson l ! •. I 
Carpet from hallway {. j ' \l 
),; 
{ -r ; '{. { i 
White sandals .{ i 'i ·'1( i 1 ' s ..... ·1~ C 
t ., 
\ 
Tissue from left collar,,i.i!'.~.&f:.Pffik ro~e ~ k.~~.,J., 
Tissue - right side below right pocke~p~ink robe 
Tissue - lower left side of pink rol:te-.•~~~ 
Tissue - left front pocket of pink robe 
Tissue - top of sleeve near left shoulder of pink robe 
Tissue - inside lower back of pink robe 
Tissue -inside left sleeve of pink robe 
Tissue and bone - blood pool in bathroom 
Tissue - blood pool in bathroom 
Hair removed from barrel of rifle 
Hair removed from barrel of rifle 
Pair of brown leather shoes - Bruno 
Hair removed from exhibit IC-Bruno's blue sweater 
Hair removed from exhibit l C-Bruno's blue sweater 
Hair removed from exhibit 1 C-Bruno's blue sweater 
Cutout from Bruno's pants containing stain 
Fibers imbedded in unknown material 
Reference blood - Sarah Johnson 
Receipt Date/Method of Delivery 




4/21/04 - FedEx 
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from the questioned hairs (4035-018A, 4035-018B, 4035-020A, 4035-020B, and 4035-020C) and 
from the reference blood of Sarah Johnson (4035-023K) was amplified and sequenced at Hypervariable Regions I and II of the 
Mitochondrial Control Region. Sequence data are presented as variations from the revised Cambridge Reference Sequence (rCRS). 
Bases not specifically listed are consistent with rCRS. 







Sample# 16069 16126 16291 
4035-01 SA C T C 
4035-0188 C T T 
4035-020A T C C 
4035-0208 T C C 
4035-020C C T T 
4035-023K C T T 
rCRS C T C 
HVII f.73~340) 
Sample# 73 185 263 295 315.1 
4035-018A A G [ ',A G C C ' ' . 
4035-018B A G G C 303-315 INC 
4035-020A G A G T 303-315 INC 
4035-020B G A : G' .. , · ....... -. ' --· ·-·'' G T C 
4035-020C A G A G C 303-315 INC 
4035-023K A G G C 303-315 INC 
rCRS A G A G A C 
(-) no base at this position (INC) inconclusive_ 
Sequences were obtained using standard mitochondrial DNA analysis techniques. Procedures used.in the analysis of this case 
adhere to the standards adopted by the DNA Advisory Board on DNA analysis methods. 
3. Conclusions: 
The mtDNA profile obtained fro from one of the 
questioned hairs removed from Bruno's blue sweater (4035-020C) is consistent with e m p e obtained from the 
reference blood - b J J fflm (4035-023K). This profile was compared to a database of 4,839 mtDNA sequences compiled by 
the FBI. Four matching sequences were found. Sarah Johnson, as well as any of her maternal relatives, cannot he excluded as 
possible contributors of the questioned hairs ( 4035-01 BB and 4035-020C). 
The mtDNA profiles obtained from two of the hairs from Bruno's blue sweater (4035-020A and 4035-020B) were consistent with 
one another and cannot be excluded from originating from a common source. However, the mtDNA profiles obtained from these 
questioned hairs (4035-020A and 4035-020B) are not consistent with the mtDNA profile obtained from the reference blood of 
Sarah Johnson (4035-023K). Sarah Johnson, as Well as any maternal relatives of Sarah Johnson, are excluded as possible 
contnbutors of the questioned hairs (4035-020A and 4035-0208). 
Based on sequence data obtained from the questioned hair ( 4035-018A), no conclusion can be reached as to whether or not the hair 
originated from Sarah Johnson (4035-023K) or a maternal relative of Sarah Johnson. 
4. Disposition of Evidence: 
All evidence received in this case will be returned to the submitting agency. 
Orchid Cellmark has maintained complete chain of custody documentation from receipt of evidence to disposition. 
ORCHID 
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5. Case Review: 





Rick W. Staub, Ph.D. 
Director of Operations 
Accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory Accreditation Board 
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!Case: CR-1999-0003152 
· Ch Violation 
arges: Date Charge 
Case History 
Twin Falls 
13 Cases Found. 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Dl·stri·ct Judge· G. Richard Amount$O.OO 





08/24/1999 118-2403(4) {F} Theft By 
Receiving/possessing Stolen 
Property Etc 




Det Penitentiary: 2 years 
lndet Penitentiary: 5 years 
of Date 
actions: 
08/24/1999 New Case Filed 
08/24/1999 Affidavit In Support Of Complaint Or Warrant For Arrest 
08/24/1999 Hearing Scheduled - (09/03/1999) John M. Melanson 
08/24/1999 Arraignment I First Appearance 
08/24/1999 Notification Of Rights Felony 
08/24/1999 Financial Statement And Order 
08/24/1999 Court Minutes 
08/24/1999 Order Appointing Public Defender 
08/24/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
08/25/1999 Request For Discovery/defendant 
08/25/1999 Response To Request For Discovery/defendant 
08/31/1999 Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
08/31/1999 Response To Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
09/03/1999 Bond Posted - Surety 
09/03/1999 Hearing Waived 
09/03/1999 Court Minutes 
09/03/1999 Ordr Holding Deft To Answer To District Ct 
09/03/1999 Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over) 
09/03/1999 Transfer In (from Idaho Court Or County) 
09/03/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Arraignment (09/21/1999) Nathan W. Higer 
09/03/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
09/07/1999 Notice Of Filing Information 
09/07/1999 Information For A Felony, Namely; Grand Theft 
09/07/1999 By Possession Of Stolen Property 
09/21/1999 Failure To Appear For Hearing Or Trial 
09/21/1999 Warrant Issued - Bench 
10/14/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Arraignment (11/02/1999) Nathan W. Higer 
10/14/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
10/19/1999 Order 
10/27/1999 Warrant Returned 
10/28/1999 Bond Exonerated 
11/02/1999 Arraignment / First Appearance 





Idaho Repository - Case Hi. Page 
11/02/1999 Court Minutes 
11/02/1999 Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
11/02/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (03/07/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
11/02/1999 Jury Trial Scheduled - (03/08/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
0212412000 
Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery Pursant To lcr 16(a) And 
Brady 
03/02/2000 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
03/07/2000 Continued 
03/07/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Status (03/14/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
03/07/2000 Notice Of Hearing 
03/14/2000 Interim Hearing Held - Status 
03/14/2000 Court Minutes 
03/15/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (04/04/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
03/15/2000 Jury Trial Scheduled - (05/02/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
03/15/2000 Notice Of Trial 
04/04/2000 Interim Hearing Held 
04/04/2000 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
04/04/2000 Court Minutes 
04/04/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Change Of Plea (04/18/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
04/05/2000 Order For Transport Of Prisoner 
04/18/2000 Interim Hearing Held - Change Of Plea 
04/18/2000 Court Minutes 
04/19/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Change Of Plea (05/02/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
05/02/2000 Interim Hearing Held - Change Of Plea 
05/02/2000 Court Minutes 
05/05/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Change Of Plea (06/13/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
06/13/2000 Interim Hearing Held - Change Of Plea 
06/13/2000 Court Minutes 
06/13/2000 Jury Trial Scheduled - (09/06/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
06/16/2000 Notice Of Hearing 
08/31/2000 Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
09/01/2000 Lodged:plaintiff's Requested Jury Instruction 
09/01/2000 Lodged:defendant's Requested Jury Instruction 
09/01/2000 Amended Notice Of Filing Information 
09/01/2000 Amended Information For A Felony, Namely; 
09/01/2000 Grand Theft By Possesion Of Stolen 
09/01/2000 Property 
09/05/2000 Order For Transport Of Prisoner 
09/06/2000 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t 
09/06/2000 Court Minutes 
09/06/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (11/21/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
09/06/2000 Acknowledgement Of Disclosure Of Consequences 
09/06/2000 Of A Plea Of Not Guilty And A Plea Of 
09/06/2000 Guilty 
09/06/2000 Acceptance Of Guilty Plea Questionnaire 
09/06/2000 Notice Of Hearing 
09/08/2000 Order To Transport For Hrsc 11-21-2000@2:00pm 
11/16/2000 Continued 
11/16/2000 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (12/05/2000) Nathan W. Higer 
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11/16/2000 Notice Of Hearing 
11/16/2000 Order To Transport For Sent 12-5-00 @ 2:00pm 
11/16/2000 Order For Updated Presentence Report 
12/05/2000 Hearing Held 
12/05/2000 Court Minutes 
12/05/2000 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
12/05/2000 Sentenced To Fine And Incarceration 
12/05/2000 Judgment Of Conviction & Order Of Commitment 
12/05/2000 Case Status Closed But Pending 
07/03/2003 Memorandum (From Pardons & Parole) 
11/13/2003 Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1999-0003147 M . t t J d R. Michael Amount$O 00 ag,s ra e u ge: Redman due: · Closed 






08/24/1999 149-319 Drivers License-driving With 
Expired License 




08/24/1999 New Case Filed 
08/24/1999 Arraignment / First Appearance 
08/24/1999 Notice Of Rights Misdemeanor 
08/24/1999 Court Minutes 
08/24/1999 Order Appointing Public Defender 
08/25/1999 Response To Request For Discovery/defendant 
08/25/1999 Request For Discovery And Inspection & 
08/25/1999 Demand For Sworn Complaint 
08/26/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (10/26/1999) R. Michael Redman 
08/26/1999 Jury Trial Scheduled - (11/03/1999) R. Michael Redman 
08/26/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
09/03/1999 Bond Posted - Surety 
0911711999 Request For Discovery, Response To Request For Discovery, Response To 
Demand For Sworn Complaint 
10/08/1999 Motion To Transport 
10/14/1999 Order To Transport 
10/26/1999 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
10/26/1999 Interim Hearing Held 
10/26/1999 Court Minutes 
10/26/1999 Written Plea Of Guilty 
10/26/1999 Change Plea To Guilty Before Hit 
11/04/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (12/14/1999) R. Michael Redman 
11/04/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
12/10/1999 Driving Record 
12/14/1999 Hearing Held 
12/14/1999 Court Minutes 
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12/14/1999 Judgment 
12/14/1999 Sentenced Neither To Fine Or Incarceration 
12/14/1999 Bond Exonerated 
12/28/1999 Returned/undelverable Mail(copy Of Judgmt) 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1998-0001262 
. Melvin C. Amount 
Magistrate Judge: Edwards due: $0.00 
Ch Violation arges: Date Charge 















04/01/1998 New Case Filed 
04/01/1998 Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
04/01/1998 Notice Of Rights Misdemeanor 
04/01/1998 Notice Of Hearing 
04/01/1998 Court Trial Scheduled - (04/27/1998) Melvin C. Edwards 
04/27/1998 Court Trial Started 
04/27/1998 Court Minutes 
04/27/1998 Found Guilty After Trial 
04/27/1998 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
04/27/1998 Sentenced To Pay Fine 
04/27/1998 Misdemeanor Deferred Payment Agreement 
04/27/1998 Case Status Closed But Pending 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
!Case: CR-1998-0005382 
. Amount 
Magistrate Judge: Court Clerks due: $0.00 Closed 
Charges: Violation Charge Citation 
Date 
03/18/1998 149-1232 Insurance-fail To Provide 3250 
Proof Of Insurance 
Officer: xxVawser, Scott Inactive, 
5000 
Disposition 





State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
i1case: CR-1996-0003375 Magistrate Jud e: Charles P. Amount$0.00 g Brumbach due: Closed ! 




Officer: TWIN FALLS SHERIFF,, 
1000 
Citation Disposition 
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Register 
10/09/1996 118-1801 Contempt Of Court 
Officer: TWIN FALLS SHERIFF,, 
1000 







04/14/1996 Returned Mail-attempted Not Known 
10/02/1996 Reopen (case Previously Closed) 
10/02/1996 Criminal Complaint 
10/02/1996 Affidavit & Notice Of Failure To Pay 
10/02/1996 Warrant Issued - Arrest 
10/23/1996 Affidavit Of Ftp Processed 
10/23/1996 Warrant Served & Arraigned In Blaine Co. 
11/05/1996 Warrant Returned 
11/05/1996 Interim Hearing Held 
11/05/1996 Arraignment And Plea Of Not Guilty On Fail To Pay 
11/05/1996 Notice Of Rights Misdemeanor 
11/05/1996 Financial Statement And Order (denied) 
11/05/1996 Court Minutes (bond Is Cash Only) 
11/05/1996 Change Assigned Judge 
11/13/1996 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (01/07/1997) Charles P. Brumbach 
11/13/1996 Jury Trial Scheduled - (01/16/1997) Charles P. Brumbach 
11/14/1996 Bond Posted - Cash 
12/06/1996 Notice Of Trial Returned/not At Box 205 
12/18/1996 Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
12/18/1996 Response To Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
01/07/1997 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
01/07/1997 Disposition With Hearing 
01/07/1997 Court Minutes 
01/07/1997 Fine Paid-fail To Pay Dismissed 
01/10/1997 Bond Converted/ Exonerated 
06/04/201 O Scanned 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1995-0011182 
. Amount 
Magistrate Judge: Court Clerks due: $0.00 Closed 
Ch Violation arges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
10/27/1995 149-1232 Insurance-fail To Provide 92520 Finding: Dismissed By 
Court Proof Of Insurance 
Officer: TWIN FALLS CITY,, 2000 Disposition 
date: 10/30/1995 
Fines/fees: $0.00 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1993-0003237 M . t t J d Charles P. Amount$O 00 agis ra e u ge: Brumbach due: · Closed 
Violation 
Page 5 of9 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=TWIN_FALL... 3/26/2012 
76 of 352
Idaho Repository - Case His. Page 
Charges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
Register 
11/05/1993 149-301 Drivers License-fail To 
Purchase 
Officer: xSchulz, Jason Inactive, 
2000 
11/05/1993 149-807(2) Stop Sign-fail To 
Stop/yield From 
Officer: xSchulz, Jason Inactive, 
2000 










11/12/1993 New Case Filed 
11/12/1993 Plea Of Not Guilty 
11/12/1993 Notice Of Rights Misdemeanor 
11/12/1993 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (01/11/1994) Charles P. Brumbach 
11/12/1993 Jury Trial Scheduled (01/19/1994) Charles P. Brumbach 
11/12/1993 Bond Posted - Surety 
01/11/1994 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t 
01/11/1994 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
01/11/1994 Court Minutes 
01/13/1994 Court Trial Scheduled (02/07/1994) Charles P. Brumbach 
01/13/1994 Letter To Janet Rose Sylten 
02/07/1994 Failure To Appear For Hearing Or Trial (on 
02/07/1994 Count Ii) 
02/07/1994 Court Minutes 
02/18/1994 Infraction Default - Fta For Trial 
03/07/1994 Hearing Scheduled - Cts I & Ii (03/22/1994) Charles P. Brumbach 
03/18/1994 Driving Record 
03/22/1994 Bond Exonerated 
03/22/1994 Hearing Held - Cts I & Ii 
03/22/1994 Court Minutes 
03/22/1994 Judgment Of Conviction And Order Of Commit. 
03/22/1994 Sentenced To Pay Fine 
03/22/1994 Misdemeanor Deferred Payment Agreement 
03/22/1994 Case Status Closed But Pending 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1993-0009817 
. Amount 
Magistrate Judge: Court Clerks due: $0.00 Closed 
;/ Charges: 6~:tion Charge Citation Disposition 
Finding: Guilty 
Disposition 
11/05/1993149-1232 Insurance-fail To Provide 76643 
Proof Of Insurance 




State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
lease: CR-1993-0002775 Magistrate Jud e: Charles P. Amount$0.00 
g Brumbach due: Closed i 
I 
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' I Violation Charges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
! 09f.l5/1993 118-903 Battery n126 Finding: Dismissed By 
Prosecutor 
Disposition 
1 Officer: xHottman, Mike Inactive, 
2000 
09f.l5/1993 118-903 Battery 




77127 Finding: Dismissed By 
Prosecutor 
Disposition 
date: 1 0/15/1993 
Fines/fees: $0.00 
\ Register 





09/28/1993 New Case Filed 
09/28/1993 Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
09/28/1993 Notice Of Rights Misdemeanor 
09/29/1993 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (11/09/1993) Charles P. Brumbach 
09/29/1993 Jury Trial Scheduled (11/17/1993) Charles P. Brumbach 
09/29/1993 Order Appointing Public Defender 
09/29/1993 Financial Statement And Order 
10/01/1993 Request For Discovery/defendant 
10/06/1993 Response To Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
10/15/1993 Motion And Order To Dismiss 
10/15/1993 Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing 
10/15/1993 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
02/04/2008 Scanned and transferred to State Archive. Box 1271 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
(Case: CR-1993-0000476 M 'st at J d . Melvin C. Amount$O 00 agi r e u ge. Edwards due: · Closed 
Ch Violation arges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
Register 
02/19/1993 118-907(8) Battery-aggravated(use 
Deadly Weapon/instrument) 
Officer: xFarnworth, Ronald 
Inactive, 2000 







02/19/1993 New Case Filed 
02/19/1993 Affidavit In Support Of Complaint Or Warrant For Arrest 
02/19/1993 Hearing Scheduled - Preliminary (02/26/1993) Melvin C. Edwards 
02/19/1993 Arraignment I First Appearance 
02/19/1993 Notice Of Assertion Of Fifth Amendment Right To Presence Of Counsel 
02/19/1993 Notification Of Rights Felony 
02/19/1993 Court Minutes 
02/19/1993 Notice Of Hearing 
02/19/1993 Order Appointing Public Defender 
02/19/1993 Bond Posted - Surety 
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02/19/1993 Request For Discovery/defendant 
02/24/1993 Response To Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
02/24/1993 Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
02/26/1993 Dismissed During/after Trial/hearing - Preliminary 
02/26/1993 Court Minutes 
02/26/1993 Bond Exonerated 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
icase: CR-1992-0008650 
. Amount 
Magistrate Judge: Court Clerks due: $0.00 Closed 
Ch Violation arges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
Finding: Guilty 
Disposition 
12/02/1992 149-1232 Insurance-fail To Provide 70269 
Proof Of Insurance 
Officer: xFarnworth, Ronald 
Inactive, 2000 
12/02/1992 149-807(2) Stop Sign-fail To 70269 
Stop/yield From 








State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-1992-0002809 M . t t J d R. Michael Amount$O 00 ag1s ra e u ge: Redman due: . Closed 
Ch Violation arges: Date Charge Citation Disposition 
Register 
12/02/1992 118-8004 {M} Driving Under The 
Influence 
70267 Finding: Guilty 
Disposition 
Officer: xFarnworth, Ronald 
Inactive, 2000 
12/02/1992 137-2732(C)(3) Controlled Substance- 70268 
possession Of 




Jail: 10 days 







12/02/1992 New Case Filed 
12/02/1992 Affidavit In Support Of Complaint Or Warrant For Arrest 
12/02/1992 Arraignment/ First Appearance 
12/02/1992 Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
12/02/1992 Notice Of Assertion Of Fifth Amendment Right To Presence Of Counsel 
12/02/1992 Financial Statement And Order 
12/02/1992 Court Minutes 
12/02/1992 Order Appointing Public Defender 
12/08/1992 Idaho Code 18-8002 Advisory Form 
12/09/1992 Request For Discovery/defendant 
12/10/1992 Response To Request For Discovery/plaintiff 
12/11/1992 Hearing Scheduled - Pre-trial Conference (02/23/1993) R. Michael Redman 
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12/11/1992 Jury Trial Scheduled (03/03/1993) R. Michael Redman 
12/18/1992 Supplemental Response 
02/08/1993 Supplemental Response 
02/23/1993 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t 
02/23/1993 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
02/23/1993 Written Plea Of Guilty 
02/23/1993 Court Minutes 
03/01/1993 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (03/23/1993) R. Michael Redman 
03/19/1993 Driving Record 
03/23/1993 Hearing Held - Sentencing 
03/23/1993 Court Minutes 
03/23/1993 Order Suspending Drivers License 
03/23/1993 Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
03/23/1993 Sentenced To Fine And Incarceration 
03/23/1993 Misdemeanor Deferred Payment Agreement 
03/23/1993 Case Status Closed But Pending 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Hartman 
No hearings scheduled 
:case: CR-1992-0007863 Magistrate Judge: Court Clerks Amount$0.00 
due: 









Officer: xGarcia, Felix Inactive, 2000 date: 01/14/1993 
Fines/fees: $25.00 
Connection: Public 
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09/09/1999 Reopen (case Previously Closed) 
09/09/1999 Motion And Order For Bench Warrant 
09/09/1999 Warrant Issued - Arrest 
09/17/1999 Warrant Returned 
09/20/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Pv Arraignment (09/24/1999) Monte B Carlson 
09/20/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
09/20/1999 Sharon Sent Copies Of The Above Document To The Attorneys 
09/24/1999 Court Minutes 
09/24/1999 Hearing Held - Pv Arraignment 
09/27/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Pv Hearing (10/22/1999) Monte B Carlson 
09/27/1999 Notice Of Hearing 
10/22/1999 Court Minutes 
10/22/1999 Hearing Held - Pv Hearing 
10/25/1999 Hearing Scheduled - Pv Hearing (10/29/1999) Monte B Carlson 
10/26/1999 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
10/26/1999 Sharon Sent Copies Of The Above Document To The Attorneys 
10/29/1999 Disposition With Hearing 
10/29/1999 Court Minutes 
10/29/1999 Execution Of Judgment Suspended - (120/180 Days) 
10/29/1999 Order Of Commitment 
10/29/1999 lsbc 12 Mos D; 36 Mos Ind; 173 Days Credit 
11/02/1999 Fof, Cone Of Law & Order Re Pv & Order Of 
11/02/1999 Commitment (for 10-29-99) 
11/03/1999 Case Status Closed But Pending 
03/16/2000 Hearing Scheduled - 120 Day Rev. (03/31/2000) Monte B Carlson 
03/16/2000 120-day Evaluation Report 
03/16/2000 Order To Attend Review Hearing 
03/31/2000 Disposition With Hearing - 120 Day Rev. 
03/31/2000 Court Minutes 
04/04/2000 Hearing Scheduled - 120 Day Review (04/20/2000) Monte B Carlson 
04/04/2000 Notice Of Hearing 4-20-00 
04/20/2000 Continued - 120 Day Review 
04/20/2000 Court Minutes 
04/20/2000 Hearing Scheduled - 120 Day Review (05/04/2000) Monte B Carlson 
04/21/2000 Notice Of Hearing 
04/21/2000 Sharon Sent Copies Of The Above Document To The Attorneys 
05/03/2000 Reopen (case Previously Closed) 
05/04/2000 Disposition With Hearing - 120 Day Review 
05/04/2000 Court Minutes 
05/04/2000 Court Relinquished Jurisdiction 
05/04/2000 1-3 Yrs lsbc; Credit For Time Served 
05/04/2000 Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
05/09/2000 Case Status Closed But Pending 
'''''''''"'''''''''''' 
Connection: Public 
Page 3 of 3 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=CASSIA&cou... 3/13/2012 
81 of 352
Idaho Repository - Case Hisi Page • 
Case History 
Cassia 
1 Cases Found. 
State of Idaho vs. Janet Rose Sylten 
No hearings scheduled 
1Case: CR-1996-0001687 0 . t . t J d . Monte B Amount$0 00 is nc u ge. Carlson due: · Closed 
i Ch . Violation Charge Citation , arges. Date Disposition 
Register 
12/31/1996 118-903 {F} Battery On Correctional 
Officer ,jailer 





Det Penitentiary: 12 
months 
lndet Penitentiary: 24 
months 
Probation: 24 months 
of Date 
actions: 
12/31/1996 New Case Filed 
12/31/1996 Criminal Complaint 
12/31/1996 Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
01/02/1997 Change Assigned Judge 
01/02/1997 Arraignment/ First Appearance 
01/02/1997 Order Appointing Public Defender 
01/03/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Prelim/battery (01/14/1997) Roy C. Holloway 
01/14/1997 Hearing Waived - Prelim/battery 
01/14/1997 Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over) 
01/14/1997 Transfer In (from Idaho Court Or County) 
01/22/1997 Information: Battery On Correctional Officer 
01/23/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Arraignment (02/03/1997) George Granata Jr. 
01/23/1997 Notice Of Hearing: Arraignment 
02/03/1997 Arraignment I First Appearance 
02/03/1997 Constitutional Rights Warning 
02/03/1997 Court Minutes 
02/03/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Status Hearing (02/28/1997) George Granata Jr. 
02/04/1997 Notice Of State's Request For Discovery 
02/04/1997 Request For Discovery 
02/04/1997 Order Re: Pre-trial Motions S/granata 
02/07/1997 Notice Of Defendant's Request For Discovery 
02/28/1997 Hearing Held - Status Hearing 
02/28/1997 Court Minutes 
02/28/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Status Hearing (04/04/1997) George Granata Jr. 
02/28/1997 Amended Notice Of Hearing: Status Hearing 
03/06/1997 Ncic lndentification Index Response 
04/04/1997 Change Plea To Guilty Before H/t - Status Hrg. 
04/04/1997 Court Minutes 
04/04/1997 Constitutional Rights Warning 
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04/04/1997 Acceptance Of Guilty Plea Questionnaire 
04/04/1997 Order To Attend Psi Interview & Appear For Sentencing 
04/04/1997 Motion For Reduction Of Bond To O.r. 
04/04/1997 Order Reducing Bond To O.r. S/granata 4/4/97 
04/04/1997 Stipulation Sentencing Agreement 
• 
04/04/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (05/09/1997) George Granata Jr. 
04/07/1997 Notice Of Hearing: Sentencing 
05/06/1997 Motion To Continue 
05/07/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (05/29/1997) George Granata Jr. 
05/07/1997 Motion To Continue 
05/07/1997 Order To Continue S/granata 5nt97 (5-29-97) 
05/09/1997 Continued Sentencing To 5/29/97 
05/28/1997 Motion To Continue 
05/29/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (06/27/1997) George Granata Jr. 
05/29/1997 Order To Continue S/granata 5/29/97 
06/12/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (07/11/1997) George Granata Jr. 
06/12/1997 Amended Notice Of Hearing :sentencing 7/11/97 
07/08/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (07/10/1997) George Granata Jr. 
07/08/1997 Amended Notice Of Hearing: Sentencing: 7/10 
07/10/1997 Sentencing Continued-def Not lmformed Of Date 
07/10/1997 Court Minutes 
07/15/1997 Motion To Continue/kerry Mcmurray 
07/16/1997 Order To Continue S/hart 7/16/97 
07/16/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (08/29/1997) George Granata Jr. 
08/21/1997 Hearing Vacated 
08/21/1997 Amended Notice Of Hearing: Sent. 8/28/97 
08/28/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (09/26/1997) George Granata Jr. 
08/28/1997 Continued Sentencing To 9/26/97 
08/28/1997 Notice Of Hearing: Sentencing 9/26/97 
08/29/1997 Motion To Continue 
08/29/1997 Order To Continue Sent To 9/26/97 S/granata 
09/02/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (09/26/1997) George Granata Jr. 
09/26/1997 Failure To Appear For Hearing Or Trial 
09/26/1997 Court Minutes 
10/01/1997 Motion And Order For Bench Warrant 
10/01/1997 Warrant Issued - Arrest 
12/22/1997 Warrant Returned 
12/22/1997 Hearing Scheduled - Sentencing (01/08/1998) George Granata Jr. 
12/22/1997 Notice Of Hearing: Sentencing 1-8-98 
01/08/1998 Hearing Held 
01/08/1998 Court Minutes 
01/08/1998 Order Of Release S/granata 
01/08/1998 Probation Ordered-24 Mos 
01/08/1998 123 Days Jail W/wk Rel; 123 Days Credit 
01/08/1998 Judgment Of Conviction, Susp Of Sentence And 
01/08/1998 Order Of Probation S/granata 
01/08/1998 Case Status Closed But Pending 
09/08/1999 Change Assigned Judge 
09/08/1999 Report Of Probation Violation 
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Offender Details - Idaho De.ment of Correction 
Search details: 
[ New Search ] [ Result Summary ] 
JANET ROSE SYLTEN #53631 
Status: Discharged 
Discharge Date: 02/22/2007 
Other Information: 
• 
The Idaho Department of Correction updates this information regularly, to ensure that it is 
complete and accurate; however, this information can change quickly. Therefore, the 
information on this site may not reflect the true content, location, status, scheduled 
termination date, or other information regarding an offender. 
More Information: 
This offender search service is designed to provide basic information about an offender. If 
you need additional basic offender record information, contact inquire@idoc.idaho.gov. 
Formal requests for copies of records should be mailed to: 
Records Bureau 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 N. Orchard Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
If you want to learn more about parole procedures, or need specific information about a 
parole eligibility date, tentative parole date and/or hearing results, please contact the 
Idaho Commission of Pardons & Parole. 
For information on Idaho Department of Correction visitation, please go to: 
www. idoc. idaho. gov I content/ prisons/visiting 
For information on Idaho Department of Correction mail regulations, please go to: 
www.idoc.idaho.gov/ content/ prisons/ offender _services/ mail_rules 
https://www.accessidaho.org/public/corr/offender/search.html 




Dennis Benjamin, ISB No. 4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISB No. 4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Pro Bono Attorneys for Appellant 
Jolynn Drage, e District 
court Blaine Count}', Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 









CASE NO. CV-2006-0000324 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GREG HAMPIKIAN 
IN SUPPORT OF DNA AND SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
Respondent. 
Dr. Greg Harnpikian, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am the Director of the Idaho Innocence Project at Boise State University, 1910 
University Drive, Boise, ID 83725-1515. 
2. The Idaho Innocence Project is participating in Sarah Marie Johnson's post-conviction 
proceedings on a pro bono basis. 
3. My academic degrees and post doctoral training include: 
Postdoctoral Associate, Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology, 1992 
National Science Foundation International Centers of Excellence 
Postdoctoral Award, 1990-91 with Jennifer Graves, La Trobe 
University, Australia 
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Ph. D., University of Connecticut, Genetics, 1990 
M.S., University of Connecticut, Genetics, 1986 
B.S., University of Connecticut, Biology, 1982 
4. My curriculum vitae is attached as an appendix to this Affidavit. 
5. I have reviewed the reports of the DNA testing completed in connection with the case 
of State v. Sarah Johnson. 
6. I have worked extensively with the state and federal CODIS databases and have 
personal knowledge that these databases have been materially expanded since the time of the 
original testing in this case, for example mew technology called Mini-STRs can be used for 
CODIS profiles. 
7. Bloodstain 2 from the robe contains a mixture of at least three individuals including an 
unknown individual. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be 
submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
8. The tissue from the left collar area of the robe is from an unknown male. Alan 
Johnson and Bruno Santos are excluded as potential contributors. This evidence may now be 
compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of 
trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
9. Bloodstain C on the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and Bruno 
Santos. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which 
was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and 
federal CODIS databases. 
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10. No conclusions could be reached due to insufficient amounts of DNA concerning the 
bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue from the 
inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left sleeve of the robe, the stain from 
Bruno Santos' pants, the fibers imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, and 
bloodstain G from the rifle. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA 
amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial and to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at 
the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage 
columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be of 
sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
11. Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may now be subjected to DNA 
analysis. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification 
techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial and to a 
reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new 
DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
12. The results from Robe sample 34, if any, are not listed on the Cellmark DNA report. 
This evidence may now be tested using advanced amplification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
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forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
13. DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item # 14) may now be 
tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
14. DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnson's bedroom door (Items# 15-16) may now be tested using advanced techniques not 
available at the time of trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and after 
and submitted to a CODIS databank. 
15. The results from Robe sample 34, if any, are not listed on the Cellmark DNA report. 
This evidence may now be tested using advanced amplification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
16. DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item # 14) may now be 
tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
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compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
17. DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnson's bedroom door (Items# 15-16) may now be tested using advanced techniques not 
available at the time of trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and after. 
The deduced profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS 
databases. 
18. DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) may now be tested using advanced 
DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference 
samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not 
available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs 
such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with 
Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be 
of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
19. DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 12-1) may now be tested using 
advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic 
labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup 
5 - AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GREG HAMPIKIAN IN SUPPORT OF DNA AND SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
89 of 352
• 
with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may 
be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
20. One of the two hairs samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle could not be 
matched to Sarah or any of her maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA testing. This hair can 
now be compared to a DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at 
the time of trial. 
21. Two of the three hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater were excluded as 
corning from Sarah and could not be identified as corning from a particular maternal line. These 
hairs can now be compared to a new DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill. One of the 
hairs also had a small root and could be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial 
to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Cellrnark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
22. DNA from an unknown contributor found on the inside of the latex glove can now be 
analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Cellrnark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted to the state and federal CO DIS databases. 
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23. Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were found on the leather glove 
from the garbage can. That DNA can now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial 
to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Cellmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be of sufficient quality to be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
24. A bloody handprint was found on the sheet under the pillow beneath Diane. DNA 
from that handprint can now be amplified using new fingerprint DNA analysis to determine 
whether the handprint was made by Alan or some other person after Diane was shot. See T Tr. 
Vol. 6, p. 4238, ln. 25- p. 4239, ln. 12. 
25. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as none of the results were compared 
with Christopher Hill's DNA profile which is now available with an appropriate chain of custody 
as documented in the Blaine County Sheriffs Office Supplemental Report 6 showing that four 
buccal swabs were obtained from Mr. Hill on April 7, 2009. 
26. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as the results were not com1?W~'il,., 
~••'. r L-··· ',. 
with Matthew Johnson's DNA profile. 
This ends my Affidavit. 
SUBSCRIBED A,~D SWORN TO 
before me this Yf!L day of April, 2012. 
,.;•' "{ L ·U/'; .. 
,..~ 6.. ~ ···"··· .. ; .,., L>:V e•• °';;e~· .... _v•" 
:: ~ • .-r ;.\ il · :: : ,0 ' .. ' 
"" . ~ • • • 
\ ··t \\ J. L 
DE~art.~ 
State of Idaho, County of Ada 
My commis~ion expires Aug 19 2014 
FIiing # 38619 
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State of Idaho, County of Ada 
My commission expires Aag 19 2014 
Fillag # 38619 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_ day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid and addressed 
to: 
Honorable Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
474 Shoshone Street 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Jim Thomas 
Blaine County Prosecutor 
201 Second Ave S., Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Jessica Lorello 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0012 
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Ph.D. Genetics, The University of Connecticut, 1990 
M.S. Genetics, The University of Connecticut, 1986 
B.S. Biological Sciences, The University of Connecticut, 1982 
Experience 
2006-present 
Professor of Biology, with a joint appointment in Criminal Justice, Boise 
State University {BSU), (Associate Professor, August 2004-2006). 
Graduate and undergraduate courses: Forensic Biology, DNA Evidence in Cold 
Cases, Advanced DNA Analysis, Biotechnology, Cell Biology, Genetics. 
2006-present 
Founder and Director of the Idaho Innocence Project at Boise State 
University. Volunteer position. Raised more than $300,000 through grants and 
donations, organized a Legal Advisory Board with leading lawyers, supervise 
staff: a full time lawyer, six volunteers, and student interns. Currently working on 
1 O Idaho cases. 
2002-present 
DNA Expert for the Georgia Innocence Project 
Analyze forensic evidence, assist in legal proceedings, testify, work with and train 
students. Involved in four exonerations, two of which resulted in the arrests of 
new suspects more than 20 years after the crime. 
1993-2004 
Professor, Biology, Clayton State University {CSU) 
(Assistant Professor 1993-97, Associate Professor, 1997-2003) 
Coordinated the Forensic Science Track for biology major. Courses: 
Biotechnology, Biotechnology Lab, Genetics, Human Genetics (on-line), 
Recombinant DNA Laboratory, Bioregulatory Affairs, Microbiology, Microbiology 
Lab, Anatomy and Physiology (A&P) sequence, A&P Labs, Sex and 
Reproduction, Introductory Biology (majors and non-majors sequence), 
Introductory Biology Labs, Biotechnology for teacher education students. 
2004 
Chair of the Georgia Academic Advisory Committee for Biological Sciences 
The Committee included department heads of all Georgia public colleges and 
universities; coordinated curriculum review, organized corporate partnerships, 





Grants Coordinator for the School of Arts and Sciences, CSU 
Organized a consortium of six area school systems, wrote two multimillion dollar 
NSF Math/Science Partnerships proposals. 
2001-2002 
Biology Coordinator, Natural Science Department, CSU 
Wrote a successful degree proposal for new Bachelor of Science in Biology, 
which includes tracks in Forensic Science, Biotechnology/Biocomputing, 
Bioregulatory Affairs/Science Management. Hired five new faculty members. 
2000 
First Presidential Faculty Fellow, CSU 
Helped coordinate new majors proposals; acted as faculty liaison to campus 
departments. 
1997- 1998 
National Science Foundation Research Opportunity Award, Georgia Tech, 
Biochemistry Dept., Research Faculty Member 
Enzymatic nucleotides, and chromatin structural changes caused by anti-cancer 
drugs, with Loren Williams. 
1994-1995 
Visiting Scientist, Emory University and The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta 
Sex-determination in malarial mosquitoes with John Lucchesi, Biology 
Department Chair, Emory University; and Frank Collins of the CDC. 
1992 
Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Postdoctoral Associate 
with William Crain 
Gene expression in mouse embryogenesis, toxicity of antisense therapies on 
pregnant mice. 
1990-1991 
U.S. National Science Foundation, Postdoctoral Fellow with Jennifer 
Graves, La Trobe University, Australia 
The sequence and expression of mammalian sex-determining genes. 
1986-1990 
Ph.D. thesis with Linda Strausbaugh, The University of Connecticut 
Transcriptional regulation of tagged histone genes in relation to the cell cycle in 




Biology, secured all funding for course from corporate sponsors. 
1985-1986 
Master's research with Paul Goetinck, University of Connecticut. 
Cartilage Link protein c-DNA. 
1983-1984 
Yale University, School of Medicine, New Haven, Conn. 
Research assistant, human keratins and drug response, psoriasis research with 
Joseph McGuire, Head of Pediatric Dermatology. 
Publications 
Valverde, L., Rosique, M., Kohnemann, S., Cardoso, S., Garcia, A., Odriozola, 
A., Aznar, JM, Celorrio, D., Schuerenkamp, M., Zubizarreta, J., Davis, M., 
Hampikian, G., Pfeiffer, H., de Pancorbo, M. Y-STR variation in the Basque 
diaspora in the Western USA: evolutionary and forensic perspectives, Int J Legal 
Med DOI 10.1007/s00414-011-0644-8 (In Press, 2011). 
Zubizarreta, J., Davis, M., Hampikian, G., "The Y-STR genetic diversity of an 
Idaho Basque population, with comparison to European Basques and US 
Caucasians", Human Biology, Volume 83, Issue 6 , 2011. 
Hampikian, G, West, E., Askelrod, 0. "The Innocence Network: Analysis of 194 
American DNA Exonerations," Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 
12,2011 
Dror, I. E. & Hampikian, G. (2011). Subjectivity and bias in forensic DNA mixture 
interpretation. Science & Justice, 51 (4), 204-208. 
Bourland, W., Vdacny, P, Davis, M., and Hampikian, G., Morphology, 
Morphometrics and Molecular Characterization of Bryophrya gemmea n. sp. 
(Ciliophora, Colpodea): Implications for the Phylogeny and Evolutionary Scenario 
for the Formation of Oral Ciliature in Order Colpodida, Journal of Eukaryotic 
Microbiology, vol 58, Issue 1, p 22-36, January/February 2011 
Davis, M., Novak, S., Hampikian, G., Mitochondrial DNA analysis of an immigrant 
Basque population: loss of diversity due to founder effects, American Journal of 




Karalova, E. M., Sargsyan, Kh.V., Hampikian G.K., Voskanyan , H. 
E., Abroyan L. 0. , AvetisyanA. S., Hakobyan, & L. A, Arzumanyan , 
H.H., Zakaryan H. S., Karalyan, Zaven A., Phenotypic and cytologic studies of 
lymphoid cells and monocytes in primary culture of porcine bone marrow during 
infection of African swine fever virus, In Vitro Cell. Dev. Biol.-Animal, (2011) 
47:200-204. 
Bullock, C., Jacob, R., McDougal, 0., Hampikian, G., Andersen, T. DockoMatic -
Automated Ligand Creation and Docking, BMC Research Notes 2010, 3:289. 
Abu B. Kanu, Greg Hampikian, Simon D. Brandt, Herbert H. Hill Jr., 
Ribonucleotide and ribonucleoside determination by ambient pressure ion 
mobility spectrometry, Analytica Chimica Acta 658 (2010) 91-97. 
D. E. Krane, et al. (39 authors) "Time for DNA Disclosure", Science, Vol. 326. no. 
5960, pp. 1631 -1632, 18 December, 2009. 
Lucian A. Lucia, Lambrini Adamapoulos, Jason Mantegna, Greg Hampikian, 
Dimitris S. Argryopoulos, John Heitmann (2007), "A Simple Method to Tune the 
Gross Antibacterial Activity of Cellulosic Biomaterials, Carbohydrate Polymers 
69"; 805-810. 
Greg Hampikian and Tim Andersen (2007), "Absent Sequences: Nullomers and 
Primes," Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, 12:355-366. 
K. Moeller, J. Besecker, G. Hampikian, A. Moll, D. Plumlee, J. Youngsman and 
J.M. Hampikian, (2007), "A Prototype Continuous Flow Polymerase Chain 
Reaction LTCC Device," Materials Science Forum Vols. 539-543 pp. 523-528. 
G. Hampikian, (2005), "The Future of Forensic DNA," The Canadian Journal of 
Police and Security Services, (Spring, 2005). 
M. Crayton, C. Ladd, M. Sommer, G. Hampikian, L. Strausbaugh, (2004), "An 
organizational model of transcription factor binding sites for a histone promoter in 
D. melanogaster," In Silica Biology 4, 40-45 (October, 2004). 
"Exit to Freedom," Johnson and Hampikian (University of Georgia Press, 2003): 
Calvin C. Johnson, Jr.'s autobiography (written by Hampikian). The true story of 
a man who served 16 years in Georgia prisons for a rape he did not commit until 
DNA evidence freed him. Afterward by Barry Scheck. 
Awarded the 2004 Silver Medal in biography, (Foreword Magazine's Book of the 
Year Awards). 




• Nominated for the 2004 African American Literary Awards. 
P. Henderson, D. Jones, G. Hampikian, Y. Kan, and G. Schuster (1999), "Long-
distance charge transport in duplex DNA: The polaron-like hopping mechanism," 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, Vol. 96, Issue 15, 8353-
8358, July 20, 1999. 
G. Hampikian, J. Graves, D. Cooper, (1994), "Sex- determination in the 
marsupial" in Molecular Genetics of Sex Determination, (Ed. S. Wachtel), 
Academic Press. 
M. Gaudette, G. Hampikian, V. Metelev, S. Agrawal and W. Crain, (1993), "Effect 
on embryos of phosphorothioate modified oligos. into pregnant mice," Antisense 
Res. & Dev., 3:391-397. 
J. Graves, J. Foster, G. Hampikian, F. Brennan, (1993), "Sex- determination in 
marsupial mammals," in Sex Chromosomes and Sex Determining Genes, 
(Editors, K. Reed and J. Graves) Gordon and Breach, Melbourne. 
J. Foster, F. Brennan, G. Hampikian, P.N. Goodfellow, A. Sinclair, R. Lovell-
Badge, L. Selwood, M. Renfree, D. Cooper and J. Graves, (1992), "Evolution of 
sex determination and the Y chromosome: SRY- related sequences in 
marsupials," Nature: 359:531-533. 
F. Deak, Y. Kiss, K. Sparks, S. Argraves, G. Hampikian and P. Goetinck (1986), 
"Amino acid sequence of chicken cartilage link protein from c-DNA clones," Proc. 
National Academy of Science, U.S.A.: 83:3766- 3770. 
Patent Awards and Applications 
US Patent 8,008,816: Magnetomechanical Transducer, and Apparatus and 
Methods for Harvesting Energy, Hampikian and Mullner inventors, awarded 
August 30, 2011. 
US Patent application: a DNA marker to be added to samples as a safeguard. 
The oligomers are based on sequences not found in GenBank, and can be 
coded to contain a wide variety of information, Hampikian inventor. 
Two invention disclosures regarding micropumps made of magnetic shape 
memory materials, 2011. 
Invention disclosure for novel anticancer peptides, 2011. 
Professional Memberships 
• American Academy of Forensic Sciences, workshop leader. 




• International Society for Computational Biology. 
• American Society of Microbiologists: Editor for education Newsletter 
(1999-2002), Editor for image archives (1999-2003); Moderator of the 
Molecular Biology and Biotechnology Education Listserve (1999-2003). 
• American Society for Cell Biology, presenter, education committee 
member, pre-doctoral grants reviewer. 
Recent Professional Education 
Tutorial Workshops, 2011 Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, Hawaii: "Mining 
the Pharmacogenetics Lierature," and, "Identification of Aberrant Pathway and 
Network Activity from High Throughput Data", Hawaii, January 3-7, 2011 
Familial Search Workshop, International Symposium on Human Identification, 
San Antonio Texas, October 14, 2010 
Low Copy Number Analysis Workshop, Ethics and Forensic Science, 
International Symposium on Human Identification, San Antonio Texas, October 
11,2010 
SNP analysis of physical characteristics (ie., eye color) as well as ancestry. 
HITNAABB Workshop, International Symposium on Human Identification, San 
Antonio Texas, October 10, 2010 
Ethics and Forensic Science, International Symposium on Human Identification, 
Las Vegas, October 15, 2009. 
Post-conviction DNA Case Management Symposium, US Department of Justice, 
Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, invited participant, 
Tampa, Fla., January 23-24, 2009. 
Tutorial Workshops, 2009 Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, Hawaii: "Open 
Science: Tools, Approaches and Implications", "Post-Transcriptional Gene 
Regulation: RNA-Protein Interactions", "RNA Processing" and "mRNA Stability 
and Localization," 2009. 
Applied Biosystems Gene Mapper & ID-X Software Training, Boise State 
University, Ma_y 26-29, 2009. 
DNA Mixture Interpretation: Principles and Practice in Component Deconvolution 
and Statistical Analysis, American Academy of Forensic Sciences workshop, 




Mixture Interpretation Workshop, taught by Gary Schutler, Ph.D., Northwest 
Association of Forensic Science, Boise, Idaho, 2008. 
Forensic Population Genetics Workshop, 19th International Symposium on 
Human Identification, Hollywood, CA, 2008. 
2008 Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, Hawaii, 2008 
Tutorial Workshops: "Multiscale Modeling and Simulation", "Computational Tools 
for Next-Generation Sequencing." 
Applied Statistics Workshop, 18th International Symposium on Human 
Identification, (covered DNA Mixtures, Statistics, Parentage and Kinship, 
Pedigree Analysis), Hollywood, CA, 2007. 
Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing, Hawaii, 2007: "Computational Proteomics." 
DNA Statistics, 1 ?1h International Symposium on Human Identification, 
Workshop, Nashville, TN, 2006. 
Advanced Topics in STR DNA Analysis, American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences, workshop, Seattle, WA, Feb. 20, 2006. 
Li-Cor DNA sequencing training for the Li-Cor 4300, Boise State University, 
2005. 
On-site evaluator training Forensic Science Education Programs Accreditation 
Commission (FEPAC), American Academy of Forensic Sciences workshop, New 
Orleans, 2005. 
"Symposium: Emerging and Enabling Technologies for Biological and Chemical 
Detection" and "Federal Bio-Chem Detection R&D Opportunities," 15.5 hours, 
Information Forecast, Washington, DC, 2005. 
Forensic Human Mitochondrial DNA Analysis, American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences workshop, Dallas, Texas, 2004. 
Forensic Science for Medicolegal Professionals Course (co-organizer), Atlanta, 
2004. 
Mass Fatalities Incident Response Planning Course, (Local coordinator), Atlanta, 
2004. 
Science in the Courtroom for the 21st Century: Issues in Forensic DNA, Chicago, 
2004. 
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Sarah Johnson brings this action pursuant to LC. §§ 19-4901, 4902(b) and 4908, and 
alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
1. Petitioner Sarah Johnson is currently incarcerated at the Pocatello Women's 
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Correctional Center in Pocatello, Idaho. 
2. Sarah is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District, State of Idaho, County of Blaine, the Honorable R. Barry Wood, presiding. 
3. The Blaine County Court number for that case is CR-2003-18200. 
4. Sarah was charged with two counts of first degree murder in the deaths of her parents 
Alan and Diane Johnson. 
5. Sarah was convicted following a jury trial. 
6. Sarah was represented at trial by attorneys Robert Pangburn and Mark Rader. 
7. The State was represented by Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Jim Thomas and 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Justin Whatcott. 
8. On June 30, 2005, the District Court sentenced Sarah to two fixed life terms. (The 
term on Count One was fixed life; the term on Count Two was life plus a fifteen year firearm 
enhancement with a minimum term of life.) 
9. Trial counsel Pangburn and Rader failed to file a timely notice of appeal. 
10. On April 19, 2006, Sarah filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief. 
11. Stephen D. Thompson was appointed to represent Sarah. 
12. On July 3, 2006, a new appeal period was granted and the remaining post-conviction 
proceedings were stayed. 
13. An appeal was taken with Sara Thomas and Jason Pintler of the SAPD representing 
Sarah. 
14. The issues on appeal were: 
1) Did the district court constructively amend the Amended Indictment by giving 
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an aiding and abetting instruction violating Sarah's rights under both the Federal 
and Idaho constitutions requiring Sarah's conviction to be vacated? 
2) Did giving the aiding and abetting instruction constitute a fatal variance 
violating Sarah's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process requiring Sarah's 
conviction to be vacated? 
3) Did the district court deny Sarah her constitutional and statutory rights to a 
unanimous jury verdict when it failed to give the jury a unanimity instruction? 
4) Did the district court deny Sarah's constitutional rights to a jury trial and to a 
fair trial when, after juror number 85 candidly confessed that he could not follow 
all of the court's instructions, the court failed to either remove the juror from the 
jury pool or obtain an unequivocal assurance from the juror that he would in fact 
follow all of the district court's instructions? 
15. On June.27, 2008, the Supreme Court denied appellate relief. State v. Johnson, 145 
Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) is attached as Appendix Ato this petition. 
16. On August 4, 2008, the Remittitur was entered. 
17. The stay of the remaining post-conviction proceedings was lifted and Christopher 
Simms was appointed to represent Sarah. 
18. On September 15, 2009, the case was reassigned from Judge Wood to Judge G. 
Richard Bevan. 
19. On January 12, 2010, a second amended petition was filed. 
20. Some of the claims for relief were ultimately conceded by Sarah, some were 
dismissed on summary judgment, and some were denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
21. The specific claims and resolutions are as follows: 
1) Sarah is innocent. This claim was denied in summary judgment on the basis 
that factual innocence is not a ground for post-conviction relief. 
2) The district court lacked jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence Sarah. This 
claim, based upon the exercise of district court adult jurisdiction without a wavier 
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hearing, was denied in summary judgment on the ground that no waiver hearing 
was required. 
3) Sarah's constitutional rights to due process were violated. This claim was 
based upon an assertion that the trial judge had conducted an independent 
investigation and therefore was not neutral and unbiased. In addition, it was 
alleged that the court had violated the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 
of the Idaho constitution by impermissibly limiting the cross-examination of 
Bruno Santos. This claim was dismissed based in part upon a concession that it 
was without merit (as to the conduct of an independent investigation) and in part 
upon summary judgment on the grounds that it could have been raised on appeal. 
4) Sarah's state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of 
counsel were denied. Sarah asserted that the specific allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel stemmed from an overall lack of diligence, failure to 
investigate the facts and law, chronic tardiness, and unpreparedness for court 
proceedings which resulted cumulatively and individually in ineffective 
assistance. The specific instances of ineffectiveness asserted were: 
a) Ineffective assistance in failing to move for a continuance of the 
trial to investigate and prepare an adequate defense when the state 
delayed its disclosure of material evidence (that the comforter on 
the Johnsons' bed covering Diane's body had been discarded and 
not gathered as physical evidence). This claim was denied 
following an evidentiary hearing. 
b) Ineffective assistance in failing to prepare and investigate and 
cross-examine the state's witnesses including Matt Johnson, Alan 
and Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Walt Femling, Steven Harkin, 
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, 
Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu 
Robinson. Sarah later conceded that there was no ineffective 
assistance in the cross-examination of Matt Johnson. The 
remaining claims were denied following the evidentiary hearing. 
c) Ineffective assistance in failing to present the testimony of 
various neighbors regarding events they observed and heard prior 
to the offenses. Sarah withdrew the claim as to one neighbor and 
the claim as to the other neighbors was denied in summary 
judgment. 
d) Ineffective assistance in dealing with fingerprint issues, 
specifically in failing to adequately investigate all available 
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2011. 
fingerprint evidence, in failing to object to the untimely disclosure 
of fingerprint evidence, ~d in failing to move for a continuance 
based upon untimely disclosure. Sarah conceded that summary 
dismissal was appropriate for all claims related to fingerprint 
evidence except for the allegation that counsel was ineffective in 
failing to elicit from the defense expert his opinion that latent 
prints found on the tools of murder were fresh prints. That claim 
was denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
e) Ineffective assistance in failing to lay a proper foundation for 
psychological opinion evidence during the hearing to suppress 
Sarah's statements. Sarah conceded that summary dismissal of 
this claim was appropriate. 
f) Ineffective assistance in dealing with the aiding and abetting 
theory of guilt. Sarah conceded that summary dismissal of this 
claim was appropriate. 
g) Ineffective assistance in investigating the allegation of Steven 
Pankey. The district court found that this claim was time barred. 
h) Ineffective assistance in failing to utilize readily available 
psychiatric evidence. The district court dismissed this claim on 
the basis that the evidence would not have been admissible at trial. 
I) Ineffective assistance due to violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. This claim was dismissed in summary 
judgment. 
j) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise the 
issue of error in denying the motion to suppress statements and in 
failing to raise the issue of insufficient evidence to support an 
aiding and abetting instruction. This claim was partly conceded 
and partly dismissed in summary judgment. 
5) Newly discovered evidence that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the 
rifle, the rifle scope, and an insert from the ammunition box required a new trial. 
This claim was denied following an evidentiary hearing. 
22. The final judgment in the original post-conviction case was entered on April 8, 
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23. A timely appeal was taken and remains pending. 
24. Dennis Benjamin and Deborah Whipple represent Sarah on that appeal. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Requests DNA Testing On Evidence Secured In 
Her Trial Which Was Not Subject To The Testing Now Requested Because That Testing Was 
Not Then Available 
25. Sarah's parents, Diane and Allen Johnson, were shot with a rifle belonging to their 
p 
renter, Mel Speegle, around 6:20 a.m. on September 2, 2003. 
26. The only question at trial was identity -- whether Sarah or someone else killed her 
parents. 
27. The State's theory was that Sarah wore a bathrobe backwards while shooting her 
mother at contact or near contact range as her mother slept, and shooting her father from a short 
range as he came out of the shower. 
28. At the time of the original testing, the State had a DNA reference sample from 
Bruno Santos who had been dating Sarah. 
29. Well after the trial, the State obtained a DNA reference sample from Christopher 
Hill after it discovered that his fingerprints were on the murder weapons. 
30. The robe, the rifle, Bruno Santos' pants, and other evidence were seized, analyzed 
and tested for blood spatter and DNA. 
31. The evidence was sent to Orchid Celmark for testing, and a report was issued on 
May 13, 2004. A copy of the Celmark STR Analysis report is attached as Appendix B to this 
Petition. A copy of the Celmark mtDNA analysis is attached as Appendix C. 
32. An adequate chain of custody of the evidence is established by the fact that the 
evidence was held admissible at trial and has remained in state custody since. 
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33. There exists new technology for testing which was not available at the time of trial. 
34. The testing done in 2004 was inconclusive in the following respects: 
a) Bloodstain 2 from the robe contains a mixture of at least three individuals 
including an unknown individual. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample 
from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be 
submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
b) The tissue from the left collar area of the robe is from an unknown male. Alan 
Johnson and Bruno Santos are excluded as potential contributors. This evidence may now be 
compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of 
trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal COD IS databases. 
c) Bloodstain C on the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and 
Bruno Santos. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample from Christopher 
Hill which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the 
state and federal CODIS databases. 
d) No conclusions could be reached due to insufficient amounts of DNA 
concerning bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue 
from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left sleeve of the robe, the stain 
from Bruno Santos' pants, the fibers imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, 
and bloodstain G from the rifle. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA 
amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial and to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at 
the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
7 · AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
106 of 352
Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage 
columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
e) Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may now be subjected to DNA 
analysis. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification 
techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial and to a 
reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new 
DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal 
CODIS databases. 
f) The results from Robe sample 34, if any, are not listed on the Celmark DNA 
report. This evidence may now be tested using advanced amplification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are 
available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques 
include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA 
analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
g) DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item# 14) may now 
be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill 
which was not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at 
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accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post 
amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. 
The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
h) DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnson's bedroom door (Items# 15-16) may now be tested using advanced techniques not 
available at the time of trial and compared to reference samples from the time of trial and after 
and submitted to a CODIS database. 
i) DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) may now be tested using 
advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification 
cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. . The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
j) DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 12-1) may now be tested 
using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic 
labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup 
with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles 
may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
k) One of the two hair samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle could 
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not be matched to Sarah or any of her maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA testing. This 
hair can now be compared to a DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not 
available at the time of trial. 
1) Two of the three hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater were excluded as 
coming from Sarah and could not be identified as coming from a particular maternal line. These 
hairs can now be compared to a new DNA reference sample from Christopher Hill. One of the 
hairs also had a small root and could be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial 
to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. 
These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy 
Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal 
CODIS databases. 
m) DNA from an unknown contributor found on the inside of the latex glove can 
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are 
available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques 
include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA 
analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
n) Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were found on the 
leather glove from the garbage can. That DNA can now be analyzed using advanced DNA 
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amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not fully available 
at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage 
columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted 
to the state and federal CODIS databases. 
o) A bloody handprint was found on the sheet under the pillow beneath Diane. 
DNA from that handprint can now be amplified using new fingerprint DNA analysis to determine 
whether the handprint was made by Alan or some other person after Diane was shot. See T Tr. . 
Vol. 6,p. 4238, ln.25 -p. 4239, In. 12. 
35. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as the results were not compared 
with Christopher Hill's DNA profile which is now available with an appropriate chain of custody 
as documented in the Blaine County Sheriffs Office Supplemental Report 6 showing that four 
buccal swabs were obtained from Mr. Hill on April 7, 2009. 
36. The 2004 testing was also inconclusive insofar as the results were not compared 
with Matthew Johnson's DNA profile. 
3 7. The requested testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative 
evidence that Sarah is innocent. 
38. The testing method requested will likely produce admissible results under the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this First Cause Of Action 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) allows a petitioner to file at any time a petition for the 
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performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing that was secured in relation to the trial which 
resulted in the conviction but which was. not subject to the testing that is now requested because 
the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial. 
The petitioner must present a prima facie case that: 1) identity was an issue in the trial; 
and 2) that the evidence has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that such 
evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect. LC. 
§ 19-4902( c ). This has been established in this case per the above allegations. 
Testing is to be allowed upon a determination that: 1) the result has the scientific 
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than· 
not that the petitioner is innocent; and 2) the testing method requested would likely produce 
admissible results under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. LC. § 19-4902( e ). 
The testing requested does have the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative 
evidence that would show it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. When Sarah's 
parents were shot, even according to the State's expert witness, blood spatter and human tissue 
were broadcast in a very wide area, even out of the room and across the hallway into Sarah's 
bedroom. However, Sarah had absolutely no blood or any other debris anywhere on her person, 
which made it highly unlikely that she could have been the shooter. If the testing of the 
previously untested and/or unidentified DNA on the robe, rifle, round, doorknob, palm print, hair 
on the rifle, Bruno's sweater, latex, and/or leather glove are shown to match Christopher Hill, 
Matthew Johnson, or other known persons it would go to show that person committed the crimes, 
not Sarah. 
Further, the State's theory of the case was that Sarah did not have blood on her because 
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her mother's head was covered with a comforter which the State discarded. If Alan's DNA is in 
the bloody handprint on the sheet, it will go to show that Alan pulled the comforter up over 
Diane's body after she was shot. This will undermine the theory that Sarah could have 
committed these crimes without getting any blood or other debris on herself and will show it is 
more probable than not that she is innocent. 
Additionally, as set out in Dr. Hampikian's affidavit which will be filed within 14 days, 
the testing requested will likely produce admissible results under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
' 
See IRE 702. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel At 
Trial And On Appeal In Violation Of The Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, 
Section 13 Under Strickland v. Washington 
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To File A Motion To Dismiss 
Pursuant To Arizona v. Youngblood Following The State's Denial Of Due 
Process In Discarding The Comforter From The Johnsons' Bed 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
39. One of the major weaknesses in the State's case was the fact that Sarah had no blood 
anywhere on herself except on the bottom of her socks. 
40. The State's expert, Mr. Englert, explained this lack of blood by positing that Diane 
Johnson's head was covered with a comforter at the time she was shot, that the shot was fired 
through the comforter and the comforter stopped blood from getting on Sarah. 
41. The comforter was found tucked in tightly over Diane's head; however, the State 
presented no evidence to explain how Diane managed to so tightly tuck her own body under it. 
42. There was evidence presented that Alan Johnson moved from the bathroom to the 
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side of the bed next to Diane's head before he died. 
43. From this it appeared possible that Alan had tucked the comforter over Diane's head 
after the shooting. 
44. If the comforter was pulled over Diane's head after the shooting, it absolutely could 
not have protected the shooter from blood exposure per the State's theory. 
45. The State discarded this comforter after having already formed the hypothesis that 
Sarah was the shooter despite the lack of blood on her. 
46. Officer Kirtley testified that he observed the comforter and did not see any bullet 
holes in it. 
4 7. The comforter would have provided exculpatory evidence if it had either a hand or ;· 
fingerprint consistent with Alan having pulled it up over Diane's head or if it did not have a 
bullet hole it in. 
48. The failure of the State to preserve this evidence was the basis for a valid motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). See US. v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 
928 (1993); Griffin v. Spratt, 768 F.Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1991),judgment rev'd in part, 969 F.2d 
16 (3rd Cir. 1992); Stuartv. State, 127 Idaho 806,907 P.2d 783 (1994). 
49. The failure to move for dismissal was deficient performance of counsel because 
such a motion would have been successful and there can be no strategic purpose for not seeking 
dismissal of the charges against the Petitioner. 
50. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Basis 
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A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment 
has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to 
the states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 44, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a 
criminal defendant's right to effective counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13; LC. § 19-852. 
Further, these rights apply to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967). 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitutions, is analyzed under_the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel'~ 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different 
result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id 
In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 (1984), the Supreme 
Court held that the government violates a defendant's right to due process if evidence it failed to 
preserve possessed "exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and 
[is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means." Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333,337 
(1988), adds the further requirement that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the 
potentially useful evidence. The presence or absence of bad faith turns on the government's 
knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-57 ftnt. *, 109 S.Ct. at 336-337, ftnt. *. 
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In this case, the State discarded the comforter that they claimed was over Diane's head at 
the time she was shot. At the time the evidence was discarded, the State had focused on Sarah 
as a suspect and also knew that Sarah did not have any blood spatter or tissue on her body or 
pajamas which was extremely inconsistent with its theory that she had killed her mother with a 
contact shot to the head. Thus, the State knew that it would have to explain this lack of 
evidence to prove Sarah guilty and that the comforter would be a key element of this explanation. 
The State's officer also knew that he had looked at the comforter and seen that it did not have a 
bullet hole in it and further, state officers knew that the comforter had been tucked in firmly oyer 
Diane's head. 
Thus, the comforter was of apparent exculpatory value. Its lack of a bullet hole would 
go to prove Sarah could not have fired the fatal shot and its condition of being firmly tucked in 
over Diane's head showed that it had been placed there after her death, not before, again going to 
prove that Sarah was not the shooter. 
However, knowing this, the State nevertheless discarded the comforter. 
Further, Sarah would not be able to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means. Once the comforter was destroyed, there was no way for Sarah to show that it 
did not have a bullet hole in it. 
Under these conditions, if counsel had moved to dismiss pursuant to Youngblood, the 
motion would have been granted. Youngblood, supra. See also, US. v. Cooper, supra; Griffin 
v. Spratt, supra; Stuart v. State, 12 7 Idaho 806, 907 P .2d 783 ( 1994 ). 
Failure to move to dismiss was deficient performance. Further, the deficiency was 
prejudicial because filing the motion to dismiss would have resulted in dismissal. 
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On these grounds, post-conviction relief must be granted. 
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Evidence Regarding 
Janet Sy/ten's Parole Status At The Time Of The Johnsons' Murders 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
51. At trial, evidence was presented that Sarah had stated that a cleaning woman had 
been accused of stealing (and most likely had stolen) some expensive lotion from the Johnson 
house. 
52. Evidence was presented that this cleaning woman was Janet Sylten and that she had 
committed a theft from the Johnsons. 
53. Evidence was further presented that Sarah said that the cleaning woman had 
telephoned Diane Johnson (who was planning on going to the police regarding the thefts), and 
that Diane found the communication frightening, threatening, and upsetting. 
54. Additionally, evidence was presented that Sarah said people were outside the 
Johnson home in the early morning hours on the day of the murders and that Diane Johnson 
recognized the voice of one of the people present as the cleaning woman. 
5 5. The State's theory at trial was that Sarah's statements were false and intended to 
divert suspicion from herself. 
56. At trial, Ms. Sylten testified that she never took anything from the Johnson house, 
never spoke with Diane, was not at the house in the early morning of the day of the murders and 
was not connected in any way with the murders. 
57. However, at the time of the Johnsons' murders, Ms. Sylten had just b~en released 
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from prison on parole on a charge of aggravated battery against a correctional officer. ROA 
attached as Appendix D. 
58. Ms. Sylten's parole status provided a motive for her to threaten Diane when she 
knew that Diane might go to the police about the theft of her lotion, provided a motive for her to 
harm or kill the Johnsons, and provided a motive for her to lie at trial about her involvement with 
the Johnsons. 
59. However, trial counsel never presented this evidence to the jury. 
60. The failure to present evidence to impeach Ms. Sylten and demonstrate her motives 
to lie and harm the Johnsons, especially Diane Johnson, was deficient performance of counsel as 
the information on Janet's parole status was readily available to counsel and there could be no 
possible strategic purpose in not presenting evidence in support of the defense theory of alternate 
perpetrators. 
61. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Basis 
As discussed above, Sarah had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington. To demonstrate ineffective assistance, deficient performance and 
prejudice must be shown. 
The failure to present evidence of Ms. Sylten's parole status was deficient performance 
because the evidence was readily available and admissible. Even if the evidence was construed 
to be evidence of other crimes, it would nonetheless be admissible to prove motive to lie and to 
harm the Johnsons, most especially Diane, because if Diane contacted the police with allegations 
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of theft by Ms. Sylten, it would have endangered Ms. Sylten's parole status. IRE 404(b). 
Moreover, failure to present this evidence could not have been strategic because there was 
absolutely no advantage to Sarah in not presenting the evidence, while presenting.tp.e evidence 
would have had the clear advantage of supporting Sarah's statements that Ms. Sylten had 
threatened the family and was at the house the morning of the killings. McKay v. State, 148 
Idaho 567,225 P.3d 567 (2010). 
Lastly, the failure to present this evidence was prejudicial. When questioned about who 
might have had a motive to harm her parents, Sarah repeatedly stated that her mother was having 
a dispute with a cleaning woman who had made threats and who had been in the yard early in the . 
morning the day of the crimes. The State's theory of the case was that Sarah had made up this 
story to divert attention from her and Ms. Sylten's denial at trial that she had ever threatened 
Diane, been at the house on the day of the murders, or had anything to do with the murders 
supported the State's theory of the case. However, had the jury known of Ms. Sylten' s parole 
status, it could have concluded that Ms. Sylten did have a motive to stop Diane from reporting 
her theft, that she did make threats to Diane, and that she was at the house and even that she had 
something to do with the murders. At the very least, the jury would have concluded that Sarah's 
statements that Diane was having a dispute with Ms. Sylten and that Ms. Sylten had said 
something that scared Diane were accurate. Such a conclusion would have resulted in a 
reasonable probability of a different result because as noted above, the physical evidence in the 
case was inconsistent with Sarah's guilt; Sarah had no blood or tissue on her even though blood 
and tissue was propelled throughout the room when Diane was shot. Had the jury also known 
that Sarah was not lying about Ms. Sylten's contact with the family, it is reasonably likely that 
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Sarah would not have been convicted. 
C. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Object To Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Throughout The Trial 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
62. Throughout the proceedings, prosecutorial misconduct occurred without defense 
objection. 
63. In pretrial proceedings, Mr. Thomas, the prosecuting attorney volunteered to the 
Court that he had told all state officials involved in the case that they could not talk to the 
defense without him or his agent present. T Tr Vol. 2, p. 840, ln. 12-p. 844, ln. 18. 
64. The State began its opening statement by telling the jury that although the case was 
State ofldaho vs. Sarah Johnson, it was about "a whole lot more. It's about these two people, 
Alan and Diane Johnson. Hard-working, honest, good, decent people, whose murder left a 
grieving son, a brother, sisters, parents, and a host of good friends." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1471, ln. 
19-22. 
65. This argument was misconduct because it played upon the sympathies of the jury 
and urged them to return a verdict based on information other than the properly admitted relevant 
evidence. 
66. In closing argument, the State committed misconduct by shifting the burden of 
proof. The State's argument was based, in part, on the theme that the defense had not proven 
that someone besides Sarah had committed the murders. T Supp. Tr. p. 175-218. 
67. Defense counsel did not object to the above-noted misconduct. 
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68. The failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct was deficient performance because 
the misconduct was readily apparent and because there could be no strategic purpose in allowing 
any of this misconduct. 
69. The failure to object at trial prevented a claim of prosecutorial misconduct from 
being raised on appeal. 
70. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Basis 
As discussed above, Sarah had state and federal constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra. 
The law on prosecutorial misconduct has long been established: 
... A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." It is his duty to use all fair, 
honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted 
in the courts of his judicial circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or 
make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire for success 
should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the 
evidence in the case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same .... It 
will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with favor upon the action of 
prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant in a particular case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part 
of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads.jurors to 
give more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of 
the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in so doing they transgress 
upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that 
nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against 
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only the 
evidence introduced.State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also State v. Babb, 
125 Idaho 934,942,877 P.2d 905,913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253,268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 
(1915). 
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State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87,156 P.3d 583,588 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct in seeking a conviction based not upon the evidence, but rather 
upon the jury's sympathies for the Johnsons and upon a shifting of the burden of proof to Sarah. 
Had counsel objected, his objection would have been sustained, the misconduct would have ceased, and a curative 
instruction would have been given. 
The failure to object was deficient performance. 
Moreover, the deficiency was prejudicial. As discussed above, the physical evidence was inconsistent with Sarah's 
guilt. If Sarah was guilty, she would have had blood residue or tissue somewhere on her. The test for blood residue is 
' extremely sensitive (parts per 100,000), and shortly after the murders, Sarah (who had not showered) was thoroughly swabbed 
for blood residue, from her face, nostrils, behind her ears and on her hair. These tests were all completely negative for blood 
residue. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the prosecutors who were clearly intelligent and powerful advocates for the State 
would have resorted to misconduct had they not entertained fears that a conviction could not be obtained without the 
misconduct. Lawyers of their caliber likely would not have risked the validity of a conviction in this case by foolish 
misconduct in the absence of fears that the evidence alone was not sufficient to gain a conviction. Given this state of the 
evidence, it is reasonably probable that had the prosecutorial misconduct been objected to, Sarah would not have been 
convicted. 
D. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance In Failing To Object To The 
Jury's Trip From Ada County To Bellevue, Idaho To Visit The Johnson House 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
71. During the trial, the jury was taken on a day long bus trip to visit the Johnson house. 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2158, ln. 1-p. 2167, ln. 9. 
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72. The Court repeatedly instructed the jury that the trip to the house was not evidence 
and it was not to consider anything it saw there in its deliberations. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2361, ln. 
7-p. 2265, ln. 15. 
73. Defense counsel waived Sarah's presence during the jury view after the State argued 
that having her at the house would be prejudicial to its case against her. T Tr. Vol. J; p. 1920, 
ln. 13- p. 1922, ln. 10. 
74. Sarah did not learn until after the jury had been taken to Bellevue that the viewing 
had occurred. 
75. Defense counsel did not object to the jury trip to the house, nor did counsel object to 
waiving Sarah's state and federal constitutional rights to be present during the proceedings 
against her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1920, ln. 13-p. 1922, ln. 10. 
76. The failure to object to the trip to the house was deficient performance of counsel. 
The trip presented the jury with information that the Court repeatedly told the jury was irrelevant 
to its deliberations, further the trip was highly prejudicial. Had defense counsel objected 
pursuant to IRE 401,402, and 403, the Court would have denied the trip, or in the alternative, the 
issue would have been preserved for appeal where the appellate court would have found 
non-harmless error. 
77. Counsel was further deficient in waiving, without her consent, Sarah's constitutional 
rights to be present at the proceedings against her. The State itself noted that Sarah's presence at 
the house would have "prejudiced" its case - i.e., would have made it harder for the State to 
prove its case against Sarah. Yet, Sarah had an absolute right to be present. 
78. The failure of counsel to object prevented the claims from being raised on appeal. 
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79. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
As discussed above, Sarah had state and federal rights to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland, supra. 
Counsel's performance in not objecting to the jury trip to the Johnson house was deficient 
performance because it was repeatedly stated to counsel by the Court that the trip was not going 
to produce relevant evidence and at the same time, it was obvious that the trip would promote the 
return of a guilty verdict on the basis of matters besides the evidence in case. If counsel would· 
have objected pursuant to IRE 402 and 403, the objection would have been granted and the jury 
would not have visited the house, because "evidence" with no probative value cannot possibly 
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Further, this deficient performance was prejudicial. As noted before, the physical 
evidence was not consistent with Sarah's guilt. It was impossible that Sarah could have shot her 
mother and father and not have gotten any blood residue or tissue anywhere on herself. Given 
the state of the physical evidence, it is reasonably probable that had the jury not been taken on the 
trip to the Johnson's home, Sarah would not have been convicted. 
Each Of These Instances Of Deficient Performance Of Trial Counsel Was 
Individually And Cumulatively Prejudicial 
80. As set out above, each of these instances of deficient performance was individually 
prejudicial. 
81. In addition, the cumulative effect of these instances of deficient performance was 
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prejudicial insofar as but for the cumulative deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome insofar as it is reasonably probable that the State would have 
been unable to obtain a conviction when the physical evidence was inconsistent with Sarah being 
present at the time her parents were killed. 
i 
TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel In 
Violation Of The Sixth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 Under 
United States v. Cronic When Her Appointed Counsel Labored Throughout The Proceedings 
Under An Actual Conflict Of Interest 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
82. Sarah was represented at trial and sentencing by Robert Pangburn and Mark Rader 
pursuant to Mr. Pangburn's contract with Blaine County for the provision of indigent criminal 
defense. 
83. Throughout the proceedings, Mr. Pangburn was involved in disputes with the county 
over the interpretation of the contract and whether or not he would be paid. 
84. These disputes began just ten days after Sarah was charged, as documented in the 
hearing held on November 11, 2003. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 1-20. 
85. Even at that early date, Mr. Pangburn alerted the Court that the county contract 
conflicted with the Rules of Professiona~ Conduct in requiring him to provide reports to the 
Court and the County Prosecutor to support his applications for payments of additional fees. T 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 10, In. 16-p. 11, ln. 8. 
86. Disputes over the county contract continued throughout the representation and two 
years later, at the end of the trial, but prior to the filing of post trial motions and the sentencing, 
the chair of the Board of County Commissioners sent the Court a letter which resulted in the 
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Court issuing a "show cause" hearing notice to Mr. Pangburn on April 15, 2005. T Supp. Tr. p. 
406, ln. 11-22. 
87. At the show cause hearing, the Court revoked the appointment of co-counsel Rader 
and all defense investigators for the remainder of the proceedings against Sarah. T Supp. Tr. p. 
407, In. 14-16. 
88. At the show cause hearing, Mr. Pangburn alerted the Court that he had concerns that 
information about his reports was being improperly shared from a sealed file. T Supp. Tr. p. 
411, In. 20-p. 412, In. 9. 
89. The State argued that it should have access to all Mr. Pangburn's reports because, 
even though Sarah had not yet been sentenced and was facing the possibility of two terms of 
fixed life being imposed, there were no more strategic decisions to be made in the case. In the 
State's words, "Obviously, that's over." T Supp. Tr. p. 411, ln. 11-18. 
90. Mr. Pangburn alleged at the show cause hearing that the statements in the County's 
letter to the Court were defamatory and wrong. T Supp. Tr. p. 414, In. 12-17. 
91. Mr. Pangburn further alleged that the County Commissioners had "mounted other 
attacks against me in this case," including not renewing his contract. T Supp. Tr. p. 415, In. 6-8. 
92: In response, the prosecutor representing the County Commissioners argued to the 
Court that the County's position was that "enough is enough," that the bills submitted to date 
were excessive and that Mr. Pangburn had billed over 1000 hours of attorney time for January 
and February alone. T Supp. Tr. p. 416, In. 21-p. 417, In. 5. 
93. In response to these arguments, the Court interpreted the county/public defender 
contract, noting that the disputes had been existent since the beginning of the case, citing a date 
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in December of 2004, when Mr. Pangburn interrupted the taking of a verdict in another trial, to 
move to withdraw from representing Sarah due to a contract issue. T Supp. Tr. p. 418, ln. 4-p. 
421, ln. 22. 
94. The Court further commented that Mr. Pangburn had been billing for.advice to 
Sarah in the PSI process that the Court did not feel was warranted, including advice and 
assistance in filling out the PSI questionnaire. T Supp. Tr. p. 421, ln. 23-p. 425, ln. 3. 
95. In reviewing and commenting on Mr. Pangburn's work for Sarah between 
conviction and sentencing, the Court noted that it was not making a personal attack on !',1r. 
Pangburn, but that this was a matter of fiscal responsibility and the Court's duties under LC.§ 
19-850 et. seq. T Supp. Tr. p. 423, ln. 14-24. 
96. The Court also noted that there was a long running dispute as to what the rate of 
compensation was. T Supp. Tr. p. 425, ln. 4-2. 
97. At that point, the Court also officially opened the sealed file of reports from Mr. 
Pangburn for inspection by the county with the offer to allow him to seek non-disclosure of 
certain items on an individual basis. T Supp. Tr. p. 427, ln. 15-p. 428, ln. 5. 
98. The contract disputes generated several memorandums from both the State and 
defense counsel and resulted in two more hearings before Sarah's sentencing hearing on June 29, 
2005. See T Supp. CR Vol. 2, pp. 310-340. 
99. At the hearing on May 3, 2005, the prosecutor referred to undisclosed ongoing 
correspondence between the County Commissioners and Mr. Pangburn. T Supp. ·Tr. p. 436, ln. 
6-13. 
100. In response, the Court stated that it simply was not going to authorize any more 
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payments to the defense until after the prosecutor had reviewed Mr. Pangburn's reports on May 
17. T Supp. Tr. p.436, In. 24-p. 437, ln. 9. 
101. On November 2, 2005, the Court entered a 37 page order governing further 
proceedings on claimed attorneys fees and expenses. T Supp CR Vol. 2, pp. 341-378. 
102. This order documents the history of fee and billing disputes that continued 
throughout Mr. Pangburn's representation of Sarah. Id. 
103. Yet another hearing was held on payment for Mr. Pangburn and the defense team 
on November 23, 2005. T Supp CR Vol. 2, pp. 382-3. 
104. On January 31, 2006, the Court entered its final order regarding attorneys fees. In 
this order, the Court required Mr. Pangburn to immediately return to Blaine County any sums 
over $65.00 per hour that it had paid him; reduced his bill for time spent preparing billings and 
for time billed for his associate attorney; and reduced Mr. Pangburn's billing in other ways (for 
example deducting time Mr. Pangburn billed for researching the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
T Supp CR pp. 401-410. 
105. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not raising this conflict as part of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the original petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I,§ 13, guarantee the right to counsel. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-96 (1963). This right to 
counsel contemplates that counsel's assistance shall be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court 
order requiring that one lawyer simultaneously represent conflicting interests. Glasser v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 60, 69-70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464-65 (1942), superseded on other grounds as stated 
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in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987), and Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 313-20, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). The right to assistance ofunconflicted counsel is 
so fundamental that prejudice from its denial need not be shown. Id., 315 U.S. at 75-76, 62 
S.Ct. at 467-468. See also, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (1980) (prejudice 
is presumed when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest); and United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,662, n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2049, n. 31 (1984). 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (2002), holds that in order to 
demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential 
conflict of interest based upon prior representation of the victim of the current criminal charges a 
petitioner must establish that the conflict adversely affected the representation. The question of 
whether a government created conflict through the payment system established for appointed 
counsel requires a showing of adverse impact or not has not been resolved by the Supreme Court. 
In this case, Sarah's counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest which had an adverse 
impact on her representation. 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct l.7(a)(2) states that a concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if there is a significant risk that the representation of a client will be materially limited by a 
lawyer's responsibilities to a third party. Comment 13 to the Rule states that a lawyer may be 
paid by a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the 
arrangements does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the 
client. 
In this case, there was a conflict under RPC l.7(a)(2) because there was no.evidence that 
Sarah was informed and consented to the payment scheme established by Blaine County and her 
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attorney, and further, and most importantly, the arrangement did compromise her lawyer's duty 
of loyalty insofar as in order to be paid, her counsel made reports to the county in violation of 
RPC 1.6 regarding confidentiality of information. In assessing this, it is important to note that 
Sarah's lawyer did not just send the county a bill setting out the hours spent and seeking 
compensation; rather, he sent detailed reports explaining what was done during each billed hour. 
Such was a violation of the duty of confidentiality. 
At least one other conflict of interest existed in the fee arrangement between the county 
and Sarah's attorney. The arrangement resulted in a violation ofRPC 1.8(f) which provides: 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
than the client unless: 
(1) the client gives informed consent; 
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by 
Rule 1.6. 
Sarah did not give informed consent; there was an interference with the client-lawyer 
relationship insofar as her counsel was tom between his duty to refrain from revealing 
confidential information to the county, his desire to be paid, his duty to zealously represent Sarah 
and his time spent arguing with the county about his billings. Also, much of the information 
relating to his representation of Sarah was not protected, but rather was revealed to the county 
and to the judge. 
There was a conflict and there was an adverse impact on Sarah's representation insofar as 
confidential information was revealed to the county throughout the proceedings. Therefore, 
post-conviction relief should now be granted. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel On 
Direct Appeal As Guaranteed By The Sixth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Article I, 
Section 13 
A. Appellate Counsel's Failure To Raise The District Court Error In Denying 
The Motion To Suppress The Testimony Of Malinda Gonzales Was Ineffective 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
106. Trial counsel moved to suppress statements Sarah allegedly made to her cellmate 
Malinda Gonzales (while Sarah was being illegally held in the Blaine County adult jail with an 
adult cellmate) on the grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of her constitutional 
rights to remain silent and upon the grounds that the State should not be allowed to profit by 
using statements obtained during Sarah's illegal detention in an adult jail with convicted and 
charged adult prisoners. Motion To Suppress Defendant's Statements to Jail Inmates, T CR 
Vol. 2, p. 360. 
107. Following a hearing, the District Court found that Sarah's detention violated Idaho 
law, but that the remedy is not the exclusion of the alleged incriminated statements, as that would 
not further the object of the state statutes prohibiting the incarceration of juveniles with adults. 
Order on Defendant's Motion To Suppress Defendant's Statement To Jail Inmates, Ex._ Vol. 
3, p. 455. 
108. Petitioner appealed from the judgment and sentence. 
109. The State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Petitioner on 
appeal. 
110. Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal. 
111. Had the issue been raised on appeal, relief would have been granted. 
112. The failure to raise this issue was deficient performance. 
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113. The failure of post-conviction counsel to raise this issue as part of the ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim was also ineffective and justifies the filing of this 
successive petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
The right to effective assistance.of counsel extends to the direct appeal of the conviction. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985). 
With regard to Sarah's motion to suppress statements allegedly made to Malinda 
Gonzales, the district court found that Sarah's pre-trial incarceration with adult offenders was 
illegal, but held that the remedy was not suppression of her statements. Appellate counsel did 
not raise the issue on appeal. 
The question of whether suppression of statements of juveniles illegally held in adult jails 
is proper is an open question in Idaho. However, as noted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47: 
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the 
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably 
trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable 
expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. 
They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege 
reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and - in a 
philosophical sense - insists upqn the equality of the individual and the state. In 
other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which 
prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because 
coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its 
purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or psychological domination, 
from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and 
depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his 
conviction. 
In illegally confining Sarah in an adult jail and then using statements she a~legedly made 
to her adult cellmate against her at trial, the State violated Sarah's constitutional right against 
32 · AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
I 
131 of 352
self-incrimination because Sarah spoke to the adult inmate only through the force and 
psychological domination of the State in illegally imprisoning her. Moreover, the statements, if 
any were actually made, were untrustworthy as they were the fruit of fear and coercion - the fear 
and coercion experienced by a sixteen year old girl in an adult jail in direct contact with male and 
female adult prisoners - induced by the State's clear violation of the law. 
The district court found that the proper remedy would not be exclusion of the statements 
because "it would not further the essential object of these statutes." However, the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter illegal state conduct. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (19_68)~ 
stressing that the exclusionary rule's major purpose is to deter lawless police conduct. The rule 
also serves the purposes of "the imperative of judicial integrity" in keeping courts from becoming 
accomplices to willful disobedience of the constitution and laws they are sworn to uphold. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960). And, finally, the 
exclusionary rule serves to assure the people - all potential victims of unlawful government 
conduct-that the government will not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk 
of seriously undermining trust in government. See State v. Koivu, 38106, 2012 WL 665990 *5 
(Idaho Mar. 1, 2012); ("In [State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43,254 P. 788 (1927)] the Court made it 
clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because it was obtained in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,355 
(1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
Indeed, the federal courts and other state courts have held that suppression is the proper 
remedy for evidence obtained as a result of police violation of state statutes in the handling of 
those accused of crimes. See State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586,593,586 P.2d 671,678 (1978) 
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(suppression appropriate remedy for violation of the "knock and announce" statute); United 
States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (suppression required where police violated 
statute which required giving defendant opportunity to post collateral for minor offense); State v. 
Caldera, 929 P.2d 482 (Wash. App. 1997) (suppression required where police violated a statute 
requiring the officer to read an arrest warrant and allow the defendant an opportunity to post 
bail); People v. Greenwood, 484 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1971) (suppression required where officer 
erroneously advised defendant as to amount of bond he would have to post for automobile 
violations). 
The district court erred in its determination of the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Had 
the court analyzed the suppression decision under the actual purposes of the rule - deterrence of 
illegal police conduct, the imperative of judicial integrity, and the assurance to the public that the 
state will not profit from illegal conduct - the statements obtained from Sarah while she was in 
the Blaine County jail in violation ofldaho law would have been suppressed on the grounds 
raised by trial counsel. Reasonable appellate counsel would have raised this claim on appeal. 
Appellate relief would have been granted because the district court erred in not suppressing the 
statements and the error was not harmless as Malinda Gonzales' testimony was the only 
testimony in the entire case that could have been construed by the jury as any sort of a 
confession. In light of the lack of any blood residue on Sarah, the case for conviction was thin 
and it cannot be said that use of the statements at trial was harmless. Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
B. Appellate Counsel's Failure To Argue That The Fixed Life Sentences· Were 
Both Excessive And Unconstitutional Was Ineffective 
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Facts Pertaining to Claim 
114. Petitioner was sentenced to two terms of fixed life even though she was sixteen 
years old at the time the offenses were committed. 
115. Appellate counsel did not argue on appeal that the fixed life sentences were 
excessive given the facts of the case or that the sentences constituted unconstitutional cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteen Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 6. 
116. The failure to raise these claims on appeal was deficient performance. 
117. Had appellate counsel raised either argument, the Idaho Supreme Court .would have . 
granted her sentencing relief. 
118. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not raising an ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claim for failing to argue the excessive and unconstitutional sentence claims in 
the original petition. 
Why Relief Should be Granted on this Claim 
Sarah's counsel in direct appeal also rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue 
that her sentences were excessive and unconstitutional. In particular, counsel was ineffective in 
not arguing that the two fixed life terms with a fifteen year enhancement were excessive as, given 
Sarah's youth and her previously non-existent criminal record, the sentences were excessive 
under any reasonable view of the evidence. The terms of confinement clearly exceeded that 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
,. 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 
568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). See also, State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48, 53,266 P.3d 
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1153, 1158 (Ct. App. 2011). 
At age 16, Sarah was still a child. She had no prior crimes of any sort. A fixed term 
short of her entire life would certainly be sufficient to insure public safety. In a number of years, 
after she reached adulthood, the parole board could examine her record in prison and determine if 
and when she would pose no danger to society if released from prison. 
And, deterrence is equally well served _by a fixed sentence followed by an indeterminate 
term of life, as a fixed life term. 
Likewise, any rehabilitative programs most surely can be completed well -before the 
natural expiration of a 16-year-old' s life. 
And, while Sarah's family was indeed anxious for retribution on her, fixed life for a child 
is a sentence in excess of any rational and reasonable notice of retribution. 
Had Sarah's direct appeal counsel raised the issue of excessive sentence, appellate relief 
would have been granted. 
Moreover, appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising a claim that Sarah's sentences 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Idaho Const. Article I,§ 6 which prohibit the 
imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. The question of whether a fixed life sentence 
imposed on a juvenile violates federal constitutional protections is currently pending before the 
United States Supreme Court in PNO cases: },filler v. Alabama, SGT Docket Number 10 9646, 
and Jackson Y. Hobbs, Docket Number 10 9647, argued March 20, 2012. was decided in Miller 
v. Alabama. U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). There the Court held mandatory sentencing 
schemes imposing fixed life unconstitutional. 
Had Sarah's appellate counsel raised the constitutional claim, either relief would have 
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.. 
been granted in the Idaho appellate court or certiorari would have been granted in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Therefore, post-conviction relief should be granted on this claim. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Sarah Was Denied Due Process Of Law As Guaranteed 
By The Fifth Amendment And1daho Constitution Article I, Section 13 When The State 
Withheld The Material Exculpatory Evidence That The Fingerprints Found On The Rifle, 
Scope, And Ammunition Box Insert Had Been Run Through AFIS And Matched To 
Christopher Hill - Brady v. Maryland 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
119. After the trial, the state matched previously unidentified fingerprints on the murder 
weapon, its scope and its ammunition to Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle who lived in 
the Johnson guesthouse. 
120. This evidence was exculpatory because it tended to show that Mr. Hill and not 
Petitioner was the one who shot Diane and Alan Johnson. 
121. The state did not turn over this evidence to Petitioner once it was discovered. 
122. Rather, a former employee of the Idaho State Police, Robert Kerchusky, learned of 
the information by informally inquiring of Maria Eguren, an employee of the state crime lab. 
123. Ms. Eguren later testified that she knew of the identification and had not told Mr. 
Kerchusky about it, but that the information accidently "slipped out" after "several 
conversations" with Mr. Kerchusky. EH T pg. 767, ln. 14. 
124. The withholding of exculpatory information from Petitioner violated her right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and its progeny. 
125. Post-conviction counsel did not raise a Brady claim in the original petition. 
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126. Instead he raised a newly discovered evidence claim based upon Mr. Kerchusky's 
discovery. 
127. This Court denied the claim because it found the newly discovered evidence was 
not likely to result in an acquittal. 
128. It was ineffective of post-conviction counsel to fail to raise the claim as a Brady 
claim because the petitioner's burden of proof in a Brady claim is lower than the burden of proof 
in a newly discovered evidence claim. 
129. Had post-conviction counsel alleged a Brady claim, this court would have_granted 
relief because there is a reasonable probability that the withheld evidence would have caused a 
different result. 
Why Relief Should be Granted as to this Claim 
Brady v. Maryland, supra, holds that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Brady 
doctrine has been expanded to include instances where the exculpatory evidence was never 
requested, or requested only in a general way. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985). 
The duty of disclosure under Brady extends to all persons working as part of the 
prosecution team or intimately connected with the government's case. The Supreme Court has 
written that "the rule encompasses evidence 'known only to police investigators and not to the 
prosecutor.' In order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to 
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this 
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case, including the police."' Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999), quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (internal citation omitted). "Because prosecutors rely so 
heavily on the police and other law enforcement authorities, the obligations imposed under Brady 
would be largely ineffective if those other members of the prosecution team had no responsibility 
to inform the prosecutor about evidence that undermined the state's preferred theory of the 
crime." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,377 (6th Cir. 2009). Finally, the state's 
obligation under Brady continued past the trial and sentencing. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F .2d 
7 46, 7 49-750 (9th Cir. 1992) (Brady duty continues into post-conviction proceedings). , 
In order to establish a Brady violation, only three things need be shown: "The evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999). Thus, constitutional error results when favorable evidence is withheld from the 
defendant "ifthere is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419,437 (1995). Sarah is only required to show that there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result. She is not required to show that it is more likely than not that she would have 
been acquitted, as she was during the newly discovered evidence proceedings. It is clear that 
Brady sets a lower bar than a newly discovered evidence motion because the "likely to result in 
an acquittal" standard was specifically rejected in Strickland in favor of the reasonable 
probability of a different result test found in Brady: "On the other hand, we believe that a 
defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
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outcome in the case." Id., pg. 693. Here, all three Brady requirements have been met. The 
withheld evidence regarding the fingerprint evidence was exculpatory. And, the withholding of 
that evidence from the jury undermines confidence in the jury's not fully informed verdict. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: The Two Fixed Life Sentences Imposed On Sarah 
Procedurally and Substantively Violate The Eighth Amendment Protection Against Cruel And 
Unusual Punishments 
Facts Pertaining to Claim 
130. Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent terms of fixed life, plus a firearm 
enhancement of 15 years. 
131. At the sentencing hearing, Richard Worst, M.D ., a psychiatrist, testified that he 
evaluated Sarah and found that she was believable. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6283, ln. 19-20. 
132. Dr. Worst further testified that Sarah is amenable to rehabilitation. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 
6289, ln. 2-3. 
133. Dr. Worst testified that he did not find anything that would allow a prediction that 
Sarah would be prone to violence. Tr. Vol. 9. p. 6289, ln. 11-14. 
134. Dr. Worst also testified as to the development of the adolescent brain and why the 
American Psychiatric Association. the American Psychological Association, the American 
Academy of Adolescent Medicine. and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law have 
all taken a stance against the death penalty for juveniles based upon the scientific understanding 
of brain development over the lifespan. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6289, In. 19-p. 6292. ln. 17. 
135. Dr. ·worst lastly testified that even though he looked very hard to find evidence that 
Sarah had conduct disorder, he could not find any substantial evidence to support that diagnosis. 
Tr. Vol. 9. p. 6294. ln. 23-p. 6295. ln. 6. 
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136. Dr. Craig Beaver, a neuropsychologist, testified at the sentencing hearing that he 
evaluated Sarah. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6367, ln. 16-p. 6368, ln. 7. 
137. Dr. Beaver testified to the current state of the scientific understanding of brain 
development and that the development of the areas of the brain associated with high-level 
decision making. organization, problem solving, inhibitory control, and higher-level adult 
reasoning and functioning do not fully develop until sometime in the mid-twenties. Tr. Vol. 9, 
p. 6370, ln. 3-p. 6371, ln. 10. 
138. Dr. Beaver also testified as to the effects of age, stress, and Ambien on memory. 
Tr. Vol. 9, ln. 6379, ln. 17-p. 6385, ln. 11. 
139. Dr. Beaver testified that Sarah has rehabilitative potential. Tr. Vol. 9, ln. 4-20. 
140. Dr. Beaver cited the facts that Sarah does not have a mental health disorder, does 
not have a drug or alcohol dependency problem. is of average intelligence, and did not have a 
prior history of violence in support of the conclusion that she can eventually be successful in the 
community. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6399, ln. 4-22. 
141. Dr. Beaver testified that the research indicates that people who have killed a parent 
have a very low recidivism rate compared to other people who go to prison. Tr. Vol. 9. p. 6400, 
ln. 1-7. 
142. Dr. Beaver further testified that the testing done on Sarah does not indicate that she 
is a sociopath. Tr. Vol. 9. p. 6400, ln. 18-p. 6401, ln. 3. 
143. Dr. Beaver testified that in his opinion, Sarah is not a substantial risk: to reoffend. 
Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6413. ln. 5-p. 6515. ln. 8. 
131. In imposing the two fixed life sentences, the District Court made only the 
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following observations regarding Sarah's age (16) at the time of the offenses: 
A. "Part of the notion here, to me at least, is that society cannot tolerate and will 
not tolerate a child rebelling against parents and killing them, the very people who in this 
circumstance were trying to protect you. And, clearly, absent any justification or excuse. 
That's precisely what happened here." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6469, In. 22-p. 6470, ln. 3. 
B. "While I recognize that some of the psychological evidence presented here at 
this sentencing hearing was to the effect that adolescents can act impulsively, the evidence in this 
case is not impulsive evidence." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6473, ln. 9-13. 
C. "Another way for me to look at it is to do what I call a T account .... And on 
the mitigating side, there is in fact your age. At the time you committed these crimes, you were 
16 years of age." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6477, ln. 12-20. 
D. "I think Dr. Worst is right in the sense that you have this distorted view of 
yourself and reality, and the truth escapes you, frankly. And I don't think it's a product of your 
age. I just think it's a product of your makeup that you find the fact of being truthful difficult to 
get a hold of" Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6489, In. 15-20. 
E. "As to Dr. Beaver's testimony about children, what I would respond is 
children normally don't act the way you act. You had many options to do many different things, 
and vou chose to do what you did." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6492, In. 13-17. 
F. "And then the state bromrht up this question about vour a2e. and made the 
comment that vou had alreadv received the benefit of vour a2e: and vou had alreadv received the 
benefit of vour a2e because the state had not sou2ht the death penaltv. And of course. the 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that this is not a death penaltv case. I understand it's not 
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a death penalty case. It's never been a death penalty case." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6492, ln. 25-p. 6493, 
ln. 8. 
G. Following this statement, the Court reviewed the case, "pretending" it was a 
death penalty case to guide its discretion. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6493, ln. 18-p. 6497. ln. 12. The Court 
concluded this analysis by stating, "So if, hypothetically, if this were a death penalty case, you 
would be a candidate for it; and that's the purpose of this exercise." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6497, ln. 
13-15. 
H. "As to general deterrence, this -- the community and people in this state have 
to understand, and the kids in this state ~ave to understand the first time they get grounded by -
when they get grounded by their parents; I shouldn't say the first, when they get grounded by 
their parents when they refuse to follow family rules, when the parents are simply trying to 
protect them from an improper, illegal relationship, kids can't just go kill parents. We would 
have absolute disarray in our society if that was sanctioned behavior." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6499, ln. 
18-p. 6500, ln. 3. 
132. The District Court violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to take into account 
how children are different from adults and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing a child to a lifetime in prison. Miller v. Alabama. U.S. . 132 S.Ct. 2455, 
2469 (2012). 
133. The two fixed life sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because a fixed life 
sentence may only be imposed the most unusual of circumstances, circumstances which do not 
exist in this case. Id. 
134. In the alternative. the two fixed life sentences violate the Eighth Amendment 
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because fixed life sentences for juveniles are categorically impermissible. Id. 
Why Relief Should be Granted as to This Claim 
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller that statutory schemes 
mandating life imprisonment without parole for those under age 18 at the time of the offense 
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching its 
decision, the Court clarified that "imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile 
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children." 132 S.Ct. at 2466. The Court 
further clarified that "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon" and indicate.d that the penalty is only appropriate for "the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 132 S.Ct. at 2470. Moreover, 
as noted in the dissents of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, the 
prohibition against fixed life sentences will likely soon be extended to all juvenile offenders, 
including those convicted of homicide in states which do not mandate fixed life terms. 132 
S.Ct. at 2481, 2486, 2489-90. 
Miller relied on two prior cases: Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which 
invalidated the death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of 18; and Graham v . 
Florida. 560 U.S. . 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), which invalidated life without parole sentences 
imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders. 
In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty cannot be applied to juveniles. 
In reaching this decision, the Court looked to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society." 543 U.S. at 561. To measure this evolution. the Court looked 
not only at the number of states that allowed executions of juveniles. but also at the consistency 
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of the direction of change in state laws. 543 U.S. at 566. The Court also looked to the laws of 
other countries and to the international authorities as instructive. 543 U.S. at 574. Lastly, the 
Court brought its own independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the penalty for a 
particular class of crimes or class of offenders. Id. 
Graham and Miller likewise looked to the evolving standards of decency, as evidenced by 
state laws, direction of change in state laws, and international standards as well as the Court's 
own independent judgment. 
In exercising its own judgment, the Court considered several factors. First, the Court 
made clear in Roper that society views juveniles as "categorcially less culpable than the average 
criminal." 543 U.S. at 567. The Court also cited three general differences between·juveniles 
and adults that demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the 
worst offenders: 1) as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies confirm, 
juveniles are less mature and responsible than adults; 2) juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure: and 3) the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. 543 U.S. at 569-70. The 
Court concluded that [t]hese differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls 
among the worst offenders." 543 U.S. at 570. "The reality that juveniles still struggle to define 
their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character." Id. In short. juveniles have a lesser 
culpability than adults. And. this lesser culpability affects the analysis of retribution, deterrence. 
and rehabilitation - retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on 
one whose culpabilitv is diminished by reason of youth and immaturity. And. rehabilitation is 
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more likely as "the signature qualities of youth are transient." 543 U.S. at 570-71. Children 
grow up. 
Roper adopted a categorical prohibition against the death penalty for juveniles because of 
the difficulties in judging and predicting in juvenile cases. The Court noted the likelihood that 
the "brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating 
arguments based on youth as a matter of course" and remarked that in some cases, it is even 
possible that the defendant's youth would wrongly be counted against him or her. 543 U.S. at 
573. The Court concluded that even trained psychiatrists do not diagnose patients under age 18 
as having antisocial personality disorder - and that if trained professionals do not believe that 
they can determine that a youth is irreparably depraved, then states cannot ask jurors to make that 
determination and extinguish the life and potential for a mature understanding of one's own 
humanity for anyone under age 18 by imposing the death penalty. Id. 
Graham applied the same analytic framework to life without possibility of parole 
sentences as had been applied to death penalty sentences in Roper. In doing so. the Court noted 
that life without parole is an especially harsh penalty for a juvenile - a harsher penalty than the 
same sentence imposed on an adult because a juvenile will spend more years and a greater 
proportion of his or her life in prison than an adult. "This reality cannot be ignored." U.S. at 
, 130 S.Ct. at 2028. 
The Court noted that life without possibility of parole sentences are like death penalty 
sentences in that they alter the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. The sentence 
"deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except 
perhaps by executive clemency - the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness 
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of the sentence." U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2027. "This sentence 'means denial of hope; it 
means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the 
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict), he will remain in prison for the 
rest of his days."' Id.. quotingNaovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 994,996 (Nev. 1989). 
The Court also noted that the developments in psychology and brain science since Roper 
continued to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. "Juveniles are 
more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 
'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults." U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 
2026, citing Roper. From both a scientific and a moral standpoint it is misguided to equate the 
actions of a juvenile with those of an adult. Id. 
In determining that the proper result was a categorical prohibition on fixed life sentences 
for non-homicide juvenile offenders, the Court looked at the penological justifications for 
sentencing and held that none - retribution, deterrence. incapacitation, or rehabilitation - provides 
an adequate justification for the harsh sentence. The Court held that retribution does not justify 
imposition of the penalty because juveniles are less culpable than adults. U.S. at . 130 
S.Ct. at 2028. Deterrence does not justify the sentence because the same characteristics that 
render juveniles less culpable than adults also make them less susceptible to deterrence . 
U.S. at . 130 S.Ct. at 2028-29. Incapacitation does not justify the sentence because the 
characteristics of juveniles make the judgment that a specific youth is incorrigible and can never 
be safely in the community again questionable. "A life without parole sentence improperly 
denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity." U.S. at 
130 S.Ct. at 2029. And finally. rehabilitation does not justify the penalty because the penalty 
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forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2030. 
Noting an on-going concern with the "unacceptable likelihood" that the brutality or 
cold-blooded nature of a particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth 
as a matter of course, the Court determined both that a criminal procedure that failed to take into 
account the defendant's youth is constitutionally flawed and further that a categorical prohibition 
against mandatory fixed life sentences was the proper course. U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 
2030-2032. 
In Miller, the Court again applied the same analytical framework - noting Graham's 
foundational principle: "that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders 
cannot proceed as though they were not children." U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2466. And, 
Miller emphasized that this is true in all cases - even in cases involving vicious murders. 
U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
Miller concluded: 
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Cf. 
Graham. 560 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2030 ('A State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom,' but must provide 'some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation'). By making youth 
(and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison 
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. 
Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider 
Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a 
categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and 
younger. But given all we have said in Roper. Graham. and this decision about 
children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty 
will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted 
in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between 'the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.' Roper. 543 U.S. 
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at 573, 125 S.Ct. at 1183; Graham, 560 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2026-2027. 
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in 
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different and 
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
pnson. 
U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
As discussed above, the dissenters in Miller all noted that Miller is "an invitation to 
overturn life without parole sentences" and that the prohibition will likely soon extend to all 
fixed life sentences even for homicides and even in states which allow judicial discretion. And, 
since Miller, the Court has in fact vacated a judgment and remanded for further consideration in 
light of Miller in Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 133 S.Ct. 183 (2012). Bear Cloud committed first 
degree murder (felony murder) and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He challenged his 
sentence in state court on the basis that life sentences are categorically unconstitutional as applied 
to all juveniles and. more specifically, as applied to juveniles who are 'mere accomplices' to a 
homicide. Bear Cloudv. State, 275 P.3d 377 (Wyo. 2012). Upon remand by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Wyoming Court vacated the juvenile fixed life sentence and detailed the 
Miller factors which must be considered by the sentencing court. Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P .3d 
36. 47-48 (Wyo. 2013). The vacation and remand may be indicative that the dissenting 
opinions predictions in Miller will be proven correct. See also. People v. Williams. 982 N.E.2d 
181 (Ill. App. 2012) (holding that Miller applies retroactively and that the sentencing court 
violated the Eighth Amendment when it did not graduate and proportion punishment for a 
defendant's crimes including first degree murder considering his status as a juvenile at the time 
of the offense. Accord, People v. Morfin. 981 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012). Jones v. State, 
122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) ("We are of the opinion that Miller created a new, substantive 
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rule which should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review."); see also, Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney, -N.E.2d- (Supreme Judicial Court Mass. December 24, 2013) ("[W]e 
conclude that the 'new' constitutional rule announced in Miller ... has retroactive application to 
cases on collateral review[.]"). 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has remanded other juvenile fixed life 
sentences for further consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama. First, in Maurico v. 
California, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 524 (2012), the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 
California Court of Appeals which had affirmed the imposition of three consecutive terms of life 
without the possibility of parole for multiple first-degree murder convictions remanding the case 
for further proceedings. The California Court held that "Mauricio's sentence here was not cruel 
and/or unusual, in light of the severity of the crimes he committed." People v. Mauricio, 2011 
WL 5995976 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2011). And more recently, the Supreme Court vacated the fixed 
life sentence of a seventeen-year-old who was convicted of first-degree murder with special 
circumstances and remanded for further proceedings. Blackwell v. California, USSCt No. 
12-5832 (January 7, 2013), vacating People v. Blackwell, 202 Cal.App.4th 144, 155, 134 
Cal.Rptr.3d 608. 618 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2011). (Upon remand in both Mauricio and Blackwell, 
the California Court of Appeals vacated the fixed life sentences and remanded to the superior 
court. The California Supreme Court has granted review in Maurico and a request for review 
has been filed in Blackwell.) Importantly, California, unlike Alabama but like Idaho. does not 
have a mandatory fixed life sentencing scheme. Thus, it appears that Miller v. Alabama applies 
even in cases where the trial court retains the discretion to impose less than a fixed life sentence 
and that fixed life sentences in those states must complv with Miller. And in Blackwell the 
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question of whether a fixed life sentence is categorically prohibited for juveniles who are 
convicted of murder under an aiding and abetting theory is presented. 134 Cal.Rptr 3 d at 618. 
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court found that Sarah could be found guilty under an 
accomplice liability theory. 145 Idaho at 475, 188 P.3d at 918. 
In Miller, the Supreme Court has directed that a trial court must undertake an analysis of 
"[e)verything [it] said in Roper and Graham" about youth. Miller, 567 U.S. at--, 132 S.Ct. 
at 2467. This means more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration as a factor 
in sentencing. A sentencing court's passing reference to the defendant's youth does not . 
eliminate need to resentence in light of Miller requirements. Sentencing courts are now required 
to apply the core teachings of Roper, Graham, and Miller in making sentencing decisions. See 
e.g .. State v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 28, 28 (La. 2012) (per curiam) (remanding to the district court 
for reconsideration of the defendant's sentence oflife imprisonment at hard labor without 
possibility of parole imposed in 1995 in light of Miller and requiring the court to make findings 
on the record); and State v. Fletcher, 112 So.3d 1031, 1036 (La. Ct. App.2013) (finding that 
while sentencing court considered some of the factors enumerated in Miller, the court's 
consideration lacked depth). 
The Iowa Supreme Court has issued a series of cases involving juvenile sentences. On 
August 16. 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated a mandatory juvenile fixed life sentence and 
remanded for resentencing. State v. Null. 836 N.W.2d. 41 a(lowa 2013). On the same day it 
issued Null. the Iowa Court vacated a 35 year fixed sentence imposed on a juvenile in State v. 
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013) and a 60 year fixed sentence imposed on a juvenile in 
State v. Ragland. 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013). (In Ragland. the defendant had been sentenced 
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to a fixed life term. In 2012, the Iowa Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration. 
In response to the Miller decision, Iowa's Governor commuted 38 juvenile fixed life sentences to 
life sentences with 60 years fixed. In 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court found that Miller applied to 
the 60 year fixed term because it was the functional equivalent to a fixed life term.) On that 
same day, the Missouri Supreme Court vacated a juvenile fixed life sentence in State v. Hart, 404 
S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013). 
In Null, the Iowa Court wrote that the district court must recognize that because "children 
are constitutionally different from adults," they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of 
culpability as adults in criminal sentencing due to the juvenile's lack of maturity, underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and the less fixed nature of the juveniles 
character." 836 N.W.2d at 74, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2464. And, if a 
district court believes a case presents an exception to this generally applicable rule, the district 
court should make findings discussing why the general rule does not apply. Id., citing Simmons, 
99 So.3d at 28; Fletcher, 112 So.3d at 1036-37. 
There are no such findings in Sarah's case. And. under the analysis in Null, the 
sentencing court's comments are no substitute for formal findings, because "the district court 
must go bevond a mere recitation of the nature of the crime. which the Supreme Court has 
cautioned cannot overwhelm the analysis in the context of juvenile sentencing." Id., see 
Graham, 560 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2032: Roper. 543 U.S. at 572-73. 
"Second, the district court must recognize that '[j]uveniles are more capable of change 
than are adults' and that as a result, 'their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably 
depraved character."' 836 N.W.2d at 75,., citing Graham. 560 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2026, in 
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I" 
turn quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; accord Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2464. And, 
"the district court must recognize that most juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not 
destined to become lifelong criminals." Id., citing Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2464; 
Graham, 560 U.S. at , 130 S.Ct. at 2029; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. In other words. the 
"'signature qualities' of youth are all 'transient."' Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2467, 
quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993). Because "incorrigibility is inconsistent 
with youth," care should be taken to avoid "an irrevocable judgment about [an offender's] value 
and place in society." Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2465. 
Finally, "the district court should recognize that a lengthy prison sentence without the 
possibility of parole such as that involved in this case is appropriate, if at all, only in rare or 
uncommon cases." Null, supra., citing Miller, 567 U.S. at , 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
More recently, a United States District Court ordered that the state of Michigan create an 
administrative structure for the pmpose of processing and determining the appropriateness of 
paroles for prisoners sentenced to life without parole sentences for crimes committed as juvenile. 
It also required the state to give notice to all such persons who have completed 10 years of 
imprisonment that their eligibility for parole will be considered in a meaningful and realistic 
manner. Hill v. Snyder, No. CV-10-14568 (Dkt #107) (D.Ct. E. Michigan November 26, 2013). 
Applying Roper. Graham and Miller to this case. an Eighth Amendment violation exists. 
First, the District Court did not take into account Sarah's status as a juvenile in sentencing her. 
The Court rejected all the defense evidence presented regarding Sarah's vouth - dismissing both 
Dr. Beaver and Dr. Worst's testimony regarding brain development and Sarah's potential for 
rehabilitation and low likelihood of reoffense. Instead of considering that Sarah's youth made 
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her less culpable than an adult, that she was more vulnerable to negative influences and outside 
pressures, and that her character not as well formed and less fixed than an adult's, the Court held 
Sarah's youth against her. The Court did exactly what the Supreme Court cautioned against and 
forbade; it allowed the nature of the crime to overpower the mitigation arguments based on 
youth. The Court determined that Sarah was more deserving of the harshest possible penalty 
because she was a child and because the Court found that children killing parents cannot be 
tolerated and social chaos might result from a lesser penalty. Had Sarah been an adult who 
killed her parents, the Court would have, by its reasoning, given her a lesser sentence because , 
adult children who kill their parents do not threaten the social fabric as seriously as juveniles who 
kill their parents do. This failure to properly consider Sarah's youth violated the Eighth 
Amendment. 
The Eighth Amendment was also violated because this case does not present the unusual 
circumstances which would allow such a penalty. While the offense of conviction was violent, 
Sarah had no prior record of violence. There was substantial evidence that Sarah was amenable 
to rehabilitation. There was no evidence that she would forever be a danger to society. In fact, 
two experts testified that she was unlikely to reoffend and likely could eventually be safety 
released into the community. 
Miller considered the legitimate penological justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentence possible. life without possibilitv of parole, on·juveniles and determined that the 
sentence cannot be justified on the basis of retribution because retribution relates to 
blameworthiness and the case for blameworthiness and thus retribution is not as strong with 
children as with adults. The Court further found that the sentence cannot be justified by 
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deterrence because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults, 
including immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity, make them less likely to consider potential 
punishment. And, incapacitation cannot justify the sentence except where a finding can be made 
that the child will forever be a danger to society - a finding that "is inconsistent with youth." (In 
particular, that finding is inconsistent with youth in this case because both Dr. Beaver and Dr. 
Worst testified that Sarah cannot be said to be incorrigible.) And, lastly, the sentence cannot be 
justified on the basis of rehabilitation because the sentence imposed disregards the possibility of 
rehabilitation. U.S. , 132 S.Ct. at 2465- 2469. 
In this case, the imposition of two fixed life sentences cannot be reconciled with the 
Eighth Amendment. The sentences cannot be justified by retribution, deterrence, incapacity, or 
rehabilitation. 
Lastly, the sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because as noted in the dissents in 
Miller. following Miller, fixed life sentences for juveniles convicted of murder will not be 
allowed. All the bases for finding the sentences unconstitutional in Miller including the trend of 
state laws, international law. and the Court's own judgment. will be applied to find the sentences 
unconstitutional regardless of what sentencing discretion is given to the trial court. 
For these reasons, should Sarah's convictions not be vacated as a result of this 
post-conviction petition. her sentences should be vacated and the matter set for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
Sarah Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel In The Original Petition For 
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Post-Conviction Relief, The Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims And The Brady Claim 
May Be Raised In A Successive Petition, And Further, This Petition Is Timely 
Relevant Facts 
135. Proceedings on Sarah's original petition for post-conviction relief have not been 
completed as the case remains pending in the Supreme Court. 
136. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood following the State's denial of due process by discarding the 
comforter was not raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
13 7. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence regarding 
Janet Sylten's parole status at the time of the Johnsons' murders was not raised in the original or 
amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
138. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct throughout the trial was not raised in the original or amended petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
139. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury's trip 
from Ada County to Bellevue to visit the Johnson house was not raised in the original or 
amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
140. The claim that Sarah was denied effective assistance of counsel when her 
appointed counsel labored throughout the proceedings under an actual conflict was interest was 
not raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
141. The claim that Sarah was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in the 
direct appeal was not raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
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142. The claim that Sarah was denied due process when the State withheld the material 
exculpatory evidence that the fingerprints found on the rifle, scope and ammunition box insert 
had been run through AFIS and matched to Christopher Hill - Brady claim, was not raised in the 
original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
143. The claim that the fixed life sentences violate the Eighth Amendment was not 
raised in the original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
·144. Post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these claims in the 
original or amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
Argument 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and indicates that 
successive petitions for post-conviction relief are generally not permissible unless the court finds 
a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended petition. 
Deficient representation by counsel in an initia} post-conviction proceeding that causes a 
claim to be inadequately presented to the court, constitutions a "sufficient reason" to allow 
assertion of the claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to LC. § 19-4908. See, 
e.g. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct. App. 2008); Baker v. State, 
143 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). 
As set out in Schwartz: 
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an application 
for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the 
determination of a proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later. The 
appeal referenced in that section rpeans the appeal in the underlying criminal case. 
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The failure to file a timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. 
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been 
concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year 
limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient 
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel 
may provide sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or 
allegations inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a 
subsequent post-conviction application. Additionally, when a second or 
successive application is presented because the initial application was summarily 
dismissed due to the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction counsel, 
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. This is so because failing to 
provide a post-conviction application with a meaningful opportunity to have his or 
her claims presented may be violative of due process. 
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The determination of what is a reasonable time for filing a successive petition is to be 
considered on a case by case basis. Id., at 190, 177 P.3d at 404, citing Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). 
When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a basis for 
bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is "whether the second [petition] has raised 
not merely a question of counsel's performance but substantive grounds for relief from the 
conviction and sentence." Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494,496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337,339, 743 P.2d 990,992 (Ct. App. 1987). Thus, to 
overcome summary dismissal, a petitioner must allege that the claims raised in the successive 
petition were either not raised or inadequately asserted in the original post-conviction action due 
to the ineffective assistance of original post-conviction counsel and a valid underlying claim for 
post-conviction relief. Nguyen, 126 Idaho at 496, 887 P.2d at 41. 
This, Sarah has done. She has alleged that her original post-conviction counsel was 




ineffective. In particular, counsel was ineffective insofar as it was deficient performance to fail 
to raise the meritorious claims that Sarah is now raising in this successive petition and that 
deficiency was prejudicial because had counsel raised these claims, post-conviction relief would 
have been granted. Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
Moreover, Sarah is raising these claims in a timely manner. The appeal from the denial 
of relief is still pending. It is not unreasonable in terms of timeliness to file a successive petition 
even before litigation has concluded on the original petition. Indeed, the language of Schwartz 
quoted above anticipates that a "reasonable time" will not expire until sometime after the 
proceedings in the original petition are concluded. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
1. That counsel be appointed to assist her in the prosecution of this action; 
2. That the judgment of conviction be vacated and that a new trial be granted; and/or 
3. That the sentences be vacated and the matter set for a new sentencing hearing; and/or 
4. For such other and further relief s the Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted thi .__.=-
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VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Sarah Johnson, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief and that the matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of 
my knowledge and belief. 
Notary Pub~r thette ofldaho 
Residing at: ~~~ ~ \\) 
My commission expires:\\~. l.A , 7--D\ C\ 




I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisZZ:. day of January, 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jim Thomas 
Blaine Co. Prosecutor 
201 Second Ave S., Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Jessica Lorello 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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MN! 1 9 2014 
.A:>i.)ffl 01age. Qledr Oisrdr:t 
Court 8la11ir; ldll1tD 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-06-324 
) 
vs. } ORDER ON PENDING 
) MOTIONS 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
The Court, having considered the pending motions and after conducting a 
hearing related to said motions on May 5, 2014, hereby enters the following 
order: 
Petitioner's oral motion to withdraw the Motion for Relief from Judgment, 
filed April 9, 2012, is GRANTED. The DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief filed April 9, 2012, in support of the Motion for Relief from 
Judgment, shall be filed nunc pro tune to April 9, 2012, in a separate case and 
assigned a separate case number. The following documents shall also be filed 
nunc pro tune to their original filing dates in the same case number assigned to 
Petitioner's DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: (1) Affidavit 
of Dr. Greg Hampikian in Support of DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief (originally filed on April 13, 2012), and (2) Petitioner's Amended 
DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (originally filed on 
January 22, 2014). The Court's prior order appointing counsel, Keith Roark, to 
represent Petitioner on her DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief shall remain in effect in the newly filed case. 
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Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition, filed May 10, 2012, shall be 
denied without prejudice to refiling it in the new case. 
Respondent's Motion to Stay Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings, 
filed July 3, 2012, is DENIED as moot. 
Respondent's Motion for Ruling on Johnson's 60(b) Motion and Request 
for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief Or, Alternatively, to Stay, filed March 24, 2014, is DENIED 
to the extent it is moot since Petitioner has withdrawn her Motion for Relief from 
Judgment. Respondent's alternative request to stay is denied without prejudice 
to Respondent seeking a stay in the new case should the Respondent choose to 
doso. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED thistf._ day of May, 2014, 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS· 2 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
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FILED:.-~.-
JUN 1 8 2014 
Jolynn Drege, I .. iMdct 
Gour/ Blaine Co:..u;!}t, k.J.lho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) Case No. CV-2014..0353 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
vs. ) TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO 
) AMENDED DNA AND 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
) POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby moves for an extension of time in 
which to file the state's answer and/or motion for summary disposition and/or other 
appropriate pleading in response to Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief ("Amended Successive Petition"). The grounds for this motion 
are as follows. 
As this Court is aware, Johnson's Amended Successive Petition was previously 
filed in Johnson's original post-conviction action (Case No. 2006-324) in support of 
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Johnson's request for relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). The state filed a response to that 
request and, ultimately, the Rule 60(b) issue was resolved by agreement of the parties that 
Johnson's Amended Successive Petition should be filed in a new case (the above-
captioned case), which occurred on May 19, 2014.1 Based on the May 19, 2014 filing 
date, the state's response is due June 18, 2014. Since May 19, 2014, undersigned 
counsel has be.en unable to finalize the state's response to Petitioner's Amended 
Successive Petition due to a death in the family and other personal matters that have 
required time away from work. In addition, during the past 30 days, undersigned counsel 
has had briefing deadlines in Melton v. Reinke, Federal District Court Case No. CV-10-
364-CWD, Loftis v. Wengler, Federal District Court Case No. CV-12-379-REB, Salinas v. 
State, Idaho Supreme Court No. 40902, State v. Pedersen, Idaho Supreme Court Docket 
No. 41431 , State v. Stewart, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 41011, State v. Skiles, 
Idaho Supreme Court No. 41628, and Padilla v. State, Idaho Supreme Court No. 41772. 
Undersigned counsel will also be on vacation from June 24 through June 30, 2014, and 
will be teaching a full day at POST on July 2, 2014. 
In light of the foregoing, the state requests an extension of 30 days in which to 
prepare a response to Petitioner's Amended Successive Petition, making the due date 
July 18, 2014. 
DATED this 18th day of June 2014. 
JE M. LORELLO 
Attorney General 
1 However, for purposes of the statute of limitation, the parties agreed that the filing date 
would be the same date the Amended Successive Petition was filed in Case No. CV-2006-
324. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 181h day of June 2014 I caused to be faxed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion For Extension Of Time To File Response to 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief to: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax(208)788-5527 
R. Keith Roark 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
_x_ Facsimile 
_x_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
~ oseanNewman, Lega!Secretary' 
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LAWRENCE G. WAID!N 
Idaho Attorney General 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #8664 
Deputies Attomey General 
Special Prosecuting Attomey 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 864-8074 
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JUN 2 7 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IOAHO. IN ANO FOR THE COUNiY OF BLAINE 
SARAHJOHNSON ) 
) 0- No. CV•ZD14-353 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF 
vs. ) TIME TO FIL! JIIESPONSE TO 
) AMENDED DNA AND 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUCCESSIVePETITIONFOR 
) POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent ) 
The Respondent's Motion for extension of Time having come before this 
Court and with gOOd cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. that the Respondent be allowed an additional 30 
daye extenSion of time to flle lts response on July 18, 2014. 
DA TED thts 21-deY of June 2014. 
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CERTIFJCATE OF, 
I HEREBY CIIITJFY that on this iz_ day ~4 I caused to be 
faxed a true and correct copy of the fonlgolng ORDER FOR ~NSION OF TIME 
TO FILE RESPONSE TO AMENDED ONA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF to: 
R. Keith Roark 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main St 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Fax {208) 822•7921 
Jessica M. Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box83120 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Fax:(208)854,,808S 
- U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
_ overnight Mail 
L"Facslmlle 
_ U.S. Mall Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
_ Ovemlght Maif 
_L Facsimile 
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Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
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Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON 
Petitioner, 
) Case No. CV-2014..0353 
) 









COMES NOW, Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and, pursuant to I.RE. 201, hereby requests that 
the Court take judicial notice of the following: 
1. Clerk's Record, State v. Johnson, Blaine County Case No. 2003-18200, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33312 
2. Exhibits, State v. Johnson, Blaine County Case No. 2003~ 18200, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33312 
3. Trial Transcript, Volumes I - IX, State v. Johnson, Blaine County Case No. 
2003-18200, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33312 
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
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,• 
4. Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, State v. Johnson, Blaine County Case No. 
2003-18200, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33312 
5. Second Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, State v. Johnson, Blaine County 
Case No. 2003-182001 Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33312 
6. Index, State v. Johnson, Blaine County Case No. 2003-18200, Idaho Supreme 
Court Docket No. 33312 
7. Clerk's Record, Johnson v. State, Blaine County Case No. CV-2006-324, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38769 
8. Transcript on Appeal, Johnson v. State, Blaine County Case No. CV-2006-324, 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38769 
9. Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, Johnson v. State, Blaine County Case No. 
CV-2006-324, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38769 
10. Exhibits, Johnson v. State, Blaine County Case No. CV-2006-324, Idaho 
The foregoing items are relevant to adjudication of the Petitioner's Amended 
DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in this case as they relate 
to the Petitioner's underlying criminal case from which she seeks relief arid her prior 
post-conviction action filed in relation thereto. 
DATED this 18th day of July 2014. 
I AM. LORELLO 
ty Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 atti day of July 2014 I caused to be delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Take Judicial Notice to: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax(208)788-5527 
R. Keith Roark 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
l Facsimile 
.1L U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
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Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
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JUL 1 g 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) Case No. CV .. 2014-0353 
) 
Petitioner, ) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs. ) DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S 
) AMENDED DNA AND 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby files this brief in support of the 
state's motion to summarily dismiss Petitioner's ("Johnson"} "Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' (hereinafter "Amended Successive 
Petition"). 
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BACKGROUND 
The state charged Johnson with, and a jury convicted her of, two counts of 
first-degree murder for murdering her parents, Alan and Diane, early in the morning 
on September 2, 2003. See State v. Johnson ("Johnson I"), 145 Idaho 970, 188 
P .3d 912 (2008}. The court entered Judgment on June 30, 2005, imposing 
concurrent life sentences, plus 15 years for a firearm enhancement. Jg., at 972, 188 
P.3d at 914. 
On April 19, 2006, Johnson filed a "pro se''1 petition for post-conviction relief 
in Blaine County Case No. CV-2006-324, in which she alleged, among other 
claims, that her attorneys were ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of appeaL 
(Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter "Petition;, pp.3-5.) Johnson also 
filed a "pro se" Motion for Appointment of Counsel and a "pro se" Motion for Court 
to Rule on "Notice of Appeal" Issue and Suspend Remaining Post-Conviction 
Claims Pending Outcome of Direct Appeal. The state filed an Answer, an objection 
to Johnson's motion to suspend, and a motion for discovery requesting 
authorization to depose Johnson's two trial attorneys - Bobby Pangburn and Mark 
Rader. 
The Court appointed counsel and granted Johnson's request to reinstate her 
appellate rights and to stay the post-conviction case pending the outcome of her 
appeal. (Order on Motion for New Appeal Period and Motion to Stay, and Order on 
Motion to Seal Motions to Withdraw filed July 3, 2006.} On appeal, Johnson raised 
1 Although Johnson's pleadings, on their face, purport to be pro se, Johnson's 
petition was, in fact, prepared by the State Appellate Public · Defender. (See 
Affidavit of Sara B. Thomas filed June 5, 2006.) 
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three issues: (1) the aiding and abetting instruction constructively amended the 
charging document and resulted in a fatal variance; (2) denial of the "constitutional 
right to a unanimous jury verdict because the district court did not instruct the jury it 
must unanimously agree on whether [she] actually killed [her parents} or whether 
she aided and abetted in the kifling;" and (3) "her constitutional rights were violated 
when the d~strict court failed to remove a certain juror from the jury pool or obtain an 
unequivocal commitment that the juror would follow all of the court's instructions." 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 P.3d at 914. The Idaho Supreme Court denied 
relief on all claims and affirmed Johnson's convictions. Id. The Remittitur issued 
. -
July 18, 2008. Johnson filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the United States 
Supreme Court denied on December 1, 2008. 
On August 15, 2008, the Court issued an order lifting the stay and 
appointing new counsel, Christopher Simms, to represent Johnson in her post-
conviction case. Johnson thereafter filed an amended petition and various motions 
for discovery and expert assistance. On July 29, 2009, Johnson flied a motion for 
leave to file a second amended petition, to which the state objected. The Court 
granted Johnson's motion without prejudice to the state's ability to raise the 
objections and defenses set forth in the state's objection to the amendment. 
Johnson filed her Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter 
··second Amended Petition") on January 12, 2010. In her Second Amended 
Petition, Johnson alleged the following claims: (1) she is "innocent''; (2) lack of 
jurisdiction because there was no juvenile waiver hearing; (3) a due process 
violation because the district judge reviewed a transcript of the grand jury 
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proceeding and police reports and related claims of judicial bias and ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to disqualify the judge; (4) 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel "in 
dealing with fingerprint evidence issues"; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel for 
"failing to lay the proper foundation to allow the admission into evidence, during the 
· hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements, of Dr. Craig Beaver, PhD 
regarding his opinion whether under all the circumstances Sarah Johnson 
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel"; (7) ineffective assistance of 
counsel in handling the "aiding and abetting theory of guilt"; (8) ineffective 
assistance of counsel "in falling to investigate and follow up on a phone call 
received from Steven Pankey informing trial counsel that he had important 
information"; (9) ineffective assistance of counsel "in failing to pursue and present a 
defense that included expert psychiatric testimony which would have infonned the 
jury that a double patricide-matricide, is an incredibly rare phenomena" and even 
"rarer still with a girl of tender years, such as the Petitioner, who has not been 
physically and/or sexually abused, is not schizophrenic and/or intoxicated"; (10) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for violating the rules of professional conduct by 
"communicating with the media in a self promotional manner"; ( 11) ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel; and {12) newly discovered evidence. (See 
genera~ Second Amended Petition.) Claim 4 of Johnson's Second Amended 
Petition was based on allegations that counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to move 
for a continuance after discovering "that a comforter, that would have contained 
physical evidence, had been discarded and not gathered as physical evidence" 
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(Second Amended Petition, pp.7-8, 11 a); (b) failing to "object to the re-enactment 
proffered by the States' [sic] forensic expert Rod Englert, as without adequate 
foundation" (Second Amended Petition, p.8, ,i b); {c) failing to "adequately 
investigate the scientific basis of a proffered experiment and fail[ing] to adequately 
investigate the relevant evidence following the State's delayed disclosure" (Second 
Amended Petition, p.8, ,t c); (d) failing to ••provide expert testimony as to 
comforters 11 (Second Amended Petition, p.9, 11 d); (5) failing to "adequately prepare 
and investigate and to cross-examine the State's witnesses for the relevance and 
accuracy of their testimony and or to make any effort to attack witness veracity, with 
factual inconsistencies from prior statements or testimony" (Second Amended 
Petition, p.9, ,t 16); and (6) failing to "elicit" testimony from the Johnsons' neighbors 
regarding what they saw or heard prior to the murders (Second Amended Petition, 
pp.13-14, ,I 17). The state sought summary dismissal of all claims in Johnson's 
Petition, which the Court granted in part, and denied in part. The Court dismissed 
additional claims pursuant to the state's request for reconsideration. Ultimately, 
Johnson's Second Amended Petition proceeded to hearing on the following claims: 
Claim 4(a) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a 
continuance after discovering the comforter on the bed where Diane 
Johnson was murdered was not collected as evidence. (Second 
Amended Petition, pp.7-8, 1} 15.a.) 
Claim 4(c) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
adequately investigate the scientific basis for the proffered coconut 
experiment. (Second Amended Petition, p.8, 11 15.c.) 
Claim 4(e) - Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the 
cross-examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt 
Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda 
Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul 
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Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Second Amended Petition, pp.9-13, ,r 
16.) 
Claim 4(f) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police 
"focused" on Johnson "to the exclusion of all other possible suspects 
and theories, because [Johnson] was the easiest target." (Second 
Amended Petition, p.13, ·,i 16.c.) 
Claim 12 - Newly discovered evidence based upon the identification 
of fingerprints belonging to Christopher Hill. (Second Amended 
Petition, pp.22-24, fflJ 27-29.) 
P. 9 
Following a four-<lay evidentiary hearing, at which numerous witnesses 
testified, and upon consideration of post-hearing briefing, the Court denied 
Johnson's Second Amended Petition for post-conviction relief on April 5, 2011. 
Johnson filed a notice of appeal from that decision on April 29, 2011. 
Approximately one year later, on April 9, 2012, while her appeal was 
pending, Johnson, with the assistance of pro bono attorneys Dennis Benjamin and 
Deborah Whipple, filed the following documents in Johnson's original post-
conviction case (Case No. CV-2006-324): (1) a DNA and Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief ("Successive Petition"); (2) Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel; (3) Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b); and (4) 
Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in Support of DNA and Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief. 
The state responded to these pleadings by asking this Court to deny the 
60(b) motion and to strike the other documents filed with it, contending, in part, that 
Johnson's pursuit of a successive petition in her original post~conviction case was 
improper. In response Johnson argued, inter alia, that her Successive Petition 
does not commence new proceedings, but Is instead merely a continuation of the 
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· old proceedings. Johnson also filed a motion seeking summary disposition of her 
Successive Petition, to which the state objected. 
Following a hearing on Johnson's request for counsel, at which Johnson 
was represented by pro bona attorney Dennis Benjamin, on June 6, 2012, the 
Court entered an Order Appointing New Counsel, ordering Blaine County to 
"appoint new counsel" for Johnson "pursuant to its standard rotation and public 
defender contract." 
On July 19, 2012, the Court entered a Second Amended Order Appointing 
New Counsel in which the Court appointed the Roark Law Firm to represent 
Johnson "pursuant to that law firm's contract with Blaine County." Pursuant to that 
appointment, on July 23, 2012, newly appointed counsel, Keith Roark, and pro 
bono counsel, Dennis Benjamin, submitted a Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel 
in which the two attorneys "stipulate[d] and agreeid] that Mr. Roark shall be 
substituted in as counsel of record for Petitioner Sarah Marie Johnson in the above-
entitled action and Mr. Benjamin has withdrawn. All future notice, pleadings and 
other mailings should be addressed to R. Keith Roark." 
On October 10, 2012, the Court entered a Further Order Appointing Counsel 
noting the Court's prior "provisional" appointment of Mr. Roark as counsel "pending 
review of all issues related to potential conflict of interest" and that Mr. Roark had 
"inform[ed] the court that he has met with the Petitioner and has explained to her, in 
writing and in person, potential issues of conflict and Ms. Johnson ... waived any 
such conflict." 
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On January 22, 2014, just a few months short of two years after she filed her 
original Successive Petition, Johnson filed her Amended Successive Petition.2 
again filing it in the original post-conviction action, Case No. CV-2006-324. 
· Approximately one month later, on February 18, 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed this Court's decision denying Johnson post-conviction relief Case No. CV-
2006-324. Johnson v. State ("Johnson II"), 156 Idaho 7, 319 P.3d 491 (2014). The 
Remittitur issued on March 12, 2014. 
In light of the resolution of Johnson's post-conviction appeal, but because 
she still had a pending Rule 60(b) motion related to her original petition, on March 
24, 2014, the state filed a motion requesting a ruling on Johnson's 60(b) Motion 
along with a supporting brief. Specifically, the state submitted that the dispute over 
the accuracy of Johnson's belief that pursuit of a su~ssive petition was 
appropriate as part of a request for 60(b) re.lief in Case No. CV-2006-324 should be 
resolved prior to proceeding further. Although Johnson did not file a written 
response to the state's request, the court conducted a hearing on the motion at 
which the Johnson agreed that her Amended Successive Petition should be 
pursued in a separate case and orally withdrew her 60(b) Motion that was filed on 
April 9, 2012. (See Order on Pending Motions, filed May 19, 2014.) The Court, 
therefore, ordered the following documents to be filed nunc pro tune to their original 
filing dates in a separate case and assigned a separate case number (Case No. 
2 Although Mr. Roark and Mr. Benjamin flied a stipulation noting Mr. Roark was 
substituting as counsel for Mr. Benjamin and "Mr. Benjamin has withdrawn," the 
Amended Successive Petition indicates that Mr. Benjamin and Ms. Whipple are "Of 
counsel to the. Roark Law Firm." 
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CV-2014-353): Successive Petition, Amended Successive Petition, and Affidavit of 
Dr. Greg Hampikian in Support of DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief ("Hampikian Aff.''). (Order on Pending Motions.) Those documents were 
filed in Case No. CV~2014-353 on May 19, 2014, but will be deemed filed on their 
original filing dates in Case No. CV-2006-324 for purposes of the statute of 
limitation. The state previously requested an extension of time to file its response 
to Johnson's Amended Successive Petition, which the Court granted. (Order for 
Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and Successive Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, filed June 27, 2014.) The state now files its response to 




Johnson's DNA Claim {Claim 1) Should Be Summarily Dismissed 
In Claim One of her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson seeks relief 
pursuant to I.C. § 194902(b). (Amended Successive Petition, pp.6-13.) This 
request should be denied. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4902(b) provides, in relevant part: 
A petitioner may, at any time, file a petition before the trial 
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the 
performance of fingerprint or forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which 
resulted in his or her conviction but which was not subject to the 
testing that is now requested because the technology for the testing 
was not available at the time of trial. 
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Subsection (c) of I.C. § 19-4902 requires the petitioner to present a prima 
facie case that 11(1) Identity was an issue in the trial which resulted in his or her 
conviction; and (2) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of 
custody sufficient to establish that such evidence has not been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect." The court must allow 
the testing only if it determines that: "(1) The result of the testing has the scientific 
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and (2) The testing method 
requested would likely produce admissible results under the Idaho rules of 
evidence." I.C. § 19-4902{e). 
In support of Claim One1 Johnson submitted the Affidavit of Dr. Greg 
Hampkian ("Hampkian Aff."). Or. Hampkian avers that new "advanced DNA 
amplification and purification techniques" are now available, and were not available 
at the time of trial, and such techniques may be used to test various evidentiary 
items that were admitted at trial. (See generally Hampikian Aff.) Dr. Hampikian 
identifies the new "techniques" as including "post amplification cleanup with 
Montage columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis." (Hampikian Aff., 
p.3.) 
Regarding the statutory requirement that the tests Johnson seeks to have 
performed are based on "technology'' that was not available at the time of trial1 the 
statute does not define what that means. DNA testing was obviously available at 
the time of trial and a significant amount of DNA testing was done in Johnson's 
case and the results of those tests were introduced at trial. (See Trial Tr., Vol. V, 
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pp.3088-3209 (DNA testimony by forensic scientist Cindy Hall).) That new 
"techniquesn for DNA testing may be available does not mean the technology for 
. DNA testing was unavailable at the time of trial; clearly it was. 3 
It is also apparent from Dr. Hampikian's affidavit that much of the testing 
Johnson seeks is not based on new technology, but is simply a request to compare 
previously unidentified DNA to the DNA sample provided by Christopher Hill. (See, 
§.:.9,., Hampikian Aff., p.6 ,m 20, 21.) That Hill's DNA sample was not available at 
the time of trial is not equivalent to demonstrating, as Johnson must, that the 
technology she wants to employ was not available at the time of trial. Johnson's 
request to compare Hill's DNA to the DNA samples collected in her underlying 
criminal case does not fall within the purview of I. C. § 19-4902(b ). 
The next statutory requirement Johnson must satisfy is a prima facie case 
that identity was an issue at trial. I.C. § 19-4902(c)(1). The statute provides no 
guidance on what this requirement means and the state is unaware of any existing 
authority interpreting this language. If identity is an issue whenever a defendant 
denies guilt,4 then identity was at issue in Johnson's case. If identity is not an issue 
when there is undisputed evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of 
the crime and there is evidence, including DNA evidence, that the defendant 
committed the crime, then identity was not an issue in Johnson's case and she is 
foreclosed from obtaining any relief under J.C. § 19-4902(b). Also relevant to the 
3 The state notes that nowhere in his affidavit does Dr. Hampikian identify when 
these "advanced" techniques became available. 
4 This is presumably not the standard since the statute allows even those who 
plead guilty to seek relief. I.C. § 194902(d) ("A petitioner who pleaded guilty in the 
underlying case may file a petition under subsection (b) of this section."). 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 11 
181 of 352
J. U L. 1 8. 2 0 14 3 : 2 9 PM ID ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV NO. 264 P. 15 
question of whether identity was an issue at trial is the fact that the jury was fully 
aware that, in addition to Johnson's DNA, there was DNA at the crime scene that 
was unidentified, 5 just as it was aware that there were fingerprints on the murder 
weapon that did not belong to Johnson. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Johnson 
based on the evidence linking her to the murders since it could find her guilty as 
either a principal or an aider and abettor. The identity of the person who 
contributed the samples that were unidentified at trial does not mean that identity 
was an issue as to Johnson because she was clearly identified as an individual 
whose DNA was found on several incriminating pieces of evidence. 
Even if Johnson has established the predicate technology requirement of 
subsection (b) and has alleged a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial 
as required by subsection (c)(1), this Court should deny her request under 
subsection (e)(1) because the result of any testing does not have the "scientific 
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
probable than not that [Johnson] is innocent." This Court has already detailed the 
overwhelming evidence of Johnson's guilt in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in Case No. cv.2006-324. As noted by this Court: 
The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's 
fingerprints were not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the 
ammunition or packaging, given that a leather glove was found in her 
room in the trash can, and the matching glove was wrapped in 
5 For example, the "majority" of the DNA found on the latex glove matched 
Johnson's, but there was, as Dr. Hampikian notes, "another DNA source in a lower 
concentration present;" however, "it was not a complete profile. 11 (Trial Tr., Vol. V, 
p.3110, Ls.17-20, p.3112, Ls.5-9; Hampikian Aff, p.7.) Johnson's request to pursue 
further testing of an item such as this supports the conclusion that Claim One 
should be denied. 
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Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove 
containing Johnson's DNA. 
Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not 
the actual shooter, was not complicit as an aider and abettor. 
It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the 
murders. There was no forced entry in this case, either to the 
Johnson home or the guesthouse; Johnson's bedroom contained 
.264 cal.iber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-handed leather 
glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson's robe in the garage; 
both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; 
the knives found in the guest bedroom and at the foot of the 
Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder or stranger would 
have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to the guesthouse; 
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her 
relationship with Santos; and Johnson gave numerous conflicting 
stories about what she allegedly was doing when her parents were 
shot. 
This court's reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not 
to say that this court is unconvinced of Johnson's direct culpability for 
the murder of her parents, as argued by the state at trial. Add to the 
above-noted circumstances the DNA evidence, Johnson's motive for 
the crimes, her access and her opportunity .... 
. . . The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in this 
record is, indeed, "overwhelming." 
P. 16 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Case No. CV-2006-324, pp.89-92 
(numbering of paragraphs omitted).) 
This Court has also noted the trial judge's apt assessment of the evidence 
against Johnson: 
[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody 
off of the street could come and find that gun in the guest house, find 
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those bullets in the guest house, know when the parents were going 
to be there; find the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the one 
knife that's hidden behind the microwave or bread box, whatever it 
was, in the dark, no less; go out past the family dog that the evidence 
was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. Take the same route that 
Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the house, past the 
trash can where the robe is found. Get her bathrobe out of the 
bathroom next to her room, and not awaken or bother her. 
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the parents' 
bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do an of this in the dark and 
not disturb the parent'S just defies common sense. 
P. 17 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Case No. CV-2006-324, p.90 (quoting 
Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.449-450).) 
Again quoting the trial judge: 
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The jury 
doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly the way the 
defense theory is that it occurred. The argument of no blood, no guilt; 
well, the converse of that is if there's blood 1 there is guilt. And there's 
blood. There's blood all over the robe, blood on the socks. 
. . . There's not one piece of evidence that excludes the 
defendant from the commission of this crime that I heard. She's right 
there. And her defense - I mean her defense people, Howard and 
Mink, testify - and Iman, I believe, all three - at least two of them 
testified that the doors were open. The door to the parents' bedroom, 
which is propped open by the pillows, and the door to Sarah 
Johnson's room is open. 
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was taken out 
of the Suburban, that's something else that this unnamed killer would 
have had to have .known, is where the gloves were located, the 
mother's gloves in the Suburban. Located those in the dark, as well, 
and brought them into the house to help commit this crime. And 
leave one in Sarah Johnson's room with two cartridges for the .264; 
unspent, unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her 
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah 
Johnson's room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson! it just doesn't 
make sense to me. 
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of the 
leather gloves found in her room, the other one found out - wrapped 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 14 
184 of 352
J.UL. 18. 2014 3:30PM ID ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV NO. 264 
up in the trash can inside the pink robe. That's what I mean by the 
circumstantial evidence here, and she admits being there. 
The evidence is oveiwhelming. 
P. 18 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Case No. CV-2006-324, pp.91-92 
(quoting Supp. Appeal Transcript, pp.450-451).) 
Just as the identification of Hill's fingerprints was inadequate to warrant a 
new trial, Johnson 11, there is no basis for concluding that additional DNA testing 
"would show that it is more prob~ble than not that [Johnson] is innocent," much less 
that Hill was involved, which is the theory she obviously wants to continue to pursue 
through DNA testing. Claim One should be dismissed. 
II. 
Claims Two Through Six Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To J.C. § 19-4908 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act specifically provides that •'[a]II 
grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. "Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding 
the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent 
application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient 
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application." Id. 
Johnson attempts to avoid the bar to successive petitions by relying on the 
principle that .. [dJeficient representation by counsel in an Initial post-conviction 
proceeding that causes a claim to be inadequately presented to the court, 
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constitutions [sic] a 'sufficient reason' to allow assertion of the claim in a 
subsequent post-conviction petition." (Amended Successive Petition, p.57.) This is 
no longer the law. 
In Murphy v. State, 2014 WL 712965 (2014), issued on February 25, 2014, 
rehearing denied,6 the Idaho Supreme Court overruled the principle on which 
Johnson relies and held; "because [there is] no statutory or constitutional right to 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, Murphy cannot demonstrate 
'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel." Likewise, Johnson cannot rely on the alleged ineffectiveness 
of post-conviction counsel as sufficient reason for filing a successive petition. Her 
Amended Successive Petition, at least as to the claims not related to her request 
for DNA testing, i.e., Claims Two through Six, must be dismissed. 
Ill. 
Claims Two - Six Are AJso Subject To Dismissal As Untimely 
With the exception of Johnson's first claim, which is governed by I.C. § 19-
4902(b), all of the claims in her Amended Successive Petition are untimely and 
should be dismissed. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a p.etition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the detennination 
of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." In the case of successive 
petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 
6 The state recognizes that Johnson's sufficient reason argument was made prior to 
the issuance of Murphy. 
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19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not 
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process 
issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) 
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). 
However, absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should be 
tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for 
dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. 
State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 
219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Claims Two, Three, and Four in Johnson's Amended Successive Petition 
allege trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for various reasons. These 
claims were known, or reasonably could have been known, when Johnson filed her 
original petition or even her Second Amended Petition. Rhoades, supra. Claim 
Six, which asserts that Johnson's fixed life sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment was also known, or reasonably could have been known, at that same 
time. Contrary to Johnson's assertion in her Amended Successive Petition, these 
claims are not timely just because she thinks it is "not unreasonable in terms of 
timeliness to file a successive petition even before litigation has concluded on the 
original petition." (Amended Successive Petition at p.59.) 
As for Johnson's fifth claim - that the state allegedly withheld exculpatory 
evidence regarding the identity of Christopher Hill's fingerprints - this claim was not 
only known when Johnson filed her Second Amended Petition, those fingerprints 
were the subject of the evidentiary hearing on Johnson's Second Amended Petition 
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and her claim that she was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence. That Johnson would like to re-frame the claim as a Brady violation does 
not make it timely (nor is it a meritorious claim). 
Because Claims Two through Six of Johnson's Amended Successive 
Petition are untimely, they should be dismissed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss Johnson's Amended Successive Petition and enter Judgment accordingly.7 
DATED this 18th day of July 2014. ------
J SICA M. LORELLO 
eputy Attorney General 
7 Should the Court deny the state's motion to summarily dismiss Claims Two 
through Six based upon I.C. § 19-4908 (and Murphy, supra) or as untimely under 
I .C. § 19-4902, the state asks that the Court set a briefing schedule for the purpose 
of addressing whether th.e claims are subject to summary dismissal due to 
Johnson's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling her to an 
evidentiary hearing on those claims. 
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OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Sarah Johnson respectfully submits the following in support of her objection to the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
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A. The DNA Claim States a Prima Facie Cause of Action and Testing Should be Allowed. 
1. There is DNA technology which was not available at the time of trial which 
could be used here. 
The state first notes that while I.C. § 19-4902(b) requires that "the technology for the 
testing was not available at the time of trial," the statute "does not define what that means." 
State's Brief, p. 10. That is true. Likewise, Sarah is unaware of any Idaho case law interpreting 
the meaning of the word "technology," nor could she find any legislative history. However, the 
meaning seems obvious after applying the well-known rule of statutory construction "[t]hat the 
language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning." LC. § 73-113; Albee 
v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 231, 31 P.3d 248, 253 (2001). 
The word "technology," in this context, means " a manner of accomplishing a task 
especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge <new technologies for information 
storage>." www.merriam-webster.com/dictionacy/technology (emphasis in original). Thus while 
DNA testing, of a sort, was available at the time of the trial, new processes and methods of testing 
DNA and new knowledge about DNA are now available. Consequently, the "technology" Sarah 
proposes to use now was not available at the time of trial. 
According to Dr. Hampikian, post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low 
Copy (LCN) DNA analysis allows DNA testing on much smaller samples than was available at 
the time of Sarah's 2005 trial. In particular, post amplification cleanup with Montage columns 
was not used by the forensic community until 2006, and the new more sensitive Globalfiler DNA 
amplification kit has only been made available since 2012 by Life technologies. This new DNA 
kit amplifies 24 regions of DNA yielding up to 48 alleles, rather than the 16 DNA regions (up to 
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32 alleles) available in the older Identifiler DNA amplification kit. These techniques represent 
new DNA "technology" that has produced results from samples that had been declared 
"untestable" due to low amounts of DNA, or that produced "inconclusive" results. In addition, 
there are new computational tools called intelligent systems which have been developed since 
2005. These tools, like TrueAllele Casework, can deal with low level DNA results, and produce 
meaningful results that human analysts may overlook. After the DNA is processed in the lab, 
intelligent systems can be used to analyze the data and generate profiles from data that had 
previously led to "inconclusive" results. This new technology will permit DNA testing to be done 
on samples that could not have been tested at the time of the trial 
Paragraphs 10-19 and 21-24 of Dr. Hampikian's first affidavit set forth evidence which 
was not DNA tested at the time of trial or was tested but the tests used were not powerful enough 
to obtain useable results. In addition, additional DNA samples are now in the CODIS database 
and samples which could not be matched to a donor should now be rerun. See first Hampikian 
affidavit, Paragraphs 6-9. Finally and obviously, Chris Hill's DNA should be compared against 
the new DNA results obtained via the application of the new technology. It should also be 
compared to the pre-trial testing results which could not be matched to an individual, as set out in 
Paragraphs 7-9 and 20 in Dr. Hampikian's first affidavit. 
2. Identity was the issue at trial. 
The state also observes that "[t]he statute provides no guidance on what [the identity] 
requirement means and the state is unaware of any existing authority interpreting this language." 
State's Brief, p. 11. And again, Sarah is also unaware of any Idaho case law interpreting the 
identity requirement, nor could she find any legislative history. But again, the plain, usual and 
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ordinary meaning of the word "identity" is not difficult to discern. "Identity," used in this context, 
means "the condition of being the same with something described or asserted." An example of its 
use is, "They arrested the wrong man. It was a case of mistaken identity." 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity (emphasis in original). The state asserted at trial 
that Sarah was the principal or accomplice to the murder; she denied that. She did not deny that 
her parents had been murdered. She denied killing them. Identity of the murderer(s) was the 
issue at trial. 
Perhaps there is no Idaho case law addressing the state's question because the meaning of 
the statute admits of only one interpretation, i.e., that identity is at issue at the trial if the defendant 
does not concede that he was the one who committed the act constituting the crime. Identity 
would not be an issue only when the defendant admitted committing the act, such as when a 
defendant accused of murder admits killing the victim but claims self-defense or when a 
defendant accused of rape admits to sexual intercourse but argues it was consensual. 
According to Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of 
Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 Drake L. Rev. 799, 
822-23 (2011), twenty-one state post-conviction DNA statutes and the federal statute limit DNA 
testing to cases where the identity of the perpetrator was at issue at trial. Another six states 
require that identity was or "should have been" an issue at trial. Id, at 821-822. 
The California legislative history of its DNA statute explains the meaning of the identity 
requirement. 
[T]he only persons who could request DNA testing under this bill are those who 
had cases in which "identity" was the key issue. Thus, these are cases where a 
person was identified by a victim or witness as the person who had committed the 
4 • OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
197 of 352
crime and no defense such as self-defense or consent was used. This will limit the 
number of cases that this bill will apply to. 
Id, quoting discussion from the California Senate Committee meeting on April 11, 2000, 
regarding California Penal Code Section 1405. 
The out-of-state cases also support Sarah's common-sense interpretation of the statute. 
The Missouri Supreme Court wrote as follows: 
The phrase "identity at issue" encompasses "mistaken identity," but it also includes 
all cases in which the defendant claims that he did not commit the acts alleged-as 
opposed to cases where the defendant admits his actions but puts forth an 
affirmative defense. See Weeks [v. State], 140 S.W.3d (39] at 47 n. 8 [Mo. 2004). 
Other states have similarly held. See Anderson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865 
(Del.2003) ("Identity is always an issue in a criminal trial unless the defendant 
admits having engaged in the alleged conduct and relies on a defense such as 
consent or justification."); State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 2004) 
("[I]dentity may be at issue during a trial even when the alleged victim identifies 
only the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime but the defendant claims no crime 
was committed."); People v. Urioste, 316 Ill. App.3d 307,249 Ill. Dec. 512, 736 
N.E.2d 706, 714 (2000) ("Where a defendant contests guilt based upon 
self-defense, compulsion, entrapment, necessity, or a plea of insanity, identity 
ceases to be the issue."). 
State v. Ruff, 256 S.W.3d 55, 57 (Mo. 2008). Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court states that 
"[a] petitioner may satisfy this requirement by showing that identity was a legitimate contested 
issue at trial. This is the case when a defendant denies having committed the acts alleged." 
Haffey v. State, 233 P.3d 315,318 (Mt. 2010). Accord, State v. Peterson, 836 A.2d 821 (NJ. 
App. Div. 2003) (Identity was issue in the case for purposes of post-conviction DNA statute 
where defendant's only defense at trial was that he was not the perpetrator, even though the state's 
evidence that he was the perpetrator was strong.). 
It is odd that the state now claims that identity was not an issue at trial because it argued 
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the opposite to the jury. The prosecutor said in closing argument: 
Now what kind of defense did the defense put up? It's called a SODDI defense. 
S-0-D-D-I. And you know, that's a defense that's well-worn, that the defense 
resorts to when the facts are against them and the law is against them. 
Now, what is it? It's Some Other Dude Did It. 
Supplemental Transcript ("Supp. Tr.") p. 177, In. 3-10. In rebuttal the state again hit on this 
theme: 
The defense has tried to convince you that there is a reasonable doubt in this case 
due to the possibility of an unknown shooter. 
Supp. Tr. p. 315, ln. 24 -p. 316, ln. 8. 
The defense at Sarah's trial was "No blood, no guilt," i.e., that she was not the one who 
killed her parents. She also argued that she was not an accomplice to the murders. She did not 
admit killing her parents nor did she argue that it was justified or excused. Thus identity was an 
issue at trial. 
3. The evidence to be tested is subiect to chain of custody. 
The state does not dispute that the evidence Sarah asks to be tested is subject to a reliable 
chain of custody. 
4. Results have the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence 
that would show petitioner is innocent. 
(a) The testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence. 
Dr. Hampikian's two affidavits set forth what new evidence could be produced. There is 
the scientific potential for the testing to produce new evidence regarding the identity of the killer. 
(b) That evidence could show Sarah is innocent. 
The state next asserts that the new DNA evidence could not show Sarah was innocent as 
6 • OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
199 of 352
the trial evidence was "overwhelming." State's Brief, p. 12. It is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, if DNA evidence exists and shows someone besides Sarah killed her parents, its 
discovery would show Sarah is innocent. As noted above, identity of the killer was the issue at 
trial. 
Second, as shown below, the evidence regarding identity is not overwhelming, especially 
when considered along with the newly discovered evidence found after the trial. 
(i) trial evidence 
Nineteen hundred latent fingerprints were processed by the state's experts. None matched 
Sarah's. Trial Transcript ("T Tr.") Vol. 5, p. 3018, ln. 14-15; p. 3068, In. 9-21. 
Starting shortly after the police arrived on the scene, Sarah's body was also repeatedly 
inspected and tested, but she did not have any blood on her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1818, ln. 15 - p. 
1819, ln. 16; p. 1858, In. 10-13; Vol. 4, p. 2249, ln. 6-9; p. 2280, ln. 11 - p. 2282, In. 8; p. 2472, 
In. 19-23; Vol. 6, p. 3653, In. 1-11; Vol. 7, p. 5032, ln. 19-24; Vol. 8, p. 5754, ln. 13. 
The absence of any blood on Sarah is exonerating because the bedroom and hallway were 
"covered with blood and flesh and brain material running up to the ceiling, across the ceiling of 
the bedroom, going towards the bathroom." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1658, In. 11-17. "Things were 
dripping off the wall and off the ceiling on the floor," T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1659, In. 7-10. The state's 
expert described the explosion of Diane Johnson's head as a "massive amount of eruption" with 
"massive energy." He described bone and tissue "hitting and ricocheting off and coming back to 
that area. That's how powerful it gets." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4169, ln. 14-19; p. 4172, ln. 10-14. Dr. 
Grey, a forensic pathologist, testified that Alan, shot in his lung, could have been coughing out 
blood in a high-velocity spatter pattern. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5376, In. 21-25. The robe had blood from 
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both Diane and Alan Johnson in patterns indicating that the blood was moving very quickly at 
high energy when it was deposited. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4205, ln. 9-17. The state's expert testified 
that "one thing, again, that can't ever be changed, it's a fact that can't be taken away, is the 
evidence that the robe is covered in a (sic) waist-down with the blood of Diane Johnson and Alan 
Johnson in a high velocity particulate." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, In. 14-18. The state's expert 
testified, "The shooter in this case did block the [blood] spatter coming back, yes." T Tr. Vol. 6, 
p. 4251, ln. 5-6. 
The T-shirt and pajama bottoms Sarah was wearing were carefully inspected and tested, 
but did not have any blood on them. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3188, ln. 18 - p. 3189, In. 5. 
The robe had gunshot residue on it. Supp. Tr. p. 206, ln. 24. There was no gunshot 
residue on Sarah or her pajamas. See T Tr. 
Fibers were found on the rifle, but they did not come from any material that was matched 
to Sarah's clothing or anything belonging to Sarah or even the Johnson household. T Tr. Vol. 6, 
p. 4243, ln. 12-1. 
The robe also had DNA on it, including DNA in a piece of human tissue which belonged 
to a male other than Bruno Santos or Alan Johnson. Clerk's Record on Appeal, Vol. 4, p. 1036. 
So, this man other than Bruno or Alan had lost body tissue while wearing or in very close 
proximity to the robe. 
The state posited that a comforter was tightly tucked over Diane's head at the time she was 
shot blocking her blood from the shooter. Supp Tr. p. 197, ln. 13-20. But, it did not explain why 
the robe the shooter wore was covered with Diane's blood. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, ln. 14-18. The 
state also failed to explain how Diane had tucked a comforter in over her own head so tightly that 
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it took force for Officer Kirtley to pull it down when he entered the bedroom. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 
5223, In. 10 - p. 5225, ln. 6. Further, the state failed to collect the comforter as evidence so that 
its theory could be tested, because its investigators did not see any relevance in it. In fact, both 
Officer Kirtley and the officer in charge of the crime scene, Stu Robinson, testified that they 
looked at the comforter at the scene and did not see a bullet hole in it. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1946, In. 
16-22; Vol. 7, p. 4680, In. 24 - p. 4683, ln. 23; p. 5223, In. 19 - p. 5225, In. 6. And, the state 
offered no explanation at all as to why Alan's blood was on the rifle and the robe, but not on 
Sarah. See Supp Tr. p. 175, In. 10 - p. 218, In. 10; p. 313, In. 13 - p. 344, In. 12. 
The state found the scope from the rifle used to kill the Johnsons on the guesthouse bed. T 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1842, ln. 16-18. The rifle, scope and ammunition all had latent fingerprints on them, 
but those fingerprints were not Sarah's. The existence of the fingerprints was inconsistent with 
the state's theory that Sarah used the rifle while wearing gloves, as the handling would have 
obscured older prints. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3028, In. 10-12; p. 3044, In. 15-21; p. 3052, In. 11-21. 
The state noted that Sarah asked for the key to a gun safe two days before her parents 
were murdered. However, Sarah's brother Matthew, who was a witness for the state, testified that 
Sarah kept jewelry in the safe, an innocent reason for a request for the key. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4562, 
In. 15-24. 
Sarah, sixteen years old, of average or low average intelligence and ability to learn, 
orphaned through a violent event, was repeatedly questioned. She was questioned by experts in 
interrogation repeatedly on the day she lost her parents. She was questioned in the absence of 
counsel. She was questioned right after having been given a hypnotic drug. She was questioned 
many times. She was accused of patricide. But, despite the state's very best efforts, she did not 
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confess. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, ln. 1; Vol. 4, p. 2177, ln. 1 -p. 2179, ln. 5; p. 2425, ln. 23 -p. 
2444, ln. 14; p. 2488, ln. 2-14; p. 2446, In. 23 - p. 2452, In. 1; p. 2446, ln. 8 - p. 2454, ln. 19; p. 
1544, ln. 3-12; Vol. 4, p. 2176, ln. 10-15; p. 1749, ln. 1 -p. 1750, ln. 1; p. 2099, In. 23 -p. 2102, 
In. 23; p. 2430, ln. 11-13; Vol 1, p. 654, ln. 9 - p. 655, ln. 21; Vol. 4, p. 2424, ln. 20 - p. 2425, In. 
12; Vol. 5, p. 3368, In. 8 - p. 3371, In. 5; p. 3377, ln. 1 - p. 3378, ln. 6; Vol. 4, p. 2179, ln. 6-20. 
The trial evidence against Sarah was not overwhelming as the state asserts. 
(ii) evidence from the first post-conviction hearing. 
In addition, the question before this Court needs to be considered in light of both the trial 
evidence and the newly discovered evidence in the first post-conviction petition and the evidence 
which could have, but was not, presented to the jury by trial counsel. 
The fingerprint evidence at the evidentiary hearing centered around two topics. First, Mr. 
Kerchusky testified that Mr. Pangburn failed to bring out highly pertinent facts during his 
testimony at the criminal trial, particularly that the unknown prints found on the rifle and 
elsewhere had been recently deposited. 
Q. All right. And didn't you also come up with, have an opinion that certain of 
those latent prints were - were fresh prints? 
A. Oh, yes. Yeah. 
Q. And upon which did you base your opinion that those prints were fresh? And if 
you could, just tell us which prints is it that it was your opinion that they were 
fresh; and upon what did you base your opinion? 
A. Okay. We could start with the scope. The scope was -there was three latent 
fingerprints that were recovered from that scope, And when I looked at the, the 
scope it appeared, the drawing that I had that they were in an upward position or 
they could have been on the side latent fingerprints. 
Q. All right. 
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A. According to the arrow that she had pointing up. And also that the fingers were 
real close together, as if somebody was pushing it real hard as you would unscrew 
a screw, is what it comes down to. And two of the latent prints were from the 
number 3 finger, which is the [right] middle finger. And one came from the 
number 4 finger, which is the [right] index finger. And I felt that, with that and also 
the fact that the scope is covered twice with clothing-when he moved I don't 
know if the clothing was on there. If it was, there would have been no latent 
fingerprints on there from the beginning. But if he moved and then put the clothing 
on, he would have left his fingerprints on there; and then when he went ahead and 
put the, either the material or - I think it was clothing is what he said - and then 
you come to realize that when he went two weeks before the wedding, he went in, 
took the gun out and then checked the gun out and the scope was on there and 
everything else, and then he went back and wrapped it up again and put it back, so 
that was twice that it was wrapped. 
Q. And when you say "he" you're referring to Mel Speegle? 
A. Mel Speegle, that's correct. 
Q. All right. Go on. 
A. Mel Speegle, right? 
Q. Okay. And go on with your answer. 
A. And with those factors, it was my opinion it had to be fresh prints, because most 
-Mr. Speegle's fingerprints were not on that gun after him handling it and all. So 
what happened to them? Most likely they were wiped off when this clothing or 
whatever he had to cover it up, because he covered these things up. So if that 
happened, that would be the same thing as far as the stock is concerned, it would 
be the same thing. And also the fact that there were fresh prints, because there were 
no etched prints going into that, that metal scope, And that was two of the key 
factors as far as those latents were concerned. 
Now as far as the bullet is concerned, that is the one where they got a latent 
fingerprint off the one bullet, That was a loaded bullet. It had a - one of the best 
latents I'd ever seen on there. And the reason why I'm saying this is because a 
bullet is cylinder, and a lot of times you don't leave a lot of friction ridge on, but 
this was an excellent latent print, and that was not etched into the bullet itself. It 
was lifted off. Once you could lift it off, its not etched into there. 
And then as far as the insert, the plastic insert, well, he moved. And that insert was 
not, according to the testimony he gave in trial. He stated that that insert, he was 
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never inside that, those box of bullets to take an inventory. He was asked about an 
inventory. He said for ten years it was, he never went in there to take an inventory 
on there. So that means those latents had to be fresh because they were not - that 
insert was not touched for ten years. 
Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr.") p. 825, In. 4 - p. 828, ln. 13. 
Mr. Kerchusky summarized his professional opinions as follows: 
[T]he prints that were on the scope were fresh because, first of all, they had 
material on them that wiped them down a couple times, and that the latents were in 
that position where it was held real tight like this (indicating). In my opinion, it 
was somebody that was trying to unscrew the scope. And also that they were not 
etched into that metal at all, because they lifted them off; and it had to be a fresh 
print that was on that. 
EH Tr. p. 847, In. 22 - p. 848, ln. 17. 
In addition, the location of the prints on the scope also indicated that it had been recently 
handled. Mr. Kerchusky testified that the fingerprints appeared to be in an upwards position 
which would consistent with someone removing the scope, but inconsistent with someone 
grabbing or touching it to sight it. EH Tr. p. 849, In. 3 - p. 850, In. 20. It is apparent that the 
scope was removed just before the murders as it was found on the bed in Mel Speegle's bedroom. 
As to the live bullet, Mr. Kerchusky's opinion was "that was a fresh print, because it 
would have etched into the brass if it was not a fresh print, because it only takes months before the 
acid starts eating into that brass surface." EH Tr. p. 851, ln. 2-6. 
It was Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that whomever left the unknown prints (later to be 
identified as Christopher Hill) was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and the last person to 
touch the scope. EH Tr. p. 854, In. 7-19. 
Second, there was evidence of a post-trial match of the previously unidentified prints on 
the rifle, its scope and ammunition. In addition to the testimony about the freshness of the prints, 
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there was also evidence that the previously unidentified prints on the murder tools had been 
matched after the trial to Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle. 
Maria Eguren, an Idaho State Police employee in the Bureau of Criminal Identification, 
received the unknown fingerprints from the murder weapon and elsewhere on November 21, 
2003. EH Tr., p. 751, In. 25 - p. 752, ln. 1. She entered them into the AFIS (Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System) unit and did not come up with a hit. EH Tr. p. 762, ln. 3-10. 
She continued to run the prints on a regular basis until January of 2009, when she received a 
match. EH Tr. p. 764, ln. 1-3. The match was Christopher Kevin Hill, who, it turned out, was a 
former employee and friend of Mr. Speegle. EH Tr. p. 766, ln. 4-7. Mr. Hill's fingerprints were 
not entered into the AFIS system until March 15, 2007, well after the 2005 criminal trial. EH Tr. 
p. 772, ln. 23 - p. 773, In. 25. Ms. Eguren did not confinn the match herself, instead she turned 
the matter over to Tina Walthall, for examination. 
Ms. Walthall, a fingerprint examiner, compared Mr. Hill's prints to the unknown prints 
and confirmed that three of his prints were on the rifle scope and two of his prints were on the box 
of that rifle's ammunition which was found in Mel Speegle's closet. EH p. 891, ln. 18 -p. 892, ln. 
13. In particular, prints from Mr. Hill's right middle finger and right ring fingers were found on 
the scope. She also found Mr. Hill's left thumbprint on a live cartridge from the ammunition and 
another right middle fingerprint on the plastic insert found in the ammunition box. Finally, Mr. 
Hill's left palm print was also found on the rifle. EH Tr. p. 893, ln. 2 - pg. 896, ln. 5. 
Even though a match had been made, no one from the State alerted Sarah or her lawyers. 
Instead, that information only came to light because Mr. Kerchusky called Ms. Eguren at home to 
inquire about the case. She said that, "[h]e called me several times, And I wasn't telling him. He 
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told me, well, I have to rerun the case. And then after several conversations with him, it slipped 
outthatldidgetahit." EHp. 767,ln.10-15. 
It was Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that Christopher Hill was the last person to touch the .264 
rifle and the last person to touch the scope. EH p. 854, In. 7-19. Here, the state's theory of the 
case was that Sarah got the rifle out of Mel Speegle's closet, removed the scope, carried the 
weapon to the house and accurately fired the weapon twice, all without leaving any of her own 
fingerprints on the gun and at the same time not destroying the unknown fingerprints. 
Consequently, the evidence that Christopher Hill's fresh fingerprints were on the gun and 
ammunition, that he was the one who took off the scope shortly before the murders, and he was 
the last person to touch the weapon further undermines the state's theory. 
The fact that the jury was aware that unidentified prints were on the scope, gun and some 
of the shells does not diminish the importance of identifying Mr. Hill. Unidentified prints are 
profoundly different from identified prints. One of the big questions in this case was obviously 
"If not Sarah, then who? And the state emphasized in closing arguments that the unknown prints 
did not come from anyone associated with the household. This emphasis makes sense because if 
the prints had come from someone who knew the house, there was less reason to believe that 
Sarah was involved. Supp. Tr. p. 336, In. 21-24. Clearly the fact that the unknown fingerprints 
could not be matched to any specific person was key to the state's argument. But, once the prints 
were matched, they were linked to someone who knew where to find the guns and had a 
connection to the Johnson house. 
Christopher Hill and Mel Speegle both testified that Christopher had helped Mel move 
into the guesthouse and so he knew the Johnson guesthouse and knew where the guns were stored. 
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EH Tr. p. 938, In. 1-3; p. 940, ln. 25 - p. 941, In. 6; p. 948, ln. 9 - p. 948, In. 5; p. 964, In. 10-12. 
See also PC R Vol. 2, p. 549, a police report documenting that Mel Speegle stated that Mr. Hill 
helped him move the guns into the guesthouse. And, Mr. Hill did not have anyone who came 
forward to verify his claim that he was camping by himself on the Magic Reservoir on the day the 
Johnsons were killed. EH Tr. p. 975, In. 2-19. And, further, Janet Sylten testified at trial that she 
and Russ Nuxoll had also been living at the Reservoir - which created a possible connection 
between Mr. Hill and Ms. Sylten, who had a documented violent history, had scared Ms. Lehat, 
had already likely committed a theft from the Johnsons and made threatening or frightening 
statements to Diane Johnson. And, moreover, who knew the Johnson house intimately having just 
cleaned it. 
If the jury had known not only that there were unidentified prints on the murder weapon 
and ammunition, but also that the prints belonged to someone who knew where the gun and 
ammunition were hidden, who was familiar with the guesthouse, and who may have been 
connected with a woman who had likely committed one crime against the Johnsons and had a 
motive to commit another to stop them from making allegations that could result in revocation of 
her newly minted parole, and who knew the Johnson house well, the outcome would have been 
different. Combining this knowledge with the lack of any forensic evidence tying Sarah to the 
crimes, weakens the state's case against Sarah. 
Speegle and Hill testified that Hill had touched the rifle although their testimony was not 
exactly consistent. Hill claimed that he had touched the rifle scope and ammunition while target 
shooting sometime in 2000 (three years before the murders). EH Tr. p. 965, ln. 21 - p. 968, ln. 21. 
Speegle did not know that Hill had used his rifle. Rather, he only knew that Hill had helped him 
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move the rifle. EH Tr. p. 957, ln. 9-15. Most importantly, Speegle could not testify that Hill did 
not touch the rifle the morning of the shootings and touching the weapon in the past does not 
exclude Hill from having touched the rifle and removing its scope on the morning of the 
shootings. 
To the contrary, the state's evidence makes it more likely that Hill was the shooter because 
it shows that he was aware of the location of the weapon and ammunition and was familiar with 
how it worked due to personal experience. (This personal experience with the weapon made him 
far more likely than Sarah to be capable of committing the offenses with only the minimum two 
shots.) The additional fact that Hill's identity is now known exonerates Sarah because it shows 
she was not the one who fired the weapon that morning and shows she was not an accomplice as 
there is no evidence that she and Hill even knew each other much less had a reason to act in 
concert. 
Further, Hill's testimony that he placed the fingerprints on the weapon when he was target 
practicing in 2000 was challenged by Mr. Kerchusky's testimony that the prints would not be on 
the weapon after a year and were, in fact, deposited just before the shootings. Moreover, Hill 
testified that he had sighted the scope in 2000. But his prints were on the scope in a way less 
consistent with sighting it than with removing it. EH Tr. p. 848, In. 8 - p. 850, In. 20. 
In sum, the evidence here is not so strong that it could not be overcome by new DNA 
evidence showing another person killed Sarah's parents. 
5. Conclusion. 
Sarah has made aprimafacie showing under I.C. § 19-4902. The Court should permit the 
testing of the requested items. 
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B. Claims Two - Five Appear to he Foreclosed by the Intervening Case of A,furphy v. State, 
156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014). 
Subsequent to the filing of the petition here, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Murphy v. State, supra. In Murphy, the Court overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 
P.2d 955 (1981), which held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction constituted sufficient 
reason to bring a successive petition under LC.§ 19-4908. 156 Idaho at 390,327 P.3d at 366. 
Claims Two-Five could have been raised in the original post-conviction petition, but were not due 
to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and thus could have been raised in this 
successive petition pursuant to Palmer. However, Murphy now appears to present a bar to their 
presentation. Accordingly, Sarah will file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus raising the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims as now permitted by Martinez v. Ryan, - U.S.-, 132 
S.Ct. 1309 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, -U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013). 
Martinez holds that inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral 
proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel raised in federal court, when the state courts do not provide a mechanism to 
raise such claims. When first decided, Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to such procedural defaults 
in Idaho courts because Palmer v. Dermitt permitted Idaho prisoners to file a successive post-
conviction petition raising the ineffective assistance of trial/appellate counsel claims which had 
been omitted in the first petition due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Now 
that Palmer has been overruled by Murphy, Martinez permits Sarah to raise the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in this petition directly in federal court and bypass the state courts 
entirely. 
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C. There is Sufficient Reason to Raise the Eighth Amendment Claim (Claim Six) in a 
Successive Petition and it is Timely. 
The state argues that "Claim Six, which asserts that Johnson's fixed life sentences violate 
the Eighth Amendment was also known, or reasonably could have been known" when she filed 
her original petition. State's Brief, pg. 17. However, that is not the case. Sarah's Eighth 
Amendment Claim is based upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. Alabama, -U.S.-, 
132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), a case banning mandatory life sentences for juveniles. Miller was not 
decided until June 25, 2012, six years after Sarah filed her original petition for post-conviction 
relief (CV-2006-324) on April 19, 2006. In fact, judgment was entered in that case on April 8, 
2011, and the case was on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court when Miller was issued. 
Clearly, she could not have raised her Miller claim in her first petition. 
Sarah filed this case on April 9, 2012, two months before Miller was decided. And she 
raised her Miller claim when she filed her Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief on January 22, 2014, while the appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court was still 
pending. (The Supreme Court did not issue its opinion in the appeal from the first petition until 
February 20, 2014, and the case was not remitted until March 26, 2014.) 
Since Sarah filed this petition prior to the final decision in her original petition, this 
petition is timely. As set out in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008): 
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an application for 
post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. The appeal 
referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case. The 
failure to file a timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. 
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been 
concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year 
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limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient 
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The successive 
petition must be filed within a reasonable amount of time. What is a reasonable amount of time is 
to be considered on a case by case basis. Id., at 190, 177 P .3d at 404, citing Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900,905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). However, the Court of Appeals has found that a 
successive petition filed one year after the decision on the appeal from the original petition was 
timely. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,799,992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999). Here Sarah 
raised her Eighth Amendment claim before her post-conviction appeal was decided and is timely 
under Hernandez. Moreover, she amended her successive petition in a reasonable amount of time 
as the state had not yet filed an answer and she was permitted to amend the petition as a matter of 
course. I.R.C.P. 15(a). 
Further, the fact that Miller was not decided until after both her original and successive 
petition had been filed is "sufficient reason" to permit her to raise the claim in her amended 
successive petition. Miller created a substantive change in Eighth Amendment law, especially as 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause had been interpreted in Idaho. For example, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of a fixed-life sentence on a sixteen-year-old defendant in 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011). In doing so, the Court held that "the nature 
and the gravity of the underlying offense may, standing alone, be sufficient to justify a determinate 
life sentence." 159 Idaho at 880, 253 P.3d at 317. That position was squarely rejected by the 
Miller Court as it applies to fixed life sentences imposed upon juveniles and consequently Mr. 
Windom's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment under Miller. 
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The Windom case was cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in affirming two other juvenile 
fixed-life cases, both prior to the issuance of Miller. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,599,261 
P.3d 853, 876 (2011) ("We hold that Draper's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the United States Constitution."); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
487, 272 P.3d 417, 459 (2012) ("[T]he gravity of the first-degree murder ... supports the severity 
of his fixed life sentence.")1 
The substantive change in the law under Miller provides sufficient reason for the filing of 
a successive petition. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court recently allowed a Miller claim to be 
raised in a fourth petition for post-conviction relief because Miller was not available to the 
defendant either on direct appeal or in his previous post-conviction petitions. People v. Davis, 6 
N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014). 
Further, this claim is not barred by Murphy v. State. Sarah does not claim she can raise the 
Miller claim now because original post-conviction counsel was ineffective. She can raise the 
claim now because it was not available to her during her direct appeal or during her post-
conviction proceedings because Miller had not yet been decided. 
Finally, Miller applies retroactively to Sarah's case. This is obvious because the Supreme 
Court applied A1iller to Jackson v. Hobbs, a companion case decided in the same opinion as 
Miller. Jackson was a case on collateral review. 132 S.Ct., at 2461 (Noting Jackson raised his 
Eighth Amendment claim in a state petition for habeas corpus). In addition, many state courts 
have found that Miller is retroactive because it created a new substantive rule. See e.g., State v. 
1 Sarah believes that Ethan Windom, Brian Draper and Torey Adamcik are the only other 
juveniles who have been sentenced to fixed life terms in Idaho. 
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Mantich, 842 N. W.2d 716 (Neb. 2014); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); Jones v. 
State, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) ("We are of the opinion that Miller created a new, 
substantive rule which should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review."); Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, (Mass. 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 
107, 117 (Iowa 2013); see also Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 2014). 
While there are no Idaho cases addressing the retroactivity of Miller, the cases above used 
the retroactivity rule from the United States Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane,489 U.S. 288 
(1989), to find the Miller retroactive. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 724, Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Jones 
v. State, 122 So.3d at 703; Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 114. 
Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applicable to those cases 
that have become final before the new rules are announced with two exceptions: rules that render 
types of primary conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe are 
retroactive as are "watershed rules that implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial." Teague, 
489 U.S., at 310. The cases above all found Miller to fall into the second Teague exception. 
Idaho has also adopted "the Teague approach when determining whether decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court ... should be given retroactive effect." Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 
138,233 P.3d 61, 69 (2010). But, at the same time, Idaho state courts are "not required to blindly 
follow [the U.S. Supreme Court's] view of what constitutes a new rule or whether a new rule is a 
watershed rule" of fundamental fairness, i.e., a rule which improves accuracy and alters our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Id. 
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether Miller is retroactive, but even if it 
does so during the pendency of this case this Court would not be bound by that ruling under 
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Rhoades. 
This Court should adopt the position taken by the out-of-state cases cited above and hold 
that Miller applies retroactively. As very recently explained by the Court of Appeals, "the 
Rhoades Court held, in considering whether to give retroactive effect to a rule of law, Idaho 
Courts should reflect independent judgment, based upon the concerns of this Court and the 
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence." Gutierrez-
Medina v. State, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2014 Opinion No. 66, p. 9 (Ct. App. August 20, 2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "[it] still stands that in order to be considered a 
watershed rule, a procedural rule must be one which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is 
seriously diminished." Gutierrez-Medina, p.12. Here, the Miller rule does not concern 
convictions, but does significantly improve accuracy in determining the proper sentence for a 
juvenile. Now, under 1vfiller, the facts of the offense of conviction are no longer sufficient alone 
to justify a fixed life sentence for a juvenile offender. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has 
directed that trial courts must undertake an analysis of"[e]verything [it] said in Roper and 
Graham" about youth. Miller, 567 U.S. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2467. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005), is the case which invalidated the death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age 
of 18; and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), invalidated life without 
parole sentences imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders. Thus Miller requires far more than 
a generalized notion of taking age into consideration as a factor in sentencing. A sentencing 
court's passing reference to the defendant's youth does not eliminate the need to resentence in 
light of Miller requirements. Sentencing courts are now required to apply the core teachings of 
Roper, Graham, and Miller in making sentencing decisions. 
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Why Sarah's fixed life sentence is in violation of Miller is set forth at pages 40-55 of the 
Amended Petition and will not be repeated here in the interests of brevity. 
D. Conclusion. 
For the reasons above, this Court should deny the state's motion to dismiss Claims One 
and Six. It should permit DNA testing to be conducted on the requested items and it should grant 
~~--
Of counsel to The Roark Law Firm 
23 • OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
216 of 352
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Zi.'/J;; of August, 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
24 • OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
217 of 352
Sep 03 2014 10:35AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274 
R. Keith Roark, ISB No. 2230 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
208-788-3919 
keith@roarkJaw.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Deborah Whipple, ISB No. 4355 
Dennis Benjamin, ISB No. 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 




Of counsel to the Roark Law Firm 
page 2 
FILED ~:2_,____~, 
SEP O 3 2014 /Z:f 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Count . Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-2014-0353 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
DR. GREG HAMPIKIAN 
Dr. Greg Harnpikian, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am the Director of the Idaho Innocence Project and a professor of Biology at Boise 
State University, 1910 University Drive, Boise, ID 83 725-151 S. 
2. 1 have previously filed an affidavit in this case. 
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3. My curriculum vitae was attached as an appendix to that affidavit. 
4. In my first affidavit I stated that many items of"evidence may now be tested using· 
advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques[.]" 
5. I have reviewed the State ofldaho's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition of Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
5. That on page 10 of its Brief, the state questions whether the new techniques I 
identified are based upon new technology. 
6. Post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy (LCN) DNA 
analysis are new technology which allows DNA testing on much smaller samples than was 
available at the time of Sarah Johnson's trial in 2005. 
7. Post amplification cleanup with Montage columns was not used by the forensic 
community until 2006, and the new more sensitive Globalfiler DNA amplification kit has only 
been made available since 2012 by Life technologies. This new DNA kit amplifies 24 regions of 
DNA yielding up to 48 alleles, rather than the 16 DNA regions (up to 32 alleles) available in the 
older Identifiler DNA amplification kit (available since 2001). 
8. Specifically, these techniques represent new DNA teclmology that has produced 
results from samples that had been declared "untestable" due to low amounts of DNA, or that 
produced "inconclusive" results. 
9. Forensic validation by the company that produced the Identifiler forensic DNA kit, 
and the new GlobalFiler Kit (released 2012) show that the new kits can produce results from 
samples that were not analyzable by the old kits. 1 
htu,://resource.Iifetechnologies.com/pages2013/WE2 l 3 221 /documents/ 4 Challenging Samples 
Using the Globa1Filer Kit Matt Phipps.pdf, last accessed August 24, 2014. 
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9. Another important component of DNA analysis that has become available since Ms. 
Johnson's trial are computational tools called intelligent systems that can deal with low level 
DNA results, and produce meaningful results that human analysts overlook. After the DNA is 
processed in the lab, intelligent systems like TrueAllele Casework can be used to analyze the 
data and generate profiles from data that had previously led to "inconclusive" results2. This 
technology was not available until after 2006. 
10. This new technology will permit DNA testing to be done on samples that could not 
have been tested at the time of the trial 
11. In particular, no conclusions could be reached due to insufficient amounts of DNA 
concerning the bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the 10\ver left side of the robe, the 
tissue from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left sleeve of the robe, 
the stain from Bruno Santos' pants, the fibers imbedded in unknown material, bloodstain B from 
the rifle, and bloodstain G from the rifle. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA 
amplification, purification, and analysis techniques. 
12. Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may now be tested using advanced 
DNA amplification, pmification, and analysis techniques. 
13. DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item# 14) could not have 
been tested at the time of trial, but may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, 
purification, and analysis techniques. 
14. DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnsori's bedroom door (Items# 15-16) could not have been tested at the time of trial, but now 
2 Perlin MW, Donner K, Homyak J, Schiermeier-Wood L, Greenspoon S (2014) TrueAllele 
Casework on Virginia DNA Mixture Evidence: Computer and Manual Interpretation in 72 
Reported Criminal Cases. PLoS ONE 9(3): e92837. doi:I0.1371/journal.pone.0092837 
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may now be tested using advanced techniques not available at the time of trial and compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial and after and submitted to a CODIS databank. 
15. DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) could not have been tested at the 
time of trial, but may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and 
analysis techniques. 
16. DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 12-1) could not have been tested 
at the time of trial, but now may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification, purification, 
and analysis techniques. 
17. One of the hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater has a small root and could 
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques. 
18. DNA from an unknown contributor found on the inside of the latex glove can now be 
further analyzed using advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques. 
18. Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were found on the leather glove 
from the garbage can. That DNA can now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification, 
purification and analysis techniques. 
This ends my Affidavit. 
r.GregHampikian 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ve.r 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi6 day of September, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid and 
addressed to: 
Honorable Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
474 Shoshone Street 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0012 
D~~~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
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FILED ~~t;fflef. 
SEP 1 6 2014 
Attomeys for Petitionor Sarah Marie Johnson 
DISTRICT COURT OF THB FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAJNB 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
VB 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 2014- 3i'3 
) Case No. CV-188P9!4 
) 
) MOTION TO CONTINUE RESPONDENT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
) PE'ITl'IONER'S AMENDED DNA AND 
) SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-
) CONVICTION RE1,IEF 
) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Sarah Jolmso~ by and through her attomcy of record, 
R. Keith R.oarlc of The Roarlc Law Finn, and hereby m0ves this court for an ORDBR. vacating the 
Oral Argument on Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's .Amended DNA 
and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Cllttelrtly set for the 18th day of September, 2014 
and resetting it for the 20• day of October, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. The basis for this motion is that 
counsel for the Petitioner will be in a two-day Jury Trial in Gooding County starting on the 17th of 
September, 2014. 
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Counsel has contaoted Jessica Lorello at the Attomey General's Office, and she 1WI no 
objection to this motion. 
DA.TED this~ of8ep!anber, 2014. 
THE .89'atiK. 
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Jessica Lorello 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
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By depositing copies of the same :in the United States Mail, postage prq,aid. at the 
local post office. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomcy(s). 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the tclccopicr numbcr(s): 
J,o8'.·· 8:t'4 -1101 y 
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FAX No. 2087883918 
Attomeys for Petitioner Sarah Marie Johnson 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
nm STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON. ) 20\4 _. 35~ 
) Case No. CV 19&6 aa4 
Petitioner. ) 
P. 004/005 
) ORDER CONTINUING RESPONDENT'S 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
) PETITIONER'S AMENDED DNA AND 
) SUCcESSIVE PE11TION FOR POST· 
) CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
Based upon the Motion to Continue 1he Oral Argument on Respondent's Motion 
For Summary ))ismjssaJ of Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief filed by the Petitioner, and it appears that the ltcspondmt has no objection to this 
motion and good cause appearing therefor;; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDEIUID that Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post"Conviction Relief eutrently set for the 
18th day of September, 2014 is VACATED and reset for the 20th day of October, 2014 at 1 ;30 p.m. 
DATB.O this .Jfe_ da.y of.sep1mm~q1 
ORDER CONTINUING RESPONDENT'S MO'QON FOR StJ:MMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETD'ION IOR POST· 
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Post 0£6.ce Box 83720 
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R. Keith Roark 
The Roark Law Finn 
409 Nmth Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
By depositiug copies of 1hc same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. at the 
local post office. 
By hand delivc:ring copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s). 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier nmnber(s): 
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Idaho Attorney General 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
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Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
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NO. 464 P. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) Case No. CV-2014-0353 
) 
Petitioner, ) REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs. ) DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S 
) AMENDED DNA AND 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby files this reply brief in support 
of the state's motion to summarily dismiss Petitioner's ("Johnson") "Amended DNA 
and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' (hereinafter "Amended 
Successive Petition"). 
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Johnson's DNA Claim (Claim One) Should Be Summarily Dismissed 
P. 3 
The court must allow additional DNA testing only if it determines that: "(1) 
The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative 
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is 
innocent; and (2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible 
results under the Idaho rules of evidence." I.C. § 19-4902(e). For the reasons 
already set forth in the state's brief filed in support of its motion for summary 
dismissal, the state maintains Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing 
additional testing is warranted. Nothing in Johnson's Objection to Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal CUObjection") changes the state's position in this 
regard. Claim One should be dismissed. 
II. 
Claims Two Through Six Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To I.C. § 19-4908 
The state requested dismissal of Claims Two through Five because each of 
those claims could have been raised in Johnson's initial petition, and Johnson 
cannot raise them in a successive petition absent a showing that there is a 
sufficient reason for not asserting the claims in her first post-conviction case. I.C. § 
19-4908. In her Amended Successive Petition, Johnson asserted that the 
"[d]eficient representation by counsel in [her] initial post-conviction proceeding" 
constitutes a sufficient reason that would allow her to avoid the successive petition 
bar. (Amended Successive Petition, p.57.) This assertion is, however, contrary to 
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 
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P.3d 365 (2014). Johnson concedes Murphy "appears to present a bar" to 
consideration of Claims Two, Three, Four, and Five. (Objection, p.17.) The claims 
must therefore be dismissed. 
Johnson does not, however, concede that Claim Six should be dismissed. 
In Claim Six, Johnson alleges her two fixed life sentences violate the Eighth 
Amendment. (Amended Successive Petition, pp.40-55.) Johnson argues that she 
could not have raised Claim Six in her initial petition because it is based on Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), a United States Supreme Court decision that dtd 
not issue until after her original petition was filed and judgment had entered. 
(Objection, p.18.) The date the Supreme Court issued Miller is irrelevant. Johnson 
did not need existing authority from the United States Supreme Court in order to 
advance an Eighth Amendment claim. If that were a requirement, Miller could 
never have brought a successful claim. Johnson's argument that she could not 
have presented her Eighth Amendment claim before Miller is without merit. See 
United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (101h Cir. 2004) (counsel's failure 
to anticipate the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 
535 U.S. 234 (2002), was not ineffective); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1542 (9th 
Cir. 1995) ("we have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant faults 
his former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future 
law and have warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective 
representation'"). 
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Further, the holding in Miller does not compel the conclusion Johnson wants 
this Court to reach. The Court in Miller held that a statutory scheme that requires 
imposition of mandatory fixed life sentence for juvenile murderers, without the 
possibility of parole, violates the Eighth Amendment because it "runs afoul" of the 
Court's cases that require "individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most 
serious penalties." 132 S.Ct. at 2460. The district court sentenced Johnson to two 
fixed life terms for first-degree murder as authorized by I. C. § 18-4004. Idaho Code 
§ 18-4004 requires a ulife sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not 
less than ten (10) years"; it does not require a mandatory life sentence without the 
possibility of parole. Thus, the statute under which the court sentenced Johnson 
does not "run[ J..afoul" of the Eighth Amendment. 1 
Because Clai~s Two through Six are barred by I.C. § 19--4908, they should 
be dismissed. 
ll I. 
Claims Two - Six Are Also Subject To Dismissal As Untimel'{ 
The state requested dismissal of Claims Two through Six on the alternative 
basis that the claims are untimely. Johnson does not address the state's argument 
regarding the timeliness of Claims Two through Five, but instead concedes the 
claims are barred by Murghv and states her intention to raise the claims "in federal 
1 Because Miller has no application to Idaho's statute, this Court need not address 
Johnson's claim that Miller is retroactive. (Objection, pp.20-22.) Nevertheless, with 
respect to Johnson's assertion regarding retroactivity, the state notes there is a split 
in authority on this issue and several courts have held, contrary to the cases 
Johnson cites, that Miller is not retroactive. See, li, Commonwealth v. Lawsoa, 
90 A. 3d 1, 8-1 O ( citing cases on both sides of retroactivity issue and rejecting 
defendant's claim that Miller is retroactive to final judgments). 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 4 
231 of 352
OCT. 10. 2014 3:15PM ID ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV NO. 464 P. 6 
court and bypass the state courts entirely.'' (Objection, p.17.) However, with 
respect to Claim Six, Johnson contends it is timely because she "filed this petition 
prior to the final decision in her original petition." (Objection, p.18.) Johnson relies 
on Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), to support 
this claim. (Objection, p.19.) Johnson's reliance on Hernandez is misplaced. 
In Hernandez, the court reiterated the rule that the provision in J.C. § 19-
4902(a) that allows for the filing of a post-conviction petition "within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal" "does not encompass 
a separately filed proceeding under the UPCPA." 133 Idaho at 797, 992 P.2d at 
792 (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
While, as Johnson correctly notes, the court found Hernandez's successive petition 
timely even though it was filed more than one year after the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of Hernandez' original petition, the court did so on the theory 
that it "relate{d] back to the date of filing of the first application." Hernandez, 133 
, 
Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. Johnson fails to acknowledge the basis for the 
court's decision much less explain why her successive petition should be timely 
based on a relation back theory. (Objection, p. 19.) Nor could Johnson make such 
a showing given that the relation back principle applied in Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 
798, 992 P.2d at 793, was based on Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 
995 (1981), which Johnson concedes was overruled by Murph~. sugra (Objection, 
p.17). Indeed, any attempt by Johnson to relate Claim Six back to the filing of her 
original petition would be contrary to her contention that it is the proper subject of a 
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successive petition because the case upon which she relies did not exist when she 
tiled her first petition. 
The proper analysis for deciding whether Claim Six is timely requires a 
showing, by Johnson, that the general one-year limitation period for post-conviction 
petitions should be tolled. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 
1069 (2009). Johnson has not and cannot satisfy that standard because the ability 
to bypass the limitation period is premised on a recognition that "rigid application of 
I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not 
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process 
issues.'" Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting Charboneau v. 
State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). As noted, Johnson's sixth 
claim is one that could have been raised in her original petition even without the 
benefit of Miller, which does not apply to her case. 
Further, the state notes that Johnson's position in her Amended Successive 
Petition was that she does not believe it is "unreasonable in terms of timeliness to 
file a successive petition even before litigation has concluded on the original 
petition." (Amended Successive Petition at p.59.) Johnson's belief does not make 
it so. To endorse such a standard would allow petitioners the ability, in some 
instances, to wait years before asserting their claims regardless of whether they 
have knowledge of them just because they have another action pending. Not even 
capital defendants have that luxur; and the state fails to see any reason why 
Johnson should. Pizzuto v. State. 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) 
("[W]e hold that a reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
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relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of 
the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time period. In that event, 
it still must be filed within a reasonable time after the claim was known or 
knowable."). Johnson filed her Amended Successive Petition on January 22, 2014; 
the purpose of the amendment was to include Claim Six. The Supreme Court 
decided Miller, on which Claim Six is based, on June 25, 2012. Eighteen months is 
not a reasonable time by any standard, including the one-year limitation period set 
forth in I.C. § 19-4902(a). Johnson's claim to the contrary fails and this Court can 
dismiss Claim Six on the alternative basis that it is untimely. 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss Johnson's Amended Successive Petition and enter Judgment accordingly. 
DATED this 10th day of October 2014. 
ICA M. LORELLO 
ty Attorney General 
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IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF TI-IE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, ) 
) Case No. CV 2014-0353 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING 
vs. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) DISMISSAL OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PETITIONER'S AMENDED 
) DNA AND SUCCESSIVE 
Respondent. ) PETITION FOR POST-
) CONVICTION RELIEF 
This matter is before the court on the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on 
07/18/14. The Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was 
filed on 01/22/14. A hearing on the State's motion was held on 10/20/14. At the hearing, 
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Jessica Lorello represented the State. The petitioner, Sarah Marie Johnson, was not in 
attendance, but her counsel, R. Keith Roark and Dennis Benjamin, were present. After 
reviewing the briefs, hearing oral arguments, and researching the applicable law, the 
Motion is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Sarah Marie Johnson ("Johnson") was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
murder following a lengthy jury trial. The court sentenced Johnson on 06/30/05 to two 
fixed life sentences (concurrent), plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. Johnson's 
first direct appeal was dismissed for being untimely. Thereafter, Johnson filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and denial 
of due process. The district court found ineffective assistance of counsel in the failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal and Johnson's appellate rights were reinstated. 
Johnson immediately filed a direct appeal and the district court stayed 
proceedings on her remaining post-conviction claims. In her appeal, Johnson argued 
that (1) the aiding and abetting instruction constructively amended the charging 
document and resulted in a fatal variance; (2) she was denied her constitutional right to 
a unanimous jury verdict because the district court did not instruct the jury that it must 
unanimously agree on whether she actually killed her parents or whether she merely 
aided and abetted in their killing; and (3) her constitutional rights were violated when 
the district court failed to remove a certain juror from the jury pool or obtain an 
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unequivocal commitment that the juror would follow all of the court's instructions. The 
Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008), denied 
Johnson any relief and affirmed the district court on each claim. A remittitur was 
issued on 07/18/08. 
On 08/15/08, the stay was lifted and on 01/12/10, Johnson filed a Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, in which she alleged lack of jurisdiction, 
due process violations, multiple instances of ineffective assistance of both trial and 
appellate counsel, and newly discovered evidence. The State filed a motion for 
summary dismissal, which was granted in part and denied in part. An evidentiary 
hearing was then held, after which the court denied relief on Johnson's six remaining 
claims. Johnson then appealed. 
On 04/09/12, while the appeal was pending, Johnson filed a DNA and Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief under CV-2006-0324 (her original post-conviction 
action). On 01/22/14, Johnson filed an Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief ("Successive Petition"), again under CV-2006-0324. The Successive 
Petition includes six broad claims for relief that can be boiled down to three categories: 
(1) a request for DNA testing under LC.§ 19-4902(b); (2) ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel; and (3) a claim that Johnson's fixed life sentences constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
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On 02/18/14, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed1 the district court's decision to 
deny Johnson's original post-conviction petition, and a remittitur was issued on 
03/12/14. The district court then ordered that Johnson's Successive Petition and all 
supplemental filings be filed nunc pro tune to their original filing dates with a new case 
number assigned (CV-2014-0353). 
On 07/18/14, the State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal of Johnson's 
Successive Petition. Johnson, represented by R. Keith Roark and Dennis Benjamin, filed 
an Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal on 08/25/14, dropping 
four of her six original claims. The court heard the State's motion on 10/20/14. 
II. SUMMARY DISMISSAL ST AND ARD 
Summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition is appropriate where "there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would 
entitle him to the requested relief." Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443, 446, 901 P.2d 
1344, 1347 (Ct. App. 1995). The court, in determining whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, "does not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that 
are unsupported by admissible evidence." Id. See also Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,873 
P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) (Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, 
are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.) 
1 Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 319 P.3d 491 (2014). 
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A petitioner's application "must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If a petitioner 
fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which she bears the 
burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 
681 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where the alleged facts, even if true, do not entitle 
the petitioner to relief as a matter of law, the trial court may dismiss the application 
without an evidentiary hearing. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975). 
III. ISSUES 
A. Claims Two Through Five Are Dismissed By Stipulation of the Parties. 
Johnson conceded in her Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal that Idaho case-law precludes her from proceeding on four of the six claims 
included in her Successive Petition.2 At the hearing held on 10/20/14, both parties 
stipulated to the dismissal of these claims. Therefore, claims two through five of 
Johnson's Successive Petition are summarily dismissed. 
2 See Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) (holding that there is no right to effective post-
conviction counsel). 
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B. Claim One (Johnson's DNA Claim) Is Dismissed For Failure to Satisfy I.C. § 
19-4902(e)(l). 
Johnson petitions' this court to allow the DNA testing of evidence, available at 
trial, based on the existence of new DNA technology not available at the time of trial. 
I.C. § 19-4902(b), Idaho's DNA testing statute, allows a petitioner to 
at any time, file a petition before the trial court that entered the judgment 
of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint or 
forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on evidence that was 
secured in relation to the trial which resulted in his or her conviction but 
which was not subject to the testing that is now requested because the 
technology for the testing was not available at the time of the trial. 
In short, the existence of new DNA technology can be the basis of a post-conviction 
claim. 
The State argues that just because new "techniques" for DNA testing have 
become available that were not available at the time ofJohnson's trial, the underlying 
technology for DNA testing did exist. Therefore, this argument goes, the ability to 
amplify and test samples that were previously untestable docs not constitute new 
technology as contemplated by the statute. The State also argues that Johnson's 
requests to run previously tested but unidentified DNA samples against an updated 
database ( that now includes Christopher Hill) fall outside the parameters of LC. § 19-
4902(b). 
The State's first argument, that new DNA amplification techniques do not 
constitute new technology because DNA testing existed at the time of Johnson's trial, is 
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without merit. The statute in question does not define "technology," but a well-known 
rule of statutory construction requires that statutory language "be given its plain, usual 
and ordinary meaning." Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 231, 31 P.3d 248, 253 (2001). 
Technology is commonly defined as "a manner of accomplishing a task esp. using 
technical processes, methods, or knowledge." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
1206 (10th ed. 2001). 
New technology need not be radically different technology, as the State seems to 
be asserting. A stagecoach and an SUV are the same technology (i.e., four wheeled 
transportation devices), but to say that the latter is not newer technology than the 
former would be untenable. Thus, while certain DNA testing methods existed at the 
time of Johnson's trial, DNA technology has advanced significantly since then, and 
these processes and methods that allow for testing of smaller and smaller samples 
satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b). 
The State's second argument has considerably more merit. Many of Johnson's 
DNA requests do not involve testing samples too small to be tested under technology 
existing at the time of trial. Instead, Johnson wants to compare a number of already 
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analyzed but unidentified3 DNA samples with Christopher Hill's DNA profile and with 
an updated DNA database.4 
Such comparisons do not utilize new DNA testing techniques. The existence of 
new DNA profiles with which to compare samples tested prior to trial by DNA 
technology existing at the time, does not satisfy the requirements of LC.§ 19-4902(b). 
Therefore, any requests in Johnson's Successive Petition seeking the comparison of 
previously tested but unidentified DNA samples with newly acquired profiles (e.g., that 
of Christopher Hill), will be dismissed. 
LC.§ 19-4902(c) further requires that a petitioner seeking DNA testing make a 
prima facie showing that 
(1) Identity was an issue in the trial which resulted in his or her 
conviction; and (2) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of 
custody sufficient to establish that such evidence has not been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced or altered in any material aspect. 
The State does not dispute the second requirement, but it does dispute whether identity 
was an issue at trial. 
3 By "unidentified" the court does not mean unidentifiable. Instead, the court is referring to samples that 
resulted in valid profiles that were simply never matched to a particular individual. 
4 For example, Johnson seeks to run the following tested, but unidentified DNA samples against a 
reference sample taken from Christopher Hill: (1) "[bJloodstain 2 from the robe" that "contains a mixture 
of at least three individuals including an unknown individual," (2) "tissue from the left collar area of the 
robe" that "is from an unknown male," (3) "!b]Ioodstain Con the rifle ... from an unknown male," (4) 
"[ojne of the two hair samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle" that "could not be matched to 
Sarah or any of her maternal relatives," "[t)wo of the three hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater" 
that "were excluded as coming from Sarah," and (5) "DNA from an unknown contributor found on the 
inside of the latex glove." See Successive Petition, pp. 7-10. 
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Again, as the statute does not define "identity," it should be given its plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning. Identity is defined as "the condition of being the same 
with something described or asserted." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 574 (10th 
ed. 2001). At trial, the State asserted that Johnson was the individual that murdered her 
parents. Voluminous evidence was presented to this end. The defense argued that 
Johnson was not the murderer, pointing the finger at an unknown third party. The jury, 
based on the evidence before it, was asked to decide whether Johnson was indeed the 
murderer (either directly, or by aiding and abetting the shooter). Therefore, because the 
identity of the murderer was at issue in Johnson's trial, the requirements of LC.§ 19-
4902( c) have been met. 
Once a prima facie showing has been made, a petitioner must dear two 
remaining statutory hurdles. LC.§ 19-4902(e) states that the trial court 
shall allow the testing ... upon a determination that: (1) The result of the 
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative 
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the 
petitioner is innocent; and (2) The testing method requested would likely 
produce admissible results under the Idaho rules of evidence. 
As with LC.§ 19-4902(c)(2), the State is not disputing that the requested testing methods 
would likely produce admissible results. The State does argue, however, that the 
testing requested by Johnson does not have the scientific potential to produce new, non-
cumulative evidence that would show that it is more likely than not that Johnson is 
innocent. The court agrees. 
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At trial, a considerable amount of evidence was presented that placed Johnson at 
the scene and that linked her to the murders. 5 Her stories were inconsistent and 
conflicted with the evidence. Her DNA was found in a latex glove, found wrapped in 
her blood splattered robe, and discarded in a trash can on the property. She knew 
where the murder weapon was kept (in the guest house safe) and had requested the key 
a few days earlier. See also this court's opinion in Johnson v. State, CV-2006-0324, pp. 89-
92 (Outlining the "mountain of evidence" against Johnson and quoting Judge Wood as 
stating at trial that the amount of evidence against Johnson was "overwhelming.") 
Evidence was also presented that suggested the possible involvement of another 
party, in the form of unidentified fingerprints and unidentified DNA. The defense 
argued Johnson's innocence under the theory that a stranger entered the house and 
murdered Johnson's parents. The jury considered this evidence and heard these 
arguments and still convicted Johnson of first degree murder. 
Therefore, the possibility of identifying a third party DNA source from 
previously untestable samples will not make it more probable than not that Johnson is 
innocent, just as the post-trial discovery that the fingerprints on the murder weapon 
belonged to Christopher Hill did not entitle Johnson to a new trial.6 The jury was aware 
5 The court uses the term "linked" because the jury could have convicted Johnson if they believed that she 
was the shooter or if they believed that she aided and abetted the shooter. 
6 The Idaho Supreme Court held that the post-trial identification of these fingerprints as Hill's would not 
likely produce an acquittal because the jury knew at trial that the prints did not belong to Johnson and 
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that DNA that did not belong to Johnson was present at the scene of the murders, just 
as they were aware that the fingerprints on the rifle were not hers. Even with that 
knowledge, the jury convicted Johnson, deciding that Johnson either (1) fired the 
murder weapon herself while wearing gloves or (2) aided and abetted the actual 
shooter. Either theory was sufficient for a conviction. Given the fact that the possibility 
of a third party shooter, as evidenced by the presence of unidentified fingerprints and 
DNA, failed to convince the jury that Johnson was innocent of murdering her parents, 
the slim possibility7 that a name or face might now be given to that shooter adds little to 
the mix. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho faced a strikingly similar situation in Fields v. State, 
151 Idaho 18, 253 P.3d 692 (2011 ). There, Fields was accused of robbing and stabbing to 
death the sole employee of a gift shop. Two witnesses testified on Fields' behalf at trial, 
claiming to have seen an unidentified male that did not match Fields' description in the 
store shortly before the murder. Fields was convicted and later brought a DNA claim 
under LC.§ 19-4902, requesting the testing of unidentified DNA found under the 
victim's fingernails and on her clothing. Testing was allowed and the DNA did not 
still convicted her. fohnson v. State, 156 ldaho 7, 319 P.3d 491 (2014) (affirming the district court's order 
den ring Johnson post-conviction relief on newly discovered evidence claims). 
7 The court uses the term "slim possibility" because this previously unidentifiable DNA could just as 
likely remain unidentifiable, could turn out to be Johnson's DNA, or the DNA of an unknown individual, 
whereupon we would be left in the exact same position as before. Additionally, merely establishing the 
source of this unidentified DNA does nothing to show that the DNA actually came from the killer. 
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belong to Fields. However, in applying LC.§ 19-4902(£), under which relief must be 
granted where the DNA test results demonstrate that the petitioner is not the person 
who committed the offense, the court held that Fields failed to meet this burden. Id., 
151 Idaho at 24, 253 P.3d at 698. 
According to the Court, this evidence failed to establish Fields' innocence 
because there was no evidence linking this DNA, found underneath the victim's 
fingernails and on her clothes, to the victim's attacker. Id. Without such evidence, the 
Court concluded that the test results could not show that Fields was not the murderer. 
Id. 
The same is true in this case. Further testing might reveal the source of DNA 
samples found on Johnson's robe, on the gun, and elsewhere, but that knowledge does 
nothing to establish that the source of those samples \Vas present in the Johnson's home 
on the morning of the crime, that the source of those samples was the shooter, or that 
Johnson didn't aid and abet the murderer of her parents.8 Consequently, because an 
analysis of previously untestable DNA samples will not make it more probable than not 
that Johnson is innocent, her request for DNA testing will not be granted. 
8 Johnson's counsel admitted at the 10/20/14 hearing that the standard required by LC.§ 19-4902(e)(1) has 
not been met. R. Keith Roark stated on the record that "we are not at this point in a position to say that 
the evidence either is or is not cumulative. We are not in a position to say that the evidence will or will 
not, more probably than not, demonstrate the innocence of Ms. Johnson ... but we need the testing." 
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C. Claim Six Is Dismissed Under I.C. §§ 19-4901(b) and 19-4908. 
Johnson claims that her fixed life sentences constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
This claim has been waived because (1) Johnson did not raise the issue on direct appeal, 
(2) she did not raise the issue in her initial post-conviction petition, and (3) Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), does not provide sufficient reason for failure to do so. 
Johnson did not raise an Eighth Amendment issue on direct appeal. LC.§ 19-
4901(b) states that a post-conviction "remedy is not a substitute for ... an appeal from the 
sentence or conviction." See also Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,923 P.2d 348 (1997) (any 
claim or issue that could have been raised on appeal, but was not, may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings). The statute goes on to say that 
[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is 
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless 
it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by 
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a 
substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in 
the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier. 
LC.§ 19-4901(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, a court may not consider, as part of a 
post-conviction petition, issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, unless the 
court determines that the claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability 
of the finding of guilt. 
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Johnson claims that her sentence violated her Eighth Amendment rights. A 
claim that a sentence was excessive or illegal can be raised on direct appeal. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 580-81, 976 P.2d 927, 934-35 (1999). Additionally, a claim that a 
sentence was excessive or illegal, by its very nature, cannot raise a substantial doubt 
about the reliability of the finding of guilt.9 Consequently, because Johnson failed to 
raise this issue on direct appeal, and because the asserted basis for relief does not raise a 
substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt, this issue is forfeited and 
may not be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. 
Even if this claim was not barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) for failure to assert it on 
direct appeal, I.C. § 19-4908 would act as an additional barrier. I.C. § 19-4908 states that 
any grounds for post-conviction relief not raised in an original petition are permanently 
waived absent "sufficient reason" for failure to do so. See also Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 
901, 894 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1995) (I.C. § 19-4908 prohibits the filing of a second petition 
unless the petitioner shows sufficient reason why the issues could not have been raised 
in the original petition). Idaho courts have refused to find sufficient reason where the 
grounds for relief were known or should have been known at the time of the original 
petition. Lake v. State, 126 Idaho 333, 336, 882 P.2d 988, 991 (Ct. App. 1994). 
9 Sentencing occurs post-conviction; therefore, no claim regarding the legality of a particular sentence can 
have any bearing on the reliability of the finding of guilt. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S 
AMENDED DNA AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 14 
250 of 352
Johnson did not raise this issue in her initial post-conviction petition. Therefore, 
absent sufficient reason for failing to do so, this issue is waived. To this end, Johnson 
must show that these grounds for relief were unknown at the time that her original 
petition was filed. 
Johnson argues that because her claim is based on Miller v. Alabama, a case 
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2012, these grounds for relief could not 
have been known when she filed her original post-conviction petition.10 However, this 
argument falters for two reasons. 
First, if Johnson believed that her sentence (and fixed life sentences for juveniles 
in general) constituted cruel and unusual punishment, she should have known that 
when the sentence was handed down. As such, she should have claimed as much in 
her original petition. Instead, Johnson claims that because case-law at the time that she 
filed her original petition would not have supported such a claim,11 these grounds for 
relief were "unknown." However, the lack of established case-law supporting one's 
argument or the presence of case-law directly adverse to one's argument is a far cry 
from sufficient reason for failure to bring that argument as required by statute. 
10 Johnson argues that Miller completely changed the legal landscape surrounding fixed life sentences for 
juvenile offenders. 
11 Under Idaho law at the time that Johnson filed her original post-conviction petition, fixed life sentences 
for juveniles convicted of murder did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under Idaho's 
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. This is still the case today, as affirmed in a number 
of recent appellate cases. See, e.g., State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853 (2011); State v. Adamcik, 152 
Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012). 
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Johnson's case may have changed the law; such is the purpose of the appellate and 
post-conviction process.12 
Second, Miller is not the panacea that Johnson claims. Miller has not been found 
to be retroactive, by either the United States Supreme Court or the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Additionally, the holding in Miller has no bearing on Johnson's situation. Miller 
held that mandatory fixed life sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide violate the 
Eighth Amendment. Idaho does not have a mandatory fixed life sentencing scheme, for 
juveniles or adults. Johnson's sentence was discretionary. 
Johnson argues that Miller means more than that. She argues that Miller requires 
a sentencing court to take a juvenile's youth into account as a sentencing factor. 
However, assuming that Johnson's interpretation of Miller is correct, Johnson admits in 
her Successive Petition that her youth was taken into account at her sentencing. 
Dr. Richard Worst testified at Johnson's sentencing as to the development of the 
adolescent brain. Successive Petition, p. 40. Dr. Craig Beaver testified that the 
development of the areas of the brain associated with high level decision making, 
organization, problem solving, inhibitory control, and higher-level adult reasoning and 
functioning do not fully develop until sometime in the mid-twenties. Id., at p. 41. 
Johnson's sentencing judge heard this testimony and acknowledged on the record (1) 
that psychological evidence had been presented to the effect that adolescents can act 
12 Miller itself was argued on appeal in the face of adverse case-law. 
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impulsively and (2) that he considered Johnson's young age to be a mitigating factor. 
Id., at p. 42. 
These statements, included in Johnson's Successive Petition, and as supported in 
the record of Judge Wood's sentencing colloquy, show that Johnson's youth was taken 
into account as a sentencing factor. Therefore, even if Idaho courts were to hold that 
Miller is to be retroactively applied and even if they were to agree with Johnson that 
Miller requires a sentencing court to take a juvenile's youth into account as a sentencing 
factor, Miller provides Johnson with no new grounds for relief and cannot establish 
sufficient reason for Johnson's failure to raise her Eighth Amendment claim in her 
original petition. Absent such sufficient reason, Johnson's failure to assert this claim in 
her original post-conviction petition permanently waived the issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
G. RICHARD BEV AN 
District Judge 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT 
Petitioner, Sarah Johnson, submits the following in support of her I.R.C.P. 59(e) motion 
to alter or amend the judgment. 
A. Introduction. 
As the Supreme Court has written that "Rule 59( e) ... does not explain what constitutes a 
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motion to alter or amend." Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873,878,292 P.2d 264,269 (2012). 
Luckily, however, the Court went on to explain "that a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a 
judgment provides the trial court with an opportunity to correct legal and factual errors." Id. 
Here, Sarah Johnson asks the Court to correct the factual and legal errors detailed below and alter 
and/or amend the judgment to permit DNA testing. Ms. Johnson's decision to not seek relief in 
this motion from the dismissal of her Eighth Amendment claim should not be construed as a 
concession that the Court is correct. She merely wishes to raise that issue on appeal. 1 
The Court, in its Order Granting Summary Disposition, first notes that identity was an 
issue at trial. Thus, the requirement in I.C. § 19-4902(c)(l) has been met. Subsection (c)(2), that 
the evidence was subject to a sufficient chain of custody, was not contested by the respondent. 
Likewise, the requirement in LC. § 19-4902(e)(2), that the testing method requested would likely 
produce admissible results, was also not disputed by the respondent. The rub lies in the Court's 
analysis of subsection (e)(l), i.e., that "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to 
produce new, non-cumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the 
petitioner is innocent." The Court has misconstrued the legal meaning of this requirement and 
when the correct interpretation is applied to the facts of this case, Sarah has established it as well. 
1 Likewise, we do not believe we "stipulated" to the dismissal of Claims 2-4 or that we 
raised claims of "ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel" as a basis for relief as stated 
by the Court. Court's Order, pg. 3, 5. We argued that we should be able to raise claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 
(1981), due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. We acknowledge that 
Palmer was overruled in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014) and have raised 
those claims in a federal habeas petition. Johnson v. Kirkman, CV-2014-395-CWD. 
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B. The Petitioner only needs to show that the result of the testing has the "scientific 
potential" to develop evidence of probable actual innocence. 
First, Sarah's counsel did not "admit[] at the 10/20/14 hearing that the standard required 
by LC.§ 19-4902(e)(l) has not been met." Court's Order, pg. 12, ft. 8. He said, "We are not in a 
position to say that the evidence will or will not, more probably than not, demonstrate the 
innocence of Ms. Johnson ... but we need the testing." Id. Counsel was merely making the 
commonsense observation that no one can know what the results of the testing will be until the 
testing is done. That was not an admission that the requested testing does not have the "scientific 
potential" to produce evidence of actual innocence. It was a request to permit such testing to see 
if the new DNA evidence is exonerating. 
Sarah does not need to prove in advance of the testing what the results will be. A 
showing that the testing methods have the "scientific potential" to produce evidence of actual 
innocence is not the same as the showing of actual innocence based upon those test results. A 
reading of subsection ( e )( 1) that conflates the two concepts is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute and the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. 
"[T]hose words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,894, 
265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). Here there is no requirement in the text of the statute that the 
petitioner prove in advance what the results of the testing will turn out to be. 
Further, that reading would make a nullity of the statute because no petitioner could ever 
say that he or she knows what the testing will actually show. Thus, even if it could be said that 
the statute is ambiguous, "[i]t is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an 
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interpretation which will not render it a nullity." State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,969,318 P.3d 
955, 959 (Ct. App. 2014). What counsel was telling the Court is that Sarah "need[s] the testing" 
to produce the evidence which could show she is actually innocent in order to be granted 
appropriate relief under subsection (f) of the statute.2 She should be granted the testing due to the 
scientific potential of the advanced DNA testing to produce such evidence. 
As will be explained in detail below, Sarah has shown that the advanced DNA testing 
requested has the scientific potential to produce evidence of actual innocence. She does not need 
to prove anything more. Acknowledging the indisputable fact that the actual testing may end up 
with inconclusive results does not change that fact. 
C. Sarah has made the required showing under the facts of the case. 
The advanced DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative 
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. The DNA 
testing has the scientific potential to identify the person who fired the murder weapon. If that 
person is not Sarah, the DNA evidence would show that she is innocent of first-degree murder as 
a principal. 
The Court, however, found that DNA testing was not likely to produce proof of actual 
innocence due to "the 'mountain of evidence' against Johnson." Court's Order, pg. 10. This, 
however, is not the case. It should be recalled that the state's theory of the case was far-fetched. 
It was that Sarah was so selfish, so obsessed with Bruno, and so enraged by being grounded that, 
even though she had never before committed any act of serious or gun violence against anyone, 
2 Idaho Code § 19-4902(f) provides that: "In the event the fingerprint or forensic DNA 
tests results demonstrate, in light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person 
who committed the offense, the court shall order the appropriate relief" 
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she stayed up all night plotting her parents' murder, which in a stoke oflucky coincidence was 
also the night before the regular garbage collection day. After coming up with this plot on the 
fly, she took the rifle from its hiding place in the guesthouse, wore some combination of the three 
gloves without getting her fingerprints or any blood on any of them, took the scope off the rifle 
without harming fingerprints placed there previously by the last person to shoot the rifle, put on 
the robe and a shower cap, and shot her sleeping mother from a left-handed position, although 
she is right-handed. She was not upset or deterred by the horrible result of the explosion of tissue 
and blood and next shot her father in the chest while he tried to reach out to her, all while she 
avoided getting any blood or tissue on her pajama pants, gloves, hands, face, or hair. She flushed 
the shower cap down the toilet, again without getting any blood on herself or causing any 
plumbing problems, and placed the knives on the beds without getting her fingerprints or DNA 
on them. She then ran out of the house and put the robe and two gloves in the garbage, again 
without getting blood from the robe on her hands. Then, in a pretended hysteria, she sought 
"help" from the neighbors, all the while forgetting or not caring that she had left cartridges, her 
keys including a key to the guesthouse, one of the gloves, and a pistol magazine in her bedroom, 
pistol ammunition in the robe, and a cartridge shell and another gun in the garage, and forgetting 
whether she wanted to tell the police that the door to her bedroom was open or closed at the time 
of the shootings. T Supp. Tr. p. 175, In. 11 - p. 218, In. 10; p. 313, In. 13 - p. 344, In. 11. In fact, 
the state's theory was far-fetched, its evidence entirely circumstantial and was certainly not 
overwhelming. 
In addition, the evidence the Court states "placed Johnson at the scene and linked her to 
the murders," Court's Order, pg. 10, is not strong. Each area specifically listed by the Court is 
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discussed below. 
1. "Her stories were inconsistent and conflicted with the evidence." (Court's 
Order, pg. 10). 
On the morning of the murders, within minutes of Sarah arriving in hysterics at the 
Richards' house, the police arrived. Throughout that day and the days to follow, Sarah was 
questioned nwnerous times. The questioning included two 20-minute interviews with Detective 
Harkins on the day her parents were killed, first at 8:30 a.m. and then at 11 :30 a.rn. Detective 
Harkins described the second interview as accusatory and said that he read Miranda warnings but 
he had to initial the form as Sarah was too upset to sign. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, In. 1; Vol. 4, p. 
2177, In. 1- p. 2179, In. 5. The next day, Sarah was questioned at the sheriff's office and her 
statements that she had an attorney went unheeded. T Tr. p. 2425, ln. 23 - p. 2444, ln. 14; p. 
2488, In. 2-14. She was again questioned on September 12 and 13 at the sheriff's office. T Tr. p. 
2446, In. 23 - p. 2452, In. 1. On the 131\ the sheriff directly accused her of murdering her parents 
but she maintained her innocence. T Tr. p. 2446, In. 8 - p. 2454, In. 19. 
At least two of the interviews on the day of her parents' deaths were conducted after 
Sarah had been given Ambien, a hypnotic which makes people suggestible, to calm her down. T 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 10-15. Officer Tremble, who questioned Sarah 
after she had been given the Ambien, described her as "disoriented." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1870, In. 8-
14. Others did not share this observation. See T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 5-22. 
Throughout the questioning, Sarah remained consistent that she had been in bed, heard 
two shots, ran to her parents' bedroom door, called out, did not hear a response, fled the house, 
and heard the sliding screen door to the bedroom open and shut as she ran. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, 
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In. 1 - p. 1750, In. 1; p. 2099, In. 23 - p. 2102, In. 23; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 11-13. 
Her statements both volunteered and in response to police questioning were not consistent 
in some details. Sometimes she said she was asleep when she heard the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she had been awakened by the shower before she heard the shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, 
In. 1-2. Sometimes she said that she got out of bed upon hearing the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she stayed in bed until after hearing the second shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, In. 12-17; p. 
2101, In. 5; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 1-4. Sometimes she said that her bedroom door was open; 
sometimes she said that it was closed; and still other times she said that it was partly open. T Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 2100, In. 22-24; Vol. 4, p. 2428, In. 12-13; p. 2492, In. 13 - p. 2492, In. 9. Sometimes 
she said that her parents' bedroom door was closed; sometimes she said that it was open. T Tr. 
Vol. 3., p. 1812, In. 11-12; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 15-19. (According to the State's expert, both 
bedroom doors had to be open. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4143, In. 17-23.) 
Sarah did not give inconsistent stories about what she was doing when her parents were 
killed. She said she was in her room in her bed when the first shot was fired, she went to her 
parents' room and called out, and then she fled the house. While some details within this 
statement changed, the thrust of the statement did not. 
Any normal person would have difficulty remembering details under such circumstances. 
Think of sitting at the bed of a dying loved one - at a death not welcomed, but expected and not 
violent. Could someone going through that be expected to remember whether the last moment of 
life was preceded by a cough and then a rattling breath or a rattling breath and then a cough? 
Could someone state for certain whether the window by the bed was open or closed? Could 
someone state without hesitation or error whether the flowers were on the night stand or on the 
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dresser? No one remembers all the details of a moment precisely and clearly. This is especially 
true when unimaginable trauma has occurred. 
It was no surprise and certainly not incriminating evidence that Sarah was unable to 
remember whether she was asleep or awake when the first shot was fired, the exact words that 
she said when she called out, and whether the bedroom doors were open or closed. 
If Sarah gave "inconsistent stories" about what she was doing it was more likely to be a 
result of the shock and distress felt by a young girl who saw her family destroyed by another's 
crime than evidence of a carefully planned and cooly executed premeditated murder. Sarah's 
story would have been totally straight, well thought out and consistent over time had the crime 
described by the State actually taken place. 
Much more remarkable is that Sarah never confessed or even made incriminating 
statements notwithstanding the best efforts of the state to obtain them. Sarah was particularly 
vulnerable to police interrogation technics being only sixteen years old, of average or low 
average intelligence and ability to learn, orphaned through a violent event. She maintained her 
innocence through repeated questioning. She was questioned by experts in interrogation 
repeatedly on the day she lost her parents. She was questioned in the absence of counsel. She 
was questioned right after having been given a hypnotic drug. She was questioned many times. 
She was accused of patricide and matricide. But, despite the state's very best efforts, she did not 
confess. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, In. 1; Vol. 4, p. 2177, In. 1 - p. 2179, In. 5; p. 2425, In. 23 -p. 
2444, In. 14; p. 2488, In. 2-14; p. 2446, In. 23 - p. 2452, In. 1; p. 2446, In. 8 - p. 2454, In. 19; p. 
1544, In. 3-12; Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 10-15; p. 1749, In. 1 -p. 1750, In. l;p. 2099, In. 23 -p. 2102, 
In. 23; p. 2430, In. 11-13. Vol. 1, p. 654, In. 9- p. 655, ln. 21; Vol. 4, p. 2424, In. 20- p. 2425, 
8 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
264 of 352
ln. 12; Vol. 5, p. 3368, ln. 8-p. 3371, In. 5; p. 3377, In. 1 -p. 3378, In. 6; Vol. 4, p. 2179, In. 6-
20. 
The evidence against Sarah was not overwhelming as has been asserted. 
2. "Her DNA was found in a latex glove. found wra1rned in a blood splattered 
robe, and discarded in a trash can on the property." (Court's Order, pg1 10). 
First, while the State's DNA expe1t found DNA matching Sarah's on the latex glove, the 
glove was so old that it had become discolored and the expert could not say the DNA was of 
recent origin. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 1-3. The expert also found DNA from someone else, not 
matched to any known sample, on that glove. The contributor of that sample could have been 
male or female. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 17-20; p. 3120, In. 17-20. There is no evidence that 
the latex glove was worn by Sarah on the morning of the murders and not at some other time in 
the far past. 
Another problem with the Court's analysis is this: the gloves, unlike the rifle and the 
robe, did not have blood on them. According to the expert testimony and common sense, this 
means that they were not worn during the shooting. It is impossible to imagine a scenario 
wherein anyone could have worn the gloves in an environment where both the gun being held 
and the robe on the arms holding the gun get blood on them but the gloves remain pristine. This 
disproves the State's theory that Sarah wore the latex gloves underneath the driving glove when 
she fired the rifle. 
Finally, the presence of the gloves in Sarah's room and the garbage can outside is more 
consistent with an intent by the real killer to divert suspicion to Sarah than some theory that 
Sarah carefully plotted and planned the murders and then left gloves not even used in her room 
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and the trash where they were quickly discovered by the police. 
3. "She knew where the murder weapon was kept (in a guest house safe) and had 
requested a key a few days earlier." (Court's Order, pg. 10). 
The murder weapon was not kept in the guest house safe. It was kept, covered by 
blankets, in a closet of the guest house. It was not in a safe. At trial, Mr. Speegle testified that he 
kept the rifle in his closet along with three other guns. (TT 2702:8-2703:2). He also testified that 
Sarah had a garage door opener to the guest house and that the weapons and ammunition were in 
the closet when she cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (TT 2693:17-20, 
2694:25-2696:6, 2715:12-25). While Sarah had cleaned the guest house, there was no evidence 
that she knew where the rifle was hidden nor is it likely she would be cleaning the inside of a 
closet. Matt Johnson testified that he had been in the guest house after Mr. Speegle had moved in 
but he did not know there were guns in the closet. T Tr Vol. 7, pg. 4527, ln. 1-3. 
Since there was no safe in the guest house, Sarah could not have asked for the key. There 
was testimony that she asked for the key to the Johnsons' gun safe two days before her parents 
were murdered. However, Sarah's brother Matthew, a witness for the state, testified that Sarah 
kept jewelry in the safe, an innocent reason for a request for the key. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4562, In. 15-
24. 
The Court's analysis is also flawed because it evaluates the evidence both under a 
principal theory ("[T]he jury could have convicted Johnson if they believed that she was the 
shooter ... ") and as under an accomplice theory(" ... or if they believed that she aided and 
abetted the murder."). Cou11's Order, pg. 10, ft. 2. In fact, however, we know the jury found that 
she was the shooter because it also returned a deadly weapon enhancement. The enhancement 
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finding would be impossible if the jury found that someone else was the shooter but that Sarah 
was her/his accomplice. This is so because the court's jury instruction required the jury find 
Sarah possessed the weapon.3 There is no accomplice liability for the firearm enhancement as it is 
a sentencing enhancement and not an offense itself. Thus, the jury must have unanimously found 
Sarah was the shooter and rejected the state's accomplice liability theory. In light of that, any new 
DNA evidence which shows that Sarah was not the shooter is evidence of innocence. 
But even if an accomplice liability theory is considered, evidence showing who the shooter 
actually was would show innocence if that person were Bruno Santos or someone totally 
unconnected with Sarah, such as a member of a criminal gang with connections to Mr. Santos. 
Mr. Santos testified at the criminal trial that he was not involved in the murder. T Vol. IV pg. 
2769, ln. 11-13. If his DNA or the DNA of one of his associates appears on the rifle or spent shell 
casings it would exonerate Sarah as the shooter. At the same time, it would exonerate her under 
an aiding and abetting theory as the state argued in closing argument at the criminal trial that Mr. 
Santos was not the one Sarah aided and abetted in the murder. Supp. T., pg. 210, ln. 25 - pg. 211, 
ln. 24. ("He's the reason for this. Again, Sarah's the means. The fact of the matter is we had an 
extensive investigation of his involvement." "If he's the killer, if he's the real murderer, is he 
going to come back [to the United States] voluntarily?) The state cannot argue it both ways, 
claiming here that evidence that Bruno Santos was the shooter would not exonerate Sarah when it 
3 The court's instruction was: "If you find the defendant guilty of murder, you must next 
consider whether the defendant displayed, used, threatened or attempted to use a firearm in the 
commission of the crime." TT Vol. 9, pg. 6093, 1n. 24 - pg. 6094, In. 2 (emphasis added). The 
court continued: "If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used, 
displayed, threatened with or attempted to use a firearm in the commission of the above crime, 
then you must indicate on the verdict form submitted to you." TT Vol. 9, pg. 6094, In. 8-12 
( emphasis added). 
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argued at trial that Sarah did not aid and abet Mr. Santos in the killings. 
In addition, identifying a third-party DNA source from previously untested samples could 
make it more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. For example, the DNA testing has the 
scientific potential to show that Christopher Hill, whose fingerprints were found on the murder 
weapon, also loaded the weapon if, for example, his DNA is found on the spent cartridge. That 
evidence would also exonerate Sarah because there is no link between her and Mr. Hill. There 
would be no reason to believe that Sarah aided and abetted Mr. Hill in the murders. Or, the DNA 
evidence could implicate someone else totally unconnected to Sarah, such as a total stranger. 
Evidence showing the shooter had no connection to Sarah would be evidence of innocence. Or 
there could be DNA from Janet Sylten, the employee of Whirlwind Cleaners. See T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 
2804, In. 4-6. Evidence at trial showed that Ms. Sylten had recently been released from prison on 
parole. She had served some number of years (she claimed that she could not remember the 
details) for grand theft and battery on a correctional officer. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2824, In. 1 - p. 2827, 
In. 5; Vol. 5, p. 2889, ln. 4-6. After Whirlwind cleaned the Johnson home, Diane Johnson 
discovered she was missing two expensive bottles of Estee Lauder lotion. Similar products were 
later found in Ms. Sylten's living area and she was fired from her job. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2433, In. 4-
6; Vol. 6, p. 3764, In. 7 - p. 3765, In. 25. Of course, Ms. Sylten's parole could be revoked if it 
were discovered she had been stealing from clients. Again, if DNA from a person like Ms. Sylten 
is discovered, that type of evidence would exonerate Sarah because there would be no link 
between Sarah and the shooter, making the already weak accomplice liability theory, which was 
rejected by the jury, untenable . 
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D. In fact, the evidence is far from overwhelming. 
The Court overlooks substantial evidence showing that Sarah is innocent. This is detailed 
on pages 7-10 of Petitioner's Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and is 
incorporated herein by this reference. In short, there was no DNA evidence, fingerprints or gun 
shot residue linking Sarah to the murder weapon. Instead, the fingerprints of Christopher Hill 
were found on both the rifle and the scope. She did not have any biological evidence on her face, 
hair, t-shirt or pajama bottoms even though the robe worn by the shooter was covered with human 
flesh and gore. 
E. Fields v. State is not apposite. 
Finally, the Court's reliance on Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 253 P.3d 692 (2011), is 
misplaced. In Fields, the victim was a store clerk who was stabbed to death during a robbery. 
The district court permitted DNA testing of scrapings found under the victim's fingernails and of 
some hairs found on her clothing. The DNA profile obtained did not match Mr. Fields, but also 
could not be matched to any other person. Mr. Fields argued this showed he was actually 
innocent because the victim likely scratched the attacker and therefore the absence of his DNA 
proved he was not the killer. The Supreme Court held that DNA evidence was not sufficient to 
show that he was actually innocent. The Court said that, "Under Idaho Code § 19-4902(t), it is 
the fingerprint or DNA test results that must demonstrate that the petitioner is not the one who 
committed the offense. In this case there would have to be admissible evidence showing that the 
hairs or fingernail scrapings tested came from the murderer." 151 Idaho at 24, 253 P .3d at 698. 
This case is in a totally different procedural posture because, unlike Fields, the Court has not 
permitted the evidence to be tested. 
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Nevertheless, the Court writes that, "[t]he same is true in this case. Further testing might 
reveal the source of the DNA samples found on Johnson's robe, on the gun, and elsewhere, but 
that knowledge does nothing to establish that the source of those samples was present in the 
Jolmson home on the morning of the crime, that the source of those samples was the shooter, or 
that Johnson didn't aid and abet the murder of her parents." Court's Order, pg. 12. In fact, 
however, whether further testing revealing the source of the DNA samples establishes any of 
those things depends on what evidence is found. If the piece of flesh with unknown male DNA 
found on the collar of the robe is Christopher Hill's, we can be sure it got there on the morning of 
the murders. Likewise, if it is his DNA on the fingerprints found on the cartridges still loaded in 
the rifle or on the spent shell casing we can be sure he was the one who loaded the rifle before 
entering the house and firing the fatal shots. The DNA evidence would be corroborated by the 
fact that his fingerprints were found on the rifle and the scope which was removed just prior to the 
shootings. This evidence would exonerate Sarah both as the principal and as an accomplice 
because there is no reason to suspect the two acted in concert. 
The same is true if the Bloodstain 2 from the robe has the DNA from Christopher Hill. 
That bloodstain could not have been placed at any time other than when the murders occurred. 
Bloodstain C on the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and Bruno 
Santos. The source of that bloodstain is most likely the shooter. If that person has no connection 
to Sarah it shows her innocence both as a principal and an accomplice. The same is true 
concerning bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the robe, the tissue 
from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside left sleeve of the robe, 
bloodstain B from the rifle, and bloodstain F from the rifle. And the same is true regarding the 
14 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
270 of 352
DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan Johnson's 
bedroom door and the unidentified palm prints. The same is true of the two hair samples 
recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle which could not be matched to Sarah or any of her 
maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA testing. If this hair came from Christopher Hill it was 
placed there at the time of the murder not when he was target shooting with the rifle many years 
prior. Likewise, the DNA from an unknown contributor which was found on the inside of the 
latex glove can now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques. 
Assuming, as the Court does, that evidence shows the identity of the shooter, if that DNA came 
from Christopher Hill, it would be exonerating to Sarah. She could have placed her DNA at 
anytime the glove was in the home but Mr. Hill's DNA could only have been placed there at the 
time of the murders as there is no evidence he used the glove prior to that day. The same is true 
regarding the low levels of DNA from an unidentified source that were found on the leather glove 
from the garbage can. If the DNA from the bloody handprint found on the sheet under the pillow 
beneath Diane Johnson is Mr. Hill's, it was placed there at the time of the murder. Most of the 
statements above can be repeated substituting the name Matthew Johnson or Janet Sylten or even 
Bruno Santos for Christopher Hill. 
Again, the Court apparently conflates the requirement under subsection ( e )(1) that, in 
order to obtain testing, "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-
cumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is 
innocent," with the petitioner's ultimate burden of proof under subsection (f) that "the fingerprint 
or DNA evidence must demonstrate that the petitioner is not the person who committed the 
offense," which is to be applied as testing is completed. As previously stated by Counsel, "we 
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need the testing" to meet subsection (f), but, as Fields illustrates, we can get the testing without 
showing what the results will ultimately be. 
F. Conclusion. 
We cannot tell, at this point, whether the evidence will be of an unknown person as in 
Fields or a known person with no connection to Sarah but with a motive to commit the murders. 
If it is the former, that would be evidence of Sarah's innocence since we know that the jury found 
her to be the shooter because of the jury's finding that she possessed a firearm during the 
commission of the offense. If the testing shows the latter, then Sarah is likely to be able to meet 
her burden of proof under subsection (f). In either case, it is enough, at this point, to say that the 
"the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent" under subsection 
(e)(l). 
The Court should grant the Motion to Alter or Amend and permit DNA testing. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day~ 2~ ~_j 
KKeithRoarit 
Attorney for Sarah Johnson 
~~~.4_,__,£ _fJJ,~~ 
Deborah Whipple :: /)~ · ~ 
Attorney at Law 
~/\\A,~~~,c..,..._-
Dennidknjamin\ 
Attorney at Law 
Of counsel to The Roark Law Firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ("day of November, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 ~J\JLw 
R. Keith Roark 
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Deborah Whipple ISB No. 4355 
Dennis Benjamin ISB No. 4199 
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Of counsel to the Roark Law Firm 
NOV O 6 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 












MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT 
Petitioner, Sarah Johnson, hereby moves this Court for an order altering or amending the 
judgment entered in this case so to permit the DNA testing of evidence. This motion is brought 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and is supported by the memorandum filed herewith. 





Respectfully submitted this~ day of November, 2014. N~ 
R~ 
Attorney for Sarah Jolmson 
D.e.u\l\rs. ~-
Dennis Benjamin 
Of counsel to The Roark Law Finn 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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Deborah Whipple ISB No. 4355 
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Of counsel to the Roark Law Firm 
ORIGl~.JAL 
NOV O 6 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












RENEWED MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE 
COMES NOW Petitioner Sarah Johnson and moves this Court pursuant to I.R.E. 201 for 
an order taking judicial notice of the following materials in the Court's possession for 
proceedings on her DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
1. The District Court file in State v. Sarah Marie Johnson, No. CR-2003-18200, as 
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described in the attached Register of Actions, including all documents in the Court file as well as 
all transcripts prepared for appeal. 
2. The District Court file in Sarah Johnson v. State, No. CV-2006-00324, as described in 
the attached Register of Actions, including all documents in the Court file as well as all 
transcripts prepared for appeal. 
Ms. Johnson previously filed a similar motion in this case on 7/18/2014, but the Register 
of Actions does not reflect that the motion was ever ruled upon. 
Good cause exists to grant this motion. The Court in its Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Disposition of Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief referred to the record in both State v. Sarah Marie Johnson, No. CR-2003-
18200 and Sarah Johnson v. State, No. CV-2006-00324. Thus, those records should become part 
of the record here. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day ofNovember, 2014. 
D.RA/\'M,~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Of counsel to The Roark Law Firm 
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Boise, ID 83720-0010 
3 • RENEWED MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
279 of 352
I 
Hearing result for Motion held 9/08/2008 04:00 PM: Distr' 
09/08/2008 Hearing Held Court Report • Susan Israel Estimated Num 
Transcript Pages for thi earing: Motion for order for · ursement of 
funds and other rel -less than 100 pages 
09/08/2008 STATUS CHAN : closed 
0911012008 Bond Conv ed (Transaction number 4 
222,90 • 1) 
0911012008 Ord on motion for order gran g renewed motion for order ti stay of 
r ef, for disbursement of els & other relief 
09/15/20 Bond Posted - Cash (R pt 5156 Dated 9/15/2008 f 
008 Bond Converted (T nsaction number 410 dated 
32,202.84) 
0 715/2008 STATUS C 
09/19/2008 Affidavl 
State of Idaho vs. Sarah M Johnson 
No hearings scheduled 
I 
;case: CR-2003-0018200 District Judge: G. Richard Amount$lS 088,50 
Bevan due: ' 
Closed pending clerk action 
' I Charges: Violation Date Charge 
! 





Disposition I Officer: Blalne 
i Prosecutor,, 9500 date: 06/30/2005 
Fines/fees: $5,088.50 










Comm Of Felony 
Officer: Blaine 
Prosecutor,, 9500 












10/29/2003 New Case Filed, Indictment 
10/29/2003 Prosecutor assigned Jim Thomas 
10/29/2003 Case Sealed 
10/29/2003 Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 2000000.00 
10/29/2003 Motion to Seal Indictment 
10/29/2003 Order Setting Bail (no bail) 
10/29/2003 Order Sealing Indictment 
1013012003 Defe~dant: Johnson, Sarah Marie Order Appointing Public Defender Court 
appointed Bob Pangburn 
1013012003 Defendant: Johnson, Sarah Marie Order Appointing Public Defender Public 
defender Bob Pangburn 
10/30/2003 Order Appointing Public Defender 
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10/30/2003 Motion to Unseal Indictment 
10/30/2003 Notice of Intent Not to Seek the Death Penalty 
10/30/2003 Notice of Intent to Seek Sentencing Enhancement 
10/30/2003 Court Minutes 
1013012003 Int~rim Hearing Held, Initial Appearance and Motion to Unseal the 
Indictment 
10/30/2003 Case Unsealed 
10/30/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 11/03/2003 09:00 AM) 
10/30/2003 Notice Of Hearing 
1013112003 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding (Mountain Express) 
1013112003 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding (KMVf) 
11/03/2003 Motion for Grand Jury Transcript 
1110312003 Motion for Order Controlling Pre-Trial Publicity, Motion to Shorten Time & 
Notice of Hearing 
11/03/2003 Request for Discovery 
1110312003 Hea~ing result for Arraignment held on 11/03/2003 09:00 AM: 
Arraignment/ First Appearance 
11/03/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 11/05/2003 10:00 AM) 
11/03/2003 Notice Of Hearing 
11/03/2003 Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And Initial Pretrial Order 
11/03/2003 Court Minutes 
11/03/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/10/2004 09:00 AM) 
11/03/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 01/12/2004 09:00 AM) 
11/03/2003 Notice Of Hearing 
1110312003 Request To Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding (Wood River Journal) 
1110512003 Hear~ng result for Hearing Scheduled held on 11/05/2003 10:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
11/05/2003 Court Minutes 
11/05/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 11/20/2003 09:30 AM) 
11/05/2003 Notice Of Hearing 
11/05/2003 Order for Grand Jury Transcript 
11/07/2003 Amended Notice of Hearing 
1110712003 Request. to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding (Court 1V) 
11/10/2003 Hearing Held 
11/10/2003 Court Minutes 
ll/l0/2003 ExParte Motion for Leave to Employ Investigator and Declaration In 
Support 
11/10/2003 ExParte Motion for Appointment of Co-Counsel and Declaration in Support 
11/10/2003 Court Minutes 
ll/l0/2003 Memorandum in Response to Defense Request for Additional Attorney at 
County Expense 
1112012003 Hearing result for Evidentlary held on 11/20/2003 09:30 AM: Hearing 
Held 
11/20/2003 Court Minutes 
11/20/2003 OrderRegarding the Grand Jury Transcript 
11/24/2003 Motion for Extension of Time to File Pre-Trial Motions 
11/24/2003 Affidavit In Support Motion for Investigation Services 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Re: Appointment of Defense Co-Counsel 
11/25/2003 Hearing date: 11/25/2003 Time: 10:00 am Court reporter: Sue Israel 
Audio tape number: D-837 
11/25/2003 Order Granting Motion for Investigation Services 
11/25/2003 Hearing Held 
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11/25/2003 Court Minutes, Lee Ritzau as co-counsel appointed 
1112612003 Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Co-
Counsel 
11/26/2003 Order Re: Defendnt's Motion for Appointment of Co-Counsel 
12/01/2003 State's Amended Reqestt For Discovery/demand For Alibi 
12/01/2003 Response To Request For Discovery/State's 
1210212003 Motion for Order for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record and Notice of 
Hearing Thereon 
12/02/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/08/2003 09:00 AM) 
12/04/2003 Lodged/Reporter's Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings 
1210812003 Defendant: Johnson, Sarah Marie Order Appointing Public Defender Public 
defender Stephen D. Thompson 
12/08/2003 Court Minutes 
1210812003 Hear~ng result for Motion to Withdraw held on 12/08/2003 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
12/09/2003 State's 1st Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
12/10/2003 Motion for Hearing to Clarify Order Prohibiting Pre-Trial Publicity 
12/10/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/15/2003 09:00 AM) 
1211112003 Reques~ to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding (Court lV) 
12/12/2003 State's 2nd Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
1211212003 Mot~on To Transfer And Unseal Search Warrant Affidavits, Returns and 
Motions 
1211512003 Hear~ng result for Hearing Scheduled held on 12/15/2003 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
12/15/2003 Court Minutes 
12/15/2003 Ex Parte Motion For Case Expenses and Declaration In Support 
12/16/2003 Motion to Seal 
12/17/2003 Amended Order Regarding Pre-Trial Publlclty 
1211712003 Me~~randum Decision On Plaintiffs Motion For Order Clarifying Pre-Trial 
Pu bhc1ty Order 
12/19/2003 Order Granting Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (Rltzau) 
12/22/2003 Motion for Case Expenses and Declaration In Support 
12/22/2003 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/29/2003 09:00 AM) 
12/22/2003 Motion for Transcript 
12/23/2003 Order Sealing 
12/23/2003 Receipt, Inventory & Return of Detention Warrant 
1212312003 Ord~r Transferring And Unsealing Search Warrant Affidavits, Returns and 
Motions 
1212912003 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 12/29/2003 09:00 AM: 
Motion for Case Expenses, Hearing Held; Motion granted. 
12/29/2003 Court Minutes 
12/30/2003 Appearance & Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel 
01/05/2004 Motion to Continue Trial & to Extend Procedural Deadlines 
01/05/2004 Order for case expenses 
01/05/2004 Fee Payment Authorization 
01/06/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/12/2004 09:00 AM) 
01/06/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
01/06/2004 Order for Transcript 
01/12/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 01/12/2004 09:00 AM: Court Minutes 
0111212004 Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 01/12/2004 09:00 AM: 
Court Minutes 
01/12/2004 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/10/2004 09 :OO AM: Continued 
01/12/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/01/2004 09:00 AM) 
01/12/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
01/15/2004 Corrected Motion For Transcript 
01/15/2004 Waiver Of Speedy Trial 
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01/16/2004 Order For Investigative Expenses 
Ol/2012004 Letter from Commissioners Assigning Mark Rader as co-counsel for 
Defendant 
01/21/2004 Order To Continue Trial And To Extend Procedural Deadlines 
02/03/2004 Motion For Access To 1193 Glen Aspen Drive 
0210612004 N~tice Of Hearing On Defendant's Motion For Access To 1193 Glen Aspen 
Drive 
02/06/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/13/2004 09:00 AM) 
0211012004 Notice Of Hearing On Defendant's Motion For Order That The Defendant 
Appear In Court In Street Clothes 
0211012004 Notice Of Hearing On Defendant's Motion To Compel Discovery Regarding 
Bruno Santos 
0211012004 Notice Of Hearing On Defendant's Motion To Compel Discovery Regarding 
Malinda Gonzalez 
02/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/17/2004 02:00 PM) 
0211112004 Motion For Order Directing that the Defendant be Unshackled & Dressed in 
Civilian aothes at all Court Appearances; Memorandum In Support 
02/11/2004 Motion to Compel Discovery Regarding Malinda Gonzales 
02/11/2004 Motionto Compel Discovery Regarding Burno Santos 
0211312004 Memorandum Objecting To Defense Motion To have Defendant Unshackled 
And Dressed In Civilian Clothes At All Court Appearances 
02/13/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/13/2004 09:00 AM: Court Minutes 
02/13/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/13/2004 09:00 AM: Court Minutes 
02/17/2004 Order Granting Limited Access into Residence of 1193 Glen Aspen Drive 
02/17/2004 Court Minutes 
02/17/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/17/2004 02 :00 PM: Hearing Held 
Lodged/Transcript of Hearings: Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Co-
02/17 /2004 Counsel and Hearing Re Public Defender Contract Nov. 25, 2003 and 
Motion to Withdraw, Dec. 8, 2003 
0211712004 Lodged/Initial Appearance, Oct. 30, 2003; Arraignment, Nov. 3, 2003; 
Cont'd Motion on Pretrial Publicity, Nov. 5, 2003 
02/19/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02/24/2004 01:00 PM) 
02/19/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
0212312004 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 02/24/2004 01 :OO PM: 
Hearing Held 
02/23/2004 Court Minutes 
02/23/2004 State's Third Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
0212512004 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Have Defendant in Civilian Clothes 
and Unshackled at all Pretrial Hearings 
02/25/2004 Lodged/Transcripts of various motions 
03/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 03/11/2004 03:00 PM) 
03/08/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
03/10/2004 Request for Reassignment of Presiding District Judge 
03/10/2004 Order of Reassignment of Presiding District Judge 
03/10/2004 Change Assigned Judge 
03/15/2004 Motion to Continue Trial and to Extend Procedural Deadlines 
03/15/2004 Continued (Hearing Scheduled 03/18/2004 03:00 PM) 
03/16/2004 Supplemental Request For Discovery 
0311812004 Hearing.result for Hearing Scheduled held on 03/18/2004 03:00 PM: 
Court Minutes 
03/19/2004 State's 4th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
0312512004 Notice Of Intent OfThe Court To Enter An Amended Order Unsealing 
Grand Jury Exhibits For The Limited Purpose Of Viewing By The Court 
03/25/2004 Order Granting Continuance And Procedural Deadlines 
04/08/2004 Motion To Extend Deadline For Submission Of Jury Questionnaire 
04/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 04/12/2004 09:30 AM) 
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04/08/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
04/09/2004 State's Proposed Juror Questionnaire 
0411212004 Hearing.result for Hearing Scheduled held on 04/12/2004 09:30 AM: 
Court Minutes 
0411212004 Order _Gran~ing Motion To Extend Deadline For Submission Of Jury 
Questionnaire 
04/13/2004 Continued (Jury Trial 09/27/2004 09:00 AM) 
04/14/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 04/16/2004 01 :00 PM) 
04/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/Heather Saunders 
04/15/2004 Lodged/Transcript of Motion to View Premises; Motions to Compel 
0411612004 Lodged/T~~script of Proceedings, ~efendant's Motion to Extend Deadline 
for Subm1ss1on of Jury Questionnaire 
04/20/2004 Fee Payment Authorization (Bob Pangburn - $730.11) 
04/26/2004 (Hearing Scheduled 05/03/2004 02:30 PM) Motion to Compel 
04/26/2004 Defendant's Second Supplemental Request for Discovery 
0412612004 Motion to Co~pel Discovery Re: Subpoenas, Subpoena Returns, Releases, 
Letters & Notices 
0412612004 Stat~'s Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery and Notice of Hearing 
Setting 
04/29/2004 Motion to Continue Motion to Compel Discovery 
04/30/2004 State's Proposed Juror Questionnaire (amended) 
05/03/2004 Proposed Juror Questionnaire 
05/03/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 05/03/2004 02:00 PM: Court Minutes 
05/03/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/24/2004 11 :00 AM) 
05/03/2004 Order Granting Continuance 
05/03/2004 Defendant's Proposed Juror Questionnaire 
05/05/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
05/17/2004 Amended Indictment 
05/17/2004 State's 5th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
05/19/2004 State's 6th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
05/20/2004 Motion to Strike Purported Amended Indictment 
0512112004 State's Motion Objecting To Hearing Date For Lack Of Proper Notice On 
Defendant's Motion To Strike Amended Indictment 
05/24/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/26/2004 11 :30 AM) 
05/24/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 05/24/2004 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
05/24/2004 Court Minutes 
05/24/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/26/2004 12:00 PM) 
0512512004 Mel;lorandum In Response To Defendant's Motion To Strike Amended 
Indictment 
05/25/2004 State's 7th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
05/26/2004 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/27/2004 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
05/26/2004 Court Minutes 
06/08/2004 State's 8th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
06/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/10/2004 02 :OO PM) 
06/08/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
06/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/27/2004 09:00 AM) 
06/10/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 06/10/2004 02:00 PM: Court Minutes 
06/10/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 06/10/2004 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
0611012004 Motion for order directing sheriff immediately to resume custody of def & 
return def to the Blaine County Jail 
06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 06/29/2004 01 :30 PM) 
06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 07/15/2004 01 :30 PM) 
06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 08/10/2004 01 :30 PM) 
06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 08/31/2004 01:30 PM) 
06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 08/12/2004 01:30 PM) 
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06/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 09/16/2004 09:00 AM) 
06/10/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
06/14/2004 State's proposed juror questionnaire 
06/16/2004 State's addendum to proposed juror questionnaire 
06/21/2004 State's 9th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
06/23/2004 Def's motion to compel discovery & request for sanctions 
0612312004 Notic~ Of Hearing on Def's motion to compel discovery & request for 
sanctions 
06/23/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 06/29/2004 01 :30 PM) 
06/24/2004 Continued (Scheduling Conference 06/30/2004 09:00 AM) 
06/24/2004 Continued (Motion to Compel 06/30/2004 09:00 AM) 
06/24/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
06/29/2004 Def's amended motion to compel discovery & request for sanctions 
06/30/2004 Reporter Transcript pretrial scheduling conference held on June 10, 2004 
0613012004 H~aring result for Motion to Compel held on 06/30/2004 09:00 AM: Court 
Minutes 
0613012004 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 06/30/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
06/30/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 07/07/2004 10:00 AM) 
06/30/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
0710112004 Motion for order directing the State to render up evidence for independent 
scientific examination & testing 
07/01/2004 Motion to shorten time 
07/01/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
07/02/2004 Affidavit for search warrant 
07/02/2004 Search Warrant Returned 
07/02/2004 Receipt, Inventory & Return of Warrant 
07/02/2004 Defs Response To Request For Discovery 
07/02/2004 Motion for leave to supplement discovery 
07/07/2004 Reporter transcript motion to compel/scheduling hearing on 6-30-04 
07/07/2004 Def's amended proposed juror questionnaires 
0710712004 H~arfng result for Pretrial Motions held on 07/07/2004 10:00 AM: Court 
Minutes 
0710712004 Hearing result for Pretrial Motions held on 07/07/2004 10:00 AM: Hearing 
Held 
07/08/2004 State's 10th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
07/08/2004 State's 2nd Request for Discovery/demand For Alibi 
07/08/2004 Motion to continue trial 
07/08/2004 Notice Of Hearing on def's motion to continue trial 
07/09/2004 State's response to Def's motion to continue jury trial 
07/15/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 07/15/2004 01:30 PM) 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Continue Hearing date: 
07/15/2004 07/15/2004 Time: 1 :34 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: D907 
0711512004 Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on 07/15/2004 01:30 PM: 
Hearing Heid 
07/15/2004 Court Minutes-review of the Johnson home 
07/15/2004 Motion to continue denied 
07/15/2004 Reporter transcript on motion for order re: testing dated July 7, 2004 
07/16/2004 Motion for status conference 
07/21/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/21/2004 12:00 PM) 
07/21/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 07/21/2004 12:00 PM: Court Minutes 
07/21/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 07/21/2004 12:00 PM: Hearing Held 
07/21/2004 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/27/2004 09:00 AM: Continued 
07/22/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/01/2005 09:00 AM) 
07/22/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
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07/27/2004 Motion for order to fix mute button on defense table microphone 
07/27/2004 Motion re: juror badges 
0712712004 Motion for order directing that the Def be unshackled and dressed in 
civilian clothes at trial; memorandum in support of motion 
07/27/2004 Motion re: use of conclusory legal terms at trial 
07/30/2004 Motion to exempt jurors from courthouse security measures 
07/30/2004 Motion re: excuses from jury duty 
07/30/2004 Motion to conduct individual & sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors 
0811012004 Hear~ng result for Scheduling Conference held on 08/10/2004 01:30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
0811012004 Hearing result for Pretrial Motions held on 08/12/2004 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
08/10/2004 Motion to exclude evidence re: Def's interactions w/ counselors 
08/10/2004 Motion to exclude Def's medical & prescription records & related evidence 
08/10/2004 Motion to exclude Def's school records & related evidence 
08/10/2004 Motion for deadline to complete jury questionnaires 
08/10/2004 Def's 4th Supplemental Request For Discovery 
0811212004 State's Motion for discovery specificity & objection to release of evidentiary 
Items 
0811212004 Lodged: State's memorandum in support of objection to releasing evidence 
& demand for specificity 
08/12/2004 Motion to suppress Def's statements to law enforcement personnel 
08/12/2004 Motion to suppress Def's statements to James & Linda Vavold 
08/12/2004 Motion to suppress Def's statements to jail inmates 
08/12/2004 Motion to suppress Def's statements to Malinda Gonzales 
08/12/2004 Def's 5th Supplemental Request For Discovery 
08/18/2004 Continued (Schedulfng Conference 09/15/2004 09:00 AM) 
08/20/2004 Notice Of Bond Forfeiture 
0812312004 M~morandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Defendnat's Statements to 
Jail Inmates 
08/23/2004 State's Eleventh Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
0812312004 Def's Motion to Compel Discovery and Response to State's Motion for 
Discovery Specificity and Objection to Release of Evidentiary Items 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery Specificity and 
Objection to Release of Evidentiary Items 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Order Directing that the 
Defendant be Unshackled ancl Dressed In Civilian Clothes at Trial 
08/23/2004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion Re: Excuses from Jury Duty 
08/23/2004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion Re: Juror Badges 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Exempt Jurors from 
Courthouse Security Measures 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion Re: Use of Conclusory Legal 
Terms at Trial 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearin~ on Defendant's Motion for Order to Fix Mute Button on 
Defense Table Microphone 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearin~ on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
Statements to Jail Inmates 
0812312004 Notice of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Defendant's Motion for 
Deadline to Complete Jury Questlonairesl 
0812312004 Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Conduct Individual and 
Sequestered Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors 
0812412004 Lo~g.ed: Memorandum in support of motion to suppress Def's statements 
to Jail Inmates 
08/25/2004 Affidavit Of Service- Subpoena, Greg Sage Lt. Blaine County Sheriff 
0812512004 Affidavit Of Service - Suboieba Duces Tecum Greg Sage, Blaine County 
Sheriff 
08/25/2004 Affidavit Of Service - Subpoena Stenve Harkins Blaine County Sheriff 
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08/25/2004 Affidavit Of Service - Subpoena, Walt Femling Blaine County Sheriff 
0812712004 Lodged:_ Memora~dum objecti~g to defense motion to prevent the state 
from using certain words at trial 
0812712004 Lodged: Memorandu~ _i~ opposition to def's motion to suppress Def's 
statements made to Jail inmates 
0813012004 State's Response To Motion For Order Directing That The Defendant Be 
Unshackled And Dressed In Civilian clothes At Trial 
0813012004 State'~ Response To Defense Motion To Exempt Jurors From Courthouse 
Security Measures 
0813012004 State'~ Res~onse To Defense Motion For Deadline To Complete Jury 
Quest1onna1res 
08/30/2004 State's Response To Defense Motion RE: Excuses From Jury Duty 
0813012004 State's Response To Defense Motion To Conduct Individual And 
Sequestered Vair Dire Of Prospective Jurors 
0813112004 Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: 08/31/2004 Time: 2:15 
pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: CD 28 
0813112004 State's Motion to dismiss or in the alternative for a more definite 
statement, re: school records 
0813112004 State's Motion to dismiss or in the alternative for a more definite 
statement, re: to James & Linda Vavold 
0813112004 State's Motion to dismiss or in the alternative for a more definite 
statemetn, re: medical & prescription records 
0813112004 State's Motion to dismiss or In the alternative for a more definite 
statement, re: school records 
oa;3112004 Hear!ng result for Scheduling Conference held on 08/31/2004 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held 
08/31/2004 Lodged: Reporter Transcript of hearing on July 21, 2004 
09/01/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/06/2004 09:00 AM) 
09/01/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
09/15/2004 Request for briefing 
0912112004 Notice Of Hearing on Def's motion to exclude evidence re: Def's 
interactions with counselors 
0912112004 Notice Of Hearing on Def's motion to exclude Def's medical & prescription 
records & related evidence 
0912112004 N~tice Of Hearing on Def's motion to exclude Def's school records & related 
evidence 
0912112004 Not!ce Of Hearing on Def's motion to suppress Def's statements to James 
& Linda Vavold 
0912112004 Notice Of Hearing on Def's motion to suppress Def's statements to law 
enforcement personnel 
0912112004 ~otice Of Hearing on Def's motion to suppress Def's statements to jail 
inmates 
0912812004 Lodged: memorandum in opposition to Def's motion to suppress Def's 
statements to James & Linda Vavold 
0912812004 Lodged: Memorandum in opposition to Def's motion to suppress Def's 
statements to law enforcement personnel 
0912812004 Lodged: Memorandum ln support of motion to exclude Def's medical & 
prescription records & related evidence 
0912812004 Lodged: Memorandum in support of motion to exclude testimony of Linda 
& James Vavold 
0912812004 Lodged: Memorandum ln support of motion to exclude Def's school records 
& related evlden ce 
0912812004 Lodged:_ Mem~randum in support of motion to evidence regarding Def's 
interactions with counselors 
0912812004 Lodged: Memorandum in support of motion to suppress Def's statements 
to Law Enforecement Personnel 
09/30/2004 Stipulation to prevent destruction of evidence by the defense 
09/30/2004 Lodged: State's Release Inventory 
10/01/2004 State's 12th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
287 of 352
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Linda Vavold 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Walt Femling 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Steve Harkins 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Tammy Hugh 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Greg Sage 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Returned-Doug Nelson 
10/04/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
10/04/2004 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Greg Sage 
1010612004 Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Suppress Hearing date: 
10/06/2004 nme: 9:00 am Audio tape number: D2 
1010612004 Order on requ_est to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a 
court proceeding 
10/06/2004 Lodged: reporter's transcript hearing on August 31, 2004 
10/06/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 10/06/2004 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
1010712004 Hearing re~ult for Motion held on 10/06/2004 09:00 AM: Case Taken 
Under Advisement 
10/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress 10/29/2004 09:00 AM) 
10/08/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
10/12/2004 Lodged: Amended Release Inventory 
Emergency motion for order directing State to remove Def from Solitary 
10/12/2004 confinement, to house Def in accordance with the law, and to cease & 
desist Isolating Def from her counsel 
10/12/2004 Affidavit of Patrick Dunn 
10/12/2004 Affidavit of Bob Pangburn 
10/12/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/13/2004 11:00 AM) 
10/12/2004 State's motion to continue suppression hearing 
10/13/2004 Hearing Held 
10/13/2004 Court Minutes 
10/13/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 10/13/2004 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
10/13/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
10/13/2004 Continued (Motion to Suppress 11/05/2004 11 :00 AM) 
10/13/2004 Order Setting Pre-Trial Motion Cutoff Date 
10/13/2004 Order granting continuance of suppression motion 
10/14/2004 State's Third Request For Discovery and Demand For Alibi 
10/18/2004 Order re: access to Sarah Marie Johnson 
10/22/2004 Notice to counsel of un-readable exhibits 
1012212004 State's motion for reconsideration of denial of defense motion to conduct 
Individual & requestered voir dire of prospective jurors 
10/22/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
10/22/2004 State's Motion for status hearing on juror questionnaires 
10/22/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
10/22/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Reconsideration 11/05/2004 11 :OO AM) 
10/25/2004 Order of Ders motion to suppress Ders statement to jail inmates 
10/29/2004 State's motion to compel 
10/29/2004 State's motion to shorten time for notice of hearing 
10/29/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
10/29/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 11/02/2004 01 :00 PM} 
10/29/2004 Ders Response To Request For Discovery 
Def's motion to compel State to cease and desist instructing State 
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10/29/2004 employees not to speak to the Defense 
1012912004 Notice Of Hearing on Def's motion to compel State to cease and desist 
instructing State employees not to speak to the defense 
1012912004 Def's _motion to compel discovery for purposes of testing & request for 
sanctions 
1012912004 Notic~ Of Hearing on Def's motion to compel discovery & request for 
sanctions 
1012912004 Defs motion to compel State to permit examination of fingerprint evidence 
outside the presence of State investigators 
1012912004 Notice Of Hearing on Defs motion to compel State to permit examination 
of fingerprint evidence outside the presence of State investigators 
1012912004 Defs motion for order directing State to run fingerprint check of Bruno 
Santos 
1012912004 Notice Of Hearing on Defs motion for order directing State to run 
fingerprint check of Bruno Santos 
11/01/2004 State's motion to compel discovery 
11/01/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
11/01/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 11/05/2004 11:00 AM) 
11/01/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
11/01/2004 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-James Boyle 
11/01/2004 Certificate of true copy of subpoena (Duces Tecum) 
ll/Ol/2004 Hear!ng result for Motion to Compel held on 11/02/2004 01:00 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
11/01/2004 Ex parte motion to commit witness to bail 
1110112004 Ex parte affidavit of Jim J. Thomas in support of motion to commit witness 
to ball 
11/01/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Defendant's Motion to Compel 11/05/2004 11:00 AM) 
1110112004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for status hearing on jury questionnaires 
11/05/2004 11:00 AM) 
11/02/2004 Defs motion to compel photographic evidence 
11/02/2004 Motion to shorten time 
1110212004 Noti~e Of Hearing o~ Def's motion to compel photographic evidence & 
motion to shorten time 
11/02/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Shorten Time 11/05/2004 11:00 AM) 
11/02/2004 Ex Parte Order setting witness bail 
1110312004 S~ate's ~esponse to Defendant's Motion for Order Directing State to Run 
Fingerprint Check of Bruno Santos 
1110312004 State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel State to Cease and 
Desist Instructing State Employees not to Speak to the Defense 
State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel State to Permit 
11/03/2004 Examination of Ringerprint Evidence Outside the Presence of State 
Investigators 
1110312004 State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery for Purposes 
of Testing and Request for Sanctions 
11/03/2004 State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Photographic Evidence 
11/04/2004 Order to Transport Defendant 
11/04/2004 State's Motion for Order to Transport Defendant 
1110412004 Notice Of Appearance; motion to quash witness bond; motion to shorten 
time; and notice of hearing-Doug Werth for Bruno Santos 
11/04/2004 Discovery Request-Doug Werth for Bruno Santos 
11/05/2004 Motion to Dismiss 
11/05/2004 Motion to Exclude Evidence 
11/05/2004 Motion To Suppress Illegally Obtained Physical Evidence 
1110512004 Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: 11/05/2004 Time: 
11 :00 am court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: D4 
11/05/2004 Lodged: Reporter's transcript hearing on October 13, 2004 
11/05/2004 Lodged: Reporter's transcript hearings on October 6 & 7, 2004 
Hearing result for Motion to Shorten Time held on 11/05/2004 11:00 AM: 
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11/05/2004 Hearing Held 
1110512004 Hearing result for Motion for status hearing on jury questionnaires held on 
11/05/2004 11:00 AM: Hearing Held 
1110512004 Hearing result for Defendant's Motion to Compel held on 11/05/2004 
11:00 AM: Hearing Held 
1110512004 Hearing r~sult for State's Motion to Compel held on 11/05/2004 11 :00 
· AM: Hearing Held 
1110512004 Hearing r~sult for Motion for Reconsideration held on 11/05/2004 11 :00 
AM: Hearing Held 
1110512004 Hear!ng result for Motion to Suppress held on 11/05/2004 11:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
11/05/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/09/2004 10:00 AM) 
11/05/2004 Affidavit of Consuelo Cederro 
11/09/2004 Affidavit of Rick Filkins 
11/09/2004 Affidavit of Douglas A. Werth 
1110912004 Motion for Witness Pursuant to ICR 15 For Taking of Deposition and 
Discharge 
11/09/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status/Jury Procedures 11/24/2004 09:00 AM) 
11/09/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
11/09/2004 Hearing result for Motion held on 11/09/2004 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
11/09/2004 Second Affidavit of Douglas A. Werth 
1111512004 Special State's Response To Request For Discovery Re: Bruno Santos 
Witness Bail Proceedings 
11/16/2004 Stipulation for defense access to State's evidence 
11/16/2004 State's motion for witness video deposition of Bruno Santos 
1111612004 Affidavit of Jim J. Thomas in support of motion to take video deposition of 
Bruno Santos 
11/16/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
11/16/2004 State's motion for witness deposition of Consuelo Cedeno/Cederra 
1111612004 Affidavit of Jim J. Thomas in support of motion to take video deposition of 
Consuelo Cedeno/Cederro 
11/16/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
11/17/2004 State's Thirteenth Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
11/18/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Witness Deposition 11/24/2004 09:00 AM) 
1111912004 Noti_ce Of 2nd Hearing on Defs motion to compel discovery for purposes of 
testing 
11/19/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 11/24/2004 09:00 AM) 
11/22/2004 Defs 6th supplemental request for discovery 
1112312004 Lodged: Defs objection to State's motions to depose witnesses & 
memorandum in support 
11/23/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
11/23/2004 Subpoena Returned-Greg Sage 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for Witness Deposition Hearing date: 
11/24/2004 11/24/2004 Time: 9:24 am Court reporter: Susan Israel Audio tape 
number: 06 
1112412004 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 11/24/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
1112412004 Hearing result for Motion for Witness Deposition held on 11/24/2004 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
1112412004 Hear!ng result for Status/Jury Procedures held on 11/24/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
11/24/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status/Jury Procedures 12/03/2004 09:00 AM) 
11/24/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
Order on Def's motion to exclude Def's school records & related evidence, 
12/01/2004 motion to exclude Def's interaction with counselors, and Defs motion to 
exclude medical & prescription records & related evidence 
12/02/2004 State's 14th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
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12/03/2004 Hearing result for Status/Jury Procedures held on 12/03/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
12/03/2004 Court Minutes 
12/03/2004 Lodged: reporter transcript for November 9, 2004 
12/03/2004 Lodged: reporter transcript for November 5, 2004 
12/03/2004 Jury Questionnaire 
12/09/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status/Jury Procedures 12/14/2004 01 :00 PM) 
12/09/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
12/09/2004 Affidavit Of Service 
12/09/2004 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Lt. Dennis Dexter 
12/09/2004 Certificate of true copy of subpoena duces tecum 
12/14/2004 Subpoena Returned/Mark Dalton 
12/14/2004 Subpoena Returned/Ed Fuller 
1211412004 Court Minutes Hearing type: Status Hearing date: 12/14/2004 lime: 
11 :00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: DB 
12/14/2004 Order denying Bob Pangburn's motion to withdraw 
12/14/2004 Order denying Mark Rader's motion to withdraw 
12/14/2004 Lodged: reporter's transcript from December 3, 2004 
12/14/2004 Hearing Held 
12/14/2004 Return Of Service 
12/14/2004 Subpoena Returned- served on 12/13/04 to Ed Fuller 
12/14/2004 Return Of Service 
12/14/2004 Subpoena Returned- served on 12/13/04 to Mark Dalton 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Status/Jury Procedures Hearing date: 
12/14/2004 12/14/2004 llme: 9:00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: DB 
1211412004 Hea~ng result for Status/Jury Procedures held on 12/14/2004 01:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
12/15/2004 State's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/Phil High 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Gene Ramsey 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Walt Femling 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned I Greg Sage 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned /Connie Burrell 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Bryan Carpita 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Brad Gelskey 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ James Shaw 12/10/04 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Salen Mink 12/15/2004 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Gary Kaufman 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Nathan Corder 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Cliff Katona 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Cloyce Corder 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Stu Robinson 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Ron Taylor 
12/15/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Steve Harkins 
12/15/2004 Court Minutes 
12/15/2004 Hearing Held 
12/17/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/29/2004 09 :00 AM) 
12/17/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/07/2005 09:00 AM) 
12/17/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/24/2005 09:00 AM) 
12/l 7 /2004 Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 12/23/2004 09 :00 AM) 
l 2/17/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Lorna Kolash 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Christian Ayala 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Pat Alder 
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12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Mitch Marcroft 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Kjell Elisson 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Steve England 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Dorothy Schinella 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Karen's Pharmacy 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Kyle Worthington 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned Marguerite Sowersby 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Megan Sowersby 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ George Dondero 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Karen Soracco 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Mark Roemer 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Rachel Richards 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Tim Richards 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Kim Richards 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Terri Sanders 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Russ Mikel, Coroner 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Randy Tremble 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Chante Caudle 
12/20/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Raul Ornelas 
12/21/2004 Personal Return Of Service Subpoena Returned/ Matt Johnson 
12/21/2004 Personal Return Of Service Subpoena Returned/ Julie Weseman Johnson 
12/21/2004 Not Found Return Of Service/ Carlos Ayala 
12/21/2004 Not Found Return Of Service/ Cami Fahey 
12/21/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Rod Englert 
12/21/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Rick Sanford, INS 
12/21/2004 Subpoena Returned-Scott Birch 
12/21/2004 Subpoena Returned-Gary Deulen 
12/21/2004 Subpoena Returned=Mlchael Dillon 
1212212004 Lodged/Memorandum In Support of Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
Statements to Malinda Gonzales 
12/22/2004 Subpoena Returned-Cam Daggett 
12/22/2004 Subpoena Returned-Timothy Neville 
12/22/2004 Subpoena Returned-Mark Palmer 
12/22/2004 Subpoena Returned-Barbara Coleman 
12/22/2004 Subpoena Returned-Syringa Stark 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Order to Show Cause Hearing date: 
12/23/2004 12/23/2004 Time: 9:00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: Dll 
1212312004 Notice Of Hearing on Def's motion suppress Def's statements to Malinda 
Gonzalez 
1212312004 Hear!ng result for Order to Show Cause held on 12/23/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
12/23/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress 12/29/2004 09:00 AM) 
12/23/2004 Subpoena Returned/ Becky Lopez 
12/23/2004 Lodged: reporter transcript for hearing on December 14th & 15th, 2004 
1212312004 Order on Def's motion to suppress Def's statements to law enforcement 
personnel 
12/27/2004 Subpoena Returned-Malinda Gonzales 
12/27/2004 Subpoena Returned-Jennifer Babbitt 
1212812004 Hear(ng result for Motion to Suppress held on 12/29/2004 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
1212812004 Lodged: letter from Bob Pangburn vacating motion to suppress hearing on 
December 29, 2004 
12/28/2004 Subpoena Returned-John Koth 
12/28/2004 Subpoena Returned-Mark Fields 
Lodged: Memorandum in opposition to Def's motion to suppress Def's 
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12/28/2004 statements made to Malinda Gonzales 
12/29/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 12/29/2004 09 :00 AM: Court Minutes 
12/29/2004 Hearing result for Status held on 12/29/2004 09 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
12/29/2004 Hearing Scheduled (Status/Jury Procedures 01/06/2005 12:00 PM) 
12/29/2004 Lodged: Reporter's transcript for hearing on December 23,2004 
12/29/2004 Subpoena Returned-Dan Tiller 
12/29/2004 Summons Issued-juror Richard Grandllch 
12/29/2004 Summons Issued-juror Ruben Lopez 
12/29/2004 Summons Issued-juror George Paddi 
12/29/2004 Summons Issued-juror Kimball Luff 
12/29/2004 Summons Issued-juror Rebecca Austin 
12/30/2004 Notice Of Hearing 
12/30/2004 Subpoena Returned-Carlos Ayala 
1213012004 Notice Of Hearing on Ders motion to suppress Ders statements to Malinda 
Gonzales 
1213012004 N~tice Of Hearing on Ders motion to suppress illegally obtained physical 
evidence 
01/03/2005 Affidavit Of Service-subpoena duces tecum for Lt. Greg Sage 
01/03/2005 Motion to shorten time 
01/03/2005 Notice Of Hearing on motion to shorten time 
01/03/2005 Motion for order to disdose certain documents 
0110312005 Lodg~d: M~morandum in support of motion to suppress Illegally obtained 
physical evidence 
01/03/2005 Lodged: State's memorandum regarding jury selection 
01/04/2005 Affidavit Of Service 
01/04/2005 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned 
01/04/2005 Certificate Of true copy of subpoena duces tecum 
01/04/2005 Return Of Service Ross Kirtley 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Robin Lehat 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Leslie Luccesl 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Russell Nuxoll 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Janet Sylten 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Jane Jiminez 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Cami Mae Bustos 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Carlos Ayala 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Mike Costing 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Status/Jury Procedures Hearing date: 
O 1/06/2005 01/06/2005 lime: 12 :07 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: D12 
01/06/2005 Return Of Service 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served John Schrader on 12/30/04 
01/06/2005 Return Of Service 
01/06/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Jim Vavold on 1/4/05 
01/06/2005 court Minutes 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Suppress Hearing date: 
01/07/2005 01/07/2005 Time: 9 :oo am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: D12 
01/07/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Linda Vavold 
01/07/2005 State's Motion to Shorten Time for Notice of Hearing 
01/07/2005 State's Motion to Continue Jury Trial 
01/07/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
01/07/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 01/10/2005 09:00 AM) 
0110712005 Hear~ng result for Motion to Suppress held on 01/07/2005 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
0110712005 Order on Def's oral motion to remove action before trial IC 19-1801 & 
293 of 352
notice to the parties 
Ol/l0/2005 S~ate's Objection to Consumption of Sample and Motion to Require 
Disclosure of Consumed Sample 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Jeff Brown 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Andrew Stark 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Continue Hearing date: 
01/10/2005 01/10/2005 Time: 1 :03 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: 9393 
Ol/l0/2005 Hear(ng result for Motion to Continue held on 01/10/2005 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-Scott Ward 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-Rob Stiles 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-Amber Moss 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-Kristina Paulette 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-Wayne Niemeyer 
01/10/2005 Subpoena Returned-William Chapin 
01/10/2005 State's 16th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
01/11/2005 Return Of Service 
01/11/2005 Subpoena Returned- Served 1/11/05 Joey Jaramillo 
01/11/2005 Return Of Service 
01/11/2005 Subpoena Returned- Served 1/10/05 Karen Chase 
0111112005 Amended order on Ders oral motion to remove action before trial & notice 
to the parties regarding further proceedings 
0111312005 Request to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding & order-ABC News In New York 
0111312005 Request to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding & order-Court TV in New York 
01/14/2005 Subpoena Returned-No Found Consuelo Cedeno 
01/14/2005 Amended order re: access to Sarah Marie Johnson 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Robin Lahat 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Carlos Ayala 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Jim Hopkins 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Marguerite Sowersby 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Walt Femllng 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Chante Caudle 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Scott Ward 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Noveta Hartmann 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Max Bailey 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Susan Choat 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Autumn Fisher 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Randy Trenble 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Ann Gasaway 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Melissa Miller 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Tim Richards 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Dorothy Schinella 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Andrea Karle 
O 1/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Tina Olson 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Mark Palmer 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Retumed George Dondero 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Brenda Annen 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Karen Chase 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Janet Sylten 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Linda O'Connor 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Mark Fields 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Christian Ayala 
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01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Pat Alder 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Mitch Marcroft 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Kjell Elisson 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Terri Sanders 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Kim Richards 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Rachel Richards 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Cloyce Corder 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Bryan Carpita 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Megan Sowersby 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Jane Lopez-Jiminez 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Becky Lopez 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Stu Robinson 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Steve Harkins 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Ron Taylor 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Mark Roemer 
01/18/2005 Subpoena Returned Russell Nuxoll 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Lorna Kolash 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Mike Oosting 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Lois Standley 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Syringa Stark 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Karen Soracco 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Mel Speegle 
01/19/2005 Subpoena Returned Barbara Coleman 
01/20/2005 State's Third Motion To Compel Discovery 
01/20/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
01/20/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 01/24/2005 09:00 AM) 
01/20/2005 State's Motion to Shorten lime for Notice of Hearing 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Steve England 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Timothy Neville 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Cami Fahey 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned John Koth 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Jeff Brown 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Gene Ramsey 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Raul Ornelas 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Gary Kaufman 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Selena Mink 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Nathan Corder 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Malinda Gonzales 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Cliff Katona 
01/20/2005 Subpoena Returned Kevin Haight 
01/20/2005 State's Trial Witness List 
01/20/2005 State's Proposed Jury Instructions 
01/20/2005 State's Motion to Allow the Jury to Visit the Crime Scene 
01/20/2005 State's 17th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
01/21/2005 State's anticipated trial exhibit list 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-US Cellular Records Custodian 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Cingular Records Custodian 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Qwest Records Custodian 
O 1/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Verizon Wireless Records 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Edge Wireless 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Roberta Dachtler 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Phil High 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Russ Mikel 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Brad Gelskey 
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01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Mark Dalton 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Connie Burrell 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Conseulo Cedeno 
01/21/2005 Subpoena Returned-Leslie Luccesl 
01/24/2005 Stipulation & order re: jury questionnaires 
01/24/2005 Addendum to State's proposed jury instructiosn 
01/24/2005 Lodged: Reporter's transcript from January 6, 2005 
01/24/2005 Lodged: Reporter's transcript from January 7, 2005 
01/24/2005 Lodged: Reporter's transcript from January 10, 2005 
0112412005 Reques~ to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding 
0112412005 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 01/24/2005 09:00 AM: Court 
Minutes 
0112412005 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 01/24/2005 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
01/24/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/31/2005 01:00 PM) 
01/25/2005 Subpoena Returned-Mark Sliwicki 
01/25/2005 Subpoena Returned-Greg Sage 
01/25/2005 Subpoena Returned-Karen's Pharmacy 
01/25/2005 Subpoena Returned-Vicki Theis 
0112612005 Request to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding & order-KMVf News in Twin 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned Matt Johnson 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned Danny Thornton 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned James Shaw 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned Joey Jaramillo 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned Bruno Santos 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned Michael Fishman 
01/27/2005 State's 18TH Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned-Ed Fuller 
01/27/2005 Subpoena Returned-Matt Johnson 
0112812005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Status Hearing date: 01/28/2005 Time: 
10 :00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter 
01/28/2005 Hearing Held 
01/28/2005 Affidavit Of Service 
01/28/2005 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Greg Sage 
01/28/2005 Affidavit Of Service 
01/28/2005 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Dennis Dexter or Lt. Mike Fehlman 
01/28/2005 Affidavit Of Service 
01/28/2005 Subpoena Duces Tecum Returned-Lt. Dennis Dexter or Lt. Mike Fehlman 
0112812005 Reques~ to obtain appr~val to broadcase and/or photograph a court 
proceeding-The Wood Rrver Journal 
01/31/2005 Motion to exclude defense witnesses & evidence due to late disclosure 
01/31/2005 State's motion to shorten time for notice of hearing 
01/31/2005 Order granting motion to shorten time 
01/31/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
01/31/2005 Hearing result for Status held on 01/31/2005 01 :00 PM: Court Minutes 
01/31/2005 Hearing result for Status held on 01/31/2005 01:00 PM: Hearing Held 
01/31/2005 Def's witness & exhibit list 
0210112005 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/01/2005 09:00 AM: Jury Trial 
Started 
02/01/2005 Court Minutes 
02/01/2005 Initial Instructions to the Prospective Jury Part I 
02/02/2005 Court Minutes 
296 of 352
02/02/2005 Order 
02/02/2005 Initial Instructions to the Prospective Jury Part II 
02/03/2005 Subpoena Returned Rae Whittaker 
02/03/2005 Court Minutes 
02/04/2005 State's 19th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
State's notice of intent to seek exclusion of defense witnesses & evidence 
0210412005 due to late disclosure 
02/04/2005 Court Minutes 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Tina Walthall 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Claudia Hooten 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Debbie Davis 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Katie Metzger 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Brian Perkins 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Kathryn Wallace 
02/04/2005 State's witness list 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Gary Craven 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Kassie Weber 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Jim Vavold 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Dean Dishman 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Linda Vavold 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Patricia Dishman 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Jennifer Babbitt 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Cynthia Hall 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Nicole Settle 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Ross Kirtley 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Julia Dupuis 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Helen Speegle 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Dwight Vanhorn 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-John Schrader 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Andrew Stark 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Scott Birch 
02/04/2005 Subpoena Returned-Alan Dupois 
02/07/2005 Court Minutes 
02/07/2005 Amended Def's witness list 
02/07/2005 Preliminary Instructions to the Jury 
02/08/2005 Court Minutes 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Michael Dillon 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Gary Deulen, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Debbie Davis, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Mel Speegle, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Helen Speegle, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Cynthia Hall, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Tina Walthall, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Glen Groben, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Katie Metzger, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Julia Dupols, not served 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Alan Dupois, not served 
02/08/2005 Certification of Material Witness 
02/08/2005 Trial Points & Authorities re: objections to testimony of Walt Femling 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Ariadne Condos 
02/08/2005 Subpoena Returned-Bryan Higgason, Jr 
02/09/2005 Court Minutes 
02/10/2005 Court Minutes 
02/11/2005 Court Minutes 
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02/14/2005 Court Minutes 
02/15/2005 Court Minutes 
02/15/2005 Lodged: letter from Jim Thomas to Doug Werth 
02/15/2005 Motion to dismiss witness bail 
02/15/2005 State's Motion in limine re: Bruno Santos Dominguez 
02/16/2005 Court Minutes 
02/16/2005 State's 20th Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
02/16/2005 Lodged: State's memorandum regarding lesser included offenses 
02/17/2005 Court Minutes 
02/17/2005 State's 21st Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
02/18/2005 Court Minutes 
02/18/2005 Order to transport defendant-Malinda Gonzalez 
02/22/2005 Court Minutes 
02/22/2005 Lodged: State's memorandum In support of motion In llmlne 
02/22/2005 State's offered caselaw in support of aider & abetter instruction 
02/22/2005 State's Motion in limine 
02/22/2005 Notice of intent not to introduce contents of October 29, 2003 interview 
02/23/2005 Court Minutes 
02/23/2005 Def's 7th Supplemental Request For Discovery 
02/24/2005 Court Minutes 
02/24/2005 State's 22nd Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
0212412005 Reques~ to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding 
02/25/2005 Court Minutes 
02/25/2005 Defs second amended witness list 
02/25/2005 Objection to State's motion in limine & memorandum in support 
02/28/2005 Court Minutes 
03/01/2005 Court Minutes 
03/02/2005 Court Minutes 
03/03/2005 Court Minutes 
03/03/2005 Subpoena Returned-Jeannie Frost 
03/04/2005 Court Minutes 
03/07/2005 Court Minutes 
03/07/2005 Defendant's third amended witness list 
03/08/2005 Court Minutes 
03/08/2005 Defendant's proposed jury instruction 
03/09/2005 Court Minutes 
03/09/2005 Lodged: State's memorandum in support of aiding & abetting instruction 
03/10/2005 Court Minutes 
03/10/2005 Order granting motion to dismiss witness bail 
03/10/2005 Ex Parte Motion to Quash Witness Bond 
03/11/2005 Court Minutes 
03/14/2005 Court Minutes 
0311412005 Def's objections to the Court's findings of fact in support of jury instruction 
No.30 
03/14/2005 Final Instructions to the Jury 
03/15/2005 Court Minutes 
03/15/2005 Court Minute Entry (Supplemental) 
03/15/2005 Court Minute Entry (supplemental) 
03/15/2005 Court Minute Entry (supplemental) 
03/15/2005 Post Verdict Jury Instruction 
03/16/2005 Court Minutes 
03/16/2005 Verdict Form 
03/16/2005 Found Guilty After Trial 
03/16/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/19/2005 09:00 AM) 
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0311712005 Noti~e of sentencing hearing & order regarding preparation for sentencing 
hearing 
03/17/2005 Exhibit list-receipt 
0312112005 Hearing Scheduled (Status 03/24/2005 01 :00 PM) Status regarding 
sentencing 
03/21/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
0312412005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Status Hearing date: 03/24/2005 llme: 1 :00 
pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: d19 
03/24/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
0312412005 Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/19/2005 01:30 PM) regarding sentencing, 
may be held by phone conference per 43.1 ICR 
0312412005 Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/17/2005 01:30 PM) regarding sentencing, 
may be held by phone conference per 43.1 ICR 
0312412005 Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/14/2005 01 :30 PM) regarding sentencing, 
may be held by phone conference per 43.1 ICR 
0312412005 Hearing resul: for Status _held on 03/24/2005 01 :00 PM: Court Minutes 
Status regarding sentencing 
0312412005 Hearing resul: for Status held on 03/24/2005 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held 
Status regarding sentencing 
03/25/2005 Motion to relocate the Def to the Ada County Jail 
03/28/2005 Motion for new trial 
03/28/2005 Motion for judgment of acquittal 
03/28/2005 Motion for arrest of judgment 
03/30/2005 Sentencing 06/29/2005 09:00 AM 
03/30/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/12/2005 02:30 PM) for relocation 
03/30/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
03/30/2005 Lodged Memorandum 
0410712005 Letter from Bob Pangburn advising the Court they have chosen Richard 
Worst, PHD to perform psychological evaluation on Def 
04/07/2005 Lodged: Memorandum objecting to Def's motion for judgment of acquittal 
04/07/2005 Lodged: Memorandum objecting to Def's motion for arrest of judgment 
04/07/2005 Lodged: Memorandum objecting to Def's motion for a new trial 
Motion for OTSC why Sheriff Walt Fem ling, Lieutenant Greg Sage and 
04/11/2005 Deputy Bear Dachtler & additional persons yet unknown should not be 
held in contempt of court 
04/11/2005 Affidavit of Linda Dunn 
04/11/2005 Affidavit of Patrick Dunn 
04/11/2005 Motion for access to client in accordance with constitutional guarantees 
04/11/2005 Motion to shorten time for notice of hearing 
04/12/2005 Continued (Motion 04/12/2005 02:00 PM) for relocation 
0411212005 Hearing r~sult for Motion held on 04/12/2005 02:00 PM: Court Minutes 
for relocation 
0411212005 Hearing result for Motion held on 04/12/2005 02:00 PM: Hearing Held for 
relocation 
04/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/03/2005 01 :00 PM) Motion for a new trial 
04/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/03/2005 01 :DO PM) Motion for acquittal 
0411412005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/03/2005 O 1 :00 PM) Motion for Arrest of 
Judgment 
04/14/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
04/15/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 04/27/2005 10:00 AM) 
04/18/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 04/27/2005 10:00 AM) 
04/18/2005 Order To Show Cause - Issued sua sponte 
0411912005 Hearing result for Status held on 04/19/2005 01 :30 PM: Court Minutes 
regarding sentencing, may be held by phone conference per 43.1 ICR 
0411912005 Hearing result for Status held on 04/19/2005 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
regarding sentencing, may be held by phone conference per 43.1 ICR 
04/25/2005 Order for Transport 
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04/27/2005 Hearing result for Orderto Show Cause held on 04/27/2005 10:00 AM: 
Court Minutes 
0412712005 Hear(ng result for Order to Show Cause held on 04/27/2005 10:00 AM: 
Hearing Held · 
04/29/2005 Lodged Memorandum In Support of Motion for New Trail 
04/29/2005 Lodged Memorandum In Support of Motion for Judgment of Aquittal 
04/29/2005 Affidavit of Patrick Dunn 
04/29/2005 Affidavit of Linda Dunn 
05/02/2005 Affidavit of Anita Moore 
05/02/2005 Lodged Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial 
0510312005 Hea:lng result for Motion held on 05/03/2005 01 :00 PM: Court Minutes 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment 
0510312005 Hearing result for Motion held on 05/03/2005 01:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment 
05/03/2005 Continued (Motion 05/17/2005 01 :00 PM) Motion for a new trial 
05/12/2005 Subpoena Returned-Hal Cloutier 
05/12/2005 Subpoena Returned-Steve McKlsslck 
05/13/2005 Affidavit of Jurors 
0511312005 Lodged_ Supplemental Memorandum Objecting to Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial 
0511612005 Reques~ to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph Court 
Proceedings 
05/16/2005 Order to Broadcast and/or Photograph Court Proceedings 
05/17/2005 Affidavit of Juror In the Sarah Marie Johnson Trial 
0511712005 Hea:ing result for ~otion held on 05/17/2005 01:30 PM: Court Minutes 
Motion for a new trial 
0511712005 Hea:ing result for ~otlon held on 05/17/2005 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Motion for a new trial 
05/20/2005 Affidavit of juror in the Sarah Marie Johnson trial 
06/02/2005 Lodged Letter 
06/07/2005 Motion for order to disclose certain documents 
06/07/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
0610712005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/14/2005 01:30 PM) motion for order to 
dlsdose certain documents 
0611012005 State's Objection to Payment of Services and Motion to Reconsider 
Previous Authorizations of Payment 
06/10/2005 State's Objection to Motion for Order to Disclose Certain Documents 
06/10/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
0611012005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/14/2005 01:30 PM) State's Motion to 
Reconsider Previous Authorization of Payment 
0611412005 Hearing result for Motion held on 06/14/2005 01 :30 PM: Court Minutes 
motion for order to disclose certain documents 
0611412005 Hearing result for Motion held on 06/14/2005 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
motion for order to disclose certain documents 
06/14/2005 Motion to Recuse Prosecutor and Memorandum In Support 
06/15/2005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/23/2005 10:00 AM} 
06/15/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
06/15/2005 Subpoena Issued-Doug Nelson 
0611512005 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding 
06/15/2005 Order to Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
06/15/2005 State's Motion to Obtain Certain Documents from Dr. Worst 
06/15/2005 State's Motion to Shorten Time for Notice of Hearing 
0611712005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: 06/17/2005 Time: 
11:15 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: d28 
0611712005 Lodged Memorandum Objecting to Defendant's Motion to Recuse 
Prosecutor 
06/17/2005 Order on State's Motion to Obtain Certain Documents from Dr. Worst 
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06/17/2005 Order on Defendant's Motion to Recuse Prosecutor 
06/17/2005 Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time 
06/17/2005 Hearing Held 
0612112005 Order for Req~est to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a 
Court Proceeding 
0612212005 Order R~quest to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph a Court 
Proceeding 
0612712005 Order R~quest to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photogtaph A Court 
Proceeding 
0612812005 Order R~quest to Obtain Approval to Broadcast and/or Photograph A Court 
Proceeding 
0612912005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Sentencing Hearing date: 06/29/2005 Time: 
9:00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: D29 
0613012005 Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-I Murder I) Confinement terms: 
Credited time: 609 days. 
06/30/2005 Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-I Murder I) Confinement terms: 
06/30/2005 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
Sentenced To Incarceration (119-2520 Enhancement-use Of Deadly 
06/30/2005 Weapon Comm Of Felony) Confinement terms: Penitentiary determinate: 
15 days. 
0613012005 Judgment of conviction upon a jury verdict of guilty to two felony counts, 
and order of commitment 
06/30/2005 Civil Judgment for crime of violence 
06/30/2005 Order of restitution 
06/30/2005 Order transmitting PSI 
06/30/2005 Subpoena Returned ServedOfflcer Fragler Mini-Cassia Justice Center 
07/01/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Rob Neiwert 
07/01/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Clay Anderson 
07/01/2005 Subpoena Returned Served Sheldon Ray WIikinson 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
07/06/2005 aerk, Per Page Paid by: Kneeland Korb & Collier Receipt number: 0003913 
Dated: 7/6/2005 Amount: $8.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For 
07/06/2005 Certificate And Seal Paid by: Kneeland Korb & Collier Receipt number: 
0003913 Dated: 7/6/2005 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
07/06/2005 State's response to Court's inquiry regarding defense expert payments 
07/06/2005 Order authorizing payment to Richard W. Worst, M.D. 
0710712005 Lodged: Memorandum in support of State's objection to payment of 
services & motion to reconsider previous authorizations of payment 
0710712005 Lodged: Memorandum in opposition to government's objection & motion 
re: defense attorney fees 
07/08/2005 State's motion for Court review of investigative services 
0710812005 Amended judg~ent upon a jury verdict of guilty to two felony counts, and 
order of commitment 
07/11/2005 2nd bill from Dr. Richard Worst 
07/19/2005 Order authorizing payment to Richard W. Worst, MD 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
07/29/2005 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: davld kerrlck & assoc Receipt number: 0004455 
Dated: 07/29/2005 Amount: $11.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For 
07/29/2005 Certificate And Seal Paid by: david kerrick & assoc Receipt number: 
0004455 Dated: 07/29/2005 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
0810412005 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/25/2005 10:00 AM} motion re: Pat Dunn's 
expenses 
08/04/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
08/17/2005 Notice Of Appeal 
08/17/2005 Appealed To The Supreme Court 
08/17/2005 STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
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08/19/2005 Notice & order appointing State Appellate Public Defender on appeal 
08/22/2005 Notice Of Hearing 
08/2212005 Continued (Motion 09/13/2005 02:00 PM) motion re: Pat Dunn's 
expenses 
0812512005 Order on State's objection to payment of services & order on motion to 
reconsider previous authorizations of payment 
09/02/2005 Remittitur-2 appeal cases were opened, one dismissed by Supreme Court 
0911312005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: 9/13/2005 Time: 2:00 
pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: 9399 
09113; 2005 Hearing result for Motion held on 09/13/2005 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
motion re: Pat Dunn's expenses 
10/07/2005 Patrick Dunn's billings 
10/07/2005 Affidavit of Patrick Dunn 
10/07/2005 Affidavit of Mark Rader 
10/07/2005 Affidavit of Bob Pangburn 
1010712005 Motion for order to show cause why Ders counsel shall not be held in 
contempt of court 
10/14/2005 Notice Of Demand Letter And Request For Payment 
10/21/2005 Order for payment of Peter Smith, Investigator 
10/24/2005 Notice Of Intent To Use Letter As Evidence 
11/02/2005 Order governing further proceedings on claimed attorneys fees & expenses 
1110212005 Addendum to order governing further proceedings on claimed attorneys 
fees & expenses 
1110412005 Hearin_g_ Schedu_led (Hearing Scheduled 11/23/2005 09:00 AM) argument 
or add1t1onal evidence 
1110712005 Order on State's motion for court review of investigative services & order 
on Ders motion for reconsideration of Court's prior oral ruling 
11/15/2005 State's Objection To Payment Of Services Without Additional Clarification 
1112312005 Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled Hearing date: 11/23/2005 
Time: 9:04 am Court reporter: Susan Israel Audio tape number: D42 
1112312005 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 11/23/2005 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held argument or additional evidence 
1112312005 Hearing Scheduled (Clerk's Status 12/06/2005 09:00 AM) Pangburn's 
statement flied? under advisement 
1211512005 Lodged: State's objection & memorandum in support of denial of additional 
funds for defense experts 
12/22/2005 Lodged: letter to counsel from the Court setting deadline re: payments 
Order on Defendant's motions for additional funds for a criminology expert 
01/31/2006 & for payment to Michael Howard; and additional funds for firearms/blood 
spatter expert and for payment to Rocky Mink 
Final Appealable Order re: attorney's fees; in particular, order on attorney 
Bob Pangburn's failure to comply iwth the Court's August 25, 2005, order 
on State's objection to payment of services & order on motion to 
01/31/2006 reconsider authorizations of payment; and order on attorney Bob 
Pangburn's affidavits in support of fee application filed May 9, 2005, June 
9, 2005, July 11, 2005 and November 14, 2005 and affidavit in support of 
expenses application filed November 16, 2005 
04/10/2006 Order 
05/04/2006 Remittitur-appeal dismissed 
05/04/2006 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
0710512006 Second Amended Judgment of Conviction upon a Jury Verdict of Guilty to 
Two Felony Counts, and Order of Commitment 
07/06/2006 Notice & order appointing State Appellate Public Defender on Appeal 
07/28/2006 Appealed To The Supreme Court 
07/28/2006 Notice Of Appeal 
07/28/2006 STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
08/07/2006 Order 
09/12/2006 Minute Entry 
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01/24/2007 State's Motion to release exhibits 
01/31/2007 Objection to State's motion to release exhibits & statement in support 
02/26/2007 State's motion to dismiss, State's motion to release exhibits 
03/01/2007 Order dismissing State's motion to release exhibits 
03/21/2007 Order granting motion to augment & suspend the briefing schedule 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
05/31/2007 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Bob Pangburn Receipt number: 0003313 Dated: 
5/31/2007 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Bob Pangburn 
05/31/2007 Receipt number: 0003313 Dated: 5/31/2007 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
06/27/2008 Supreme Court of the State ofldaho 2008 Opinion No. 89 
08/04/2008 Remittltur 
08/04/2008 Remanded 
08/04/2008 STATIJS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
02/10/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: ABC News Receipt number: 0008070 Dated: 
2/10/2009 Amount: $52.00 (Credit card) 
0211012009 Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: ABC News Receipt 
number: 0008070 Dated: 2/10/2009 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
10/22/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Felicia Banegas Receipt number: 0013550 Dated: 
10/22/2009 Amount: $48.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Felicia Banegas 
10/22/2009 Receipt number: 0013550 Dated: 10/22/2009 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
1210312010 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/07/2010 09:30 AM) motion to release trial 
exhibit will be heard in Twin Falls 
12/03/2010 Respondent's motion to release state's exhibit 
12/03/2010 Respndent's motion to shorten time for hearing and notice of hearing 
12/03/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
12/03/2010 Affidavit in support of motion to shorten time for hearing 
12/03/2010 Respondents Motion to release states exhibits 
12/03/2010 Respondents Motion to shorten time for hearing and notice of hearing 
12/03/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
12/03/2010 Affidavit in support of motion to shorten time for hearing 
12/03/2010 Order of reassignment 
12/03/2010 Change Assigned Judge 
1210612010 Hearing result for Motion held on 12/07/2010 09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
motion to release trial exhibit will be heard in Twin Falls 
12/06/2010 Order releasing State's Exhibit No. 123 
12/06/2010 Stipulation to release State's exhibit No. 123 
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Sarah M Johnson, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 1 
Post G, Closed ~i 
Case:CV-2006-0000324 District Filed: 04/19/2006 Subtype: Conviction Judge: Richard Status: OS/lO/lOl 
Relief Bevan 
Subjects:Johnson, Sarah M 
Other Parties:state Of Idaho 
Disposition: Date Judgment Disposition Disposition P rt' a 1es Type Date Type 
04/08/2011 Petition 
Denied 
Johnson, Sarah M (Subject), 






Register of Date 
actions: 
Filing: 9SPC - Post Conviction Relief Filing Paid by: Johnson, Sarah M 
04/19/2006 (subject) Receipt number: 0002226 Dated: 4/19/2006 Amount: $.00 
(Cash) 
04/19/2006 Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Appearance Stephen D. Thompson 
04/19/2006 Other party: State of Idaho Appearance Jim Thomas 
04/19/2006 Petition for post-conviction relief 
04/19/2006 Motion to proceed In forma pauperls & supporting affidavit 
04/19/2006 Order for waiver of prepaid fees 
04/19/2006 Motion for appointment of counsel 
04/19/2006 Affidavit In support of motion for appointment of counsel 
0411912006 Motion for court to rule on "notice of appeal" issue & suspend remaining 
post-conviction claims pending outcome of direct appeal 
04/19/2006 Affidavit of inability to pay 
04/19/2006 Order Appointing Public Defender 
04/19/2006 New Case Filed 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any FIie Or Record By The 
04/24/2006 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith- Id. Mtn. Express Receipt number: 
0002289 Dated: 4/24/2006 Amount: $29.00 (Cash) 
04/25/2006 Order appointing special prosecutor 
04/27/2006 Petition for appointment of special prosecutor 
05/10/2006 Change Assigned Judge 
05/19/2006 Answer To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
05/19/2006 Other party: State of Idaho Appearance Justin D. Whatcott 
05/19/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/23/2006 03:00 PM) 
0512312006 Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled Hearing date: 
5/23/2006 Time: 3 :00 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter 
0512312006 Hear!ng result for Hearing Scheduled held on 05/23/2006 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/06/2006 02:00 PM) Motion for Court to 
05/24/2006 Rule on "Notice of Appeal" Issue & Suspend Remaining Post Conviction 
Claims Pending Outcome of Direct Appeal 
05/24/2006 Notice Of Hearing 
0513112006 Respondent's memorandum objecting to Petitioner's motion to rule on 
appeal Issue & suspend remaining post-conviction claims 
05/31/2006 Motion for discovery pursuant to ICR 57(b) 
0610512006 Affidavit of Sara B. Thomas Chief Appellate Unit State Appellate Public 
Defender 
06/05/2006 Motion For Appointment Of New Public Defender 
06/05/2006 Motion to Seal 
06/05/2006 Motion to Stay Proceedings 
0610612006 Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled Hearing date: 6/6/2006 
Time: 2 :00 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape number: D61 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/06/2006 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
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06/06/2006 Motion for Court to Rule on "Notice of Appeal" Issue & Suspend 
Remaining Post Conviction Claims Pending Outcome of Direct Appeal 
06/06/2006 Case Taken Under Advisement 
06/06/2006 Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Appeal and For Stay 
0610612006 Request to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding 
0610712006 Reques~ to obtain approval to broadcast and/or photograph a court 
proceeding 
06/09/2006 Request for additional briefing 
0611512006 Motion to E~tend Briefing D~adfine and Rule on Conflict and 
representation and for Special Counsel 
0611612006 Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum objecting to Petitioner's 
motions 
06/19/2006 Order on ex parte motion to extend briefing deadline 
0612112006 Motion for clarification of request for additional briefing & order on ex 
parte motion to extend briefing deadline 
0612112006 Petitlon.ers ~tatement of Supplemental Authorities In Support of Motion 
for Clariflcat1on 
06/21/2006 Brief of Amlcus Curiae 
06/21/2006 Memorandum In Response to Request for Additonal Briefing 
0612312006 Motion to appoint office of the State Appellate Public Defender for 
purposes of determining conflict 
06/23/2006 Notice OfTelephonlc Hearing (no hearing date set) 
0612812006 Amended motion to appoint office of the State Appellate Public Defender 
for purposes of determining conflict 
06/30/2006 Affidavit of Mark Rader 
07/03/2006 no longer u/a 
0710312006 Ord:r on motion for new appeal period, and motion to stay, and order on 
motion to seal motions to withdraw 
Motion to stay all issues pending resolution of conflicts Issues & 
07/03/2006 appointment of special counsel; and Motion for appointment of a new 
public defender; and motion to seal are Denied (no Document) 
Motion for new appeal period; and motion to stay post-conviction 
07/03/2006 proceedings pending the outcome of the direct appeal are Granted (No 
Document) 
07/05/2006 STATUS CHANGED: inactive 
07/14/2006 Order 
0711412006 Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/08/2006 02 :00 PM) Status on sealed 
documents In file 
07/14/2006 Notice Of Hearing 
0810112006 Hearing result for Status held on 08/08/2006 02:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Status on sealed documents In file 
1110212006 Hearing Sche~uled (Status 11/21/2006 03 :30 PM) Status on Steve 
Thompson's bill 
11/02/2006 Notice Of Hearing 
1111612006 Hearing result for Status held on 11/21/2006 03:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Status on Steve Thompson's bill 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any FIie Or Record By The 
07/03/2008 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Cassidy Friedman Receipt number: 0003517 
Dated: 7/3/2008 Amount: $26.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Cassidy Friedman 
07/03/2008 Receipt number: 0003517 Dated: 7/3/2008 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
0811512008 Order lifting stay of psot conviction porceedlngs and order appointing 
counsel and order setting status/scheduling conference 
0811512008 Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Order Appointing Public Defender Public 
defender Christopher P, Simms 
08/19/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 09/05/2008 01:30 PM) 
08/19/2008 Order Appointing Public Defender 
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08/19/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
08/22/2008 Notice Of Appearance 
08/22/2008 Motion to prepare transcript and legal file at County cost 
08/25/2008 Motion for appointment of separate district judge 
08/27/2008 Order granting motion for appointment of separate district judge 
Continued (Scheduling Conference 09/05/2008 09:00 AM) do not need 
09/04/2008 to transport Johnson for this hearing Please hear this last on the 
calendar. Justin Whatcott is driving in from Boise 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Scheduling Conference Hearing date: 
09/05/2008 9/5/2008 Time: 9:07 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: D148 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on 09/05/2008 09:00 
0910512008 AM: Hearing Held do not need to transport Johnson for this hearing 
Please hear this last on the calendar. Justin Whatcott Is driving In from 
Boise 
09/05/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 10/07/2008 01 :30 PM) 
09/08/2008 Motion for appointment of co-counsel at County expense 
09/08/2008 Motion for appointment of investigator at County expense 
0910812008 Affidavit of Chri~tophe~ P. Simms in support of motion for appointment of 
co-counsel & of investigator at County expense 
0911612008 State's Objection to Petitioner's motion for appointment of co-counsel at 
County expense 
0911612008 State's Objection to Petitioner's motion for appointment of Investigator 
at County expense 
09/30/2008 Order granting motion to prepare transcript & clerk's record 
10/06/2008 Continued (Scheduling Conference 10/07/2008 03:30 PM) 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Scheduling Conference Hearing date: 
10/07/2008 10/7/2008 Time: 3:53 pm Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: DlSO 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on 10/07/2008 03:30 
10/07/2008 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Linda Ledbetter 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 pages 
10/09/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 11/05/2008 03:00 PM) 
10/09/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
11/05/2008 Stipulation regarding scheduling 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on 11/05/2008 03 :00 
1110512008 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Linda Ledbetter 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less than 100 
pages 
11/05/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/09/2009 01 :30 PM) 
11/06/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
02/13/2009 Motion for order of discvoery relating to newly discovered evidence 
0211312009 N_otice Of Hea_ring motion for order of discovery relating to newly 
discovered evidence 
0211712009 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02/24/2009 01:30 PM) motion 
for admission of discovery regarding newly discovered evidence 
02/23/2009 Continued (Status 06/16/2009 01:30 PM) 
02/23/2009 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any FIie Or Record By The 
02/24/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: terry Receipt number: 0008403 Dated: 
2/24/2009 Amount: $4.00 (Cash) 
0212412009 Amende? Notice Of ~earing Motion for Order of Discovery Relating to 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
02/24/2009 Affidavit Of Service of Subpoena 
02/24/2009 Affidavit Of Service of Subpoena 
02/24/2009 Subpoena-Marla 
0212412009 Affidavit OF Robert J. Kerschusky in Support of Motion for Order of 
Discovery Relating Newly Discovered Evidence 
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02/25/2009 Stipulation regarding photographic evidence 
0212612009 Continued (Hearing Scheduled 03/03/2009 01 :30 PM) motion for 
admission of discovery regarding newly discovered evidence 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
02/26/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ariel Hansen Receipt number: 0008456 Dated: 
2/26/2009 Amount: $7 .00 (Cash) 
02/26/2009 Motion for State to Appear by Telephone 
0212712009 Con~in~ed (He_aring Schedule~ 03/04/20~9 02:30 PM) motion for 
adm1ss1on of discovery regarding newly discovered evidence 
02/27/2009 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
03/02/2009 Continued (Status 06/02/2009 01 :30 PM) 
03/02/2009 Second Amended Notice Of Hearing 
0310312009 Reques~ to obtain approval to video record or broadcast a court 
proceeding & order 
03/03/2009 Order granting State's motion to appear by telephone 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing on New Evidence Hearing date: 
03/04/2009 3/4/2009 Time: 12:00 am Court reporter: Linda Ledbetter Audio tape 
number: 0168 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any FIie Or Record By The 
03/04/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt number: 0008616 Dated: 
3/4/2009 Amount: $2.00 (Cash) 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 03/04/2009 02:30 PM: 
0310412009 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Linda Ledbetter Estimated 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: motion for admission of 
discovery regarding newly discovered evidence LESS THAN 100 PAGES 
03/04/2009 Order of discovery relating to newly discovered evidence 
03/04/2009 Order releasing duplicate photographic evidence 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
03/05/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ariel Hansen Receipt number: 0008628 Dated: 
3/5/2009 Amount: $2.00 {Cash) 
0310512009 Motion for. Order of Discovery Relating To Independent Judicial 
Investigation 
03/05/2009 Motion for Disqualification of District Judge 
0310512009 Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration/ clarification Regarding 
Appointment of Experts 
0310512009 Motion for reconsideration/ clarification Regarding Appointment of 
Experts 
03/13/2009 Objection To Petitioner's Motion for Disqualification of District Judge 
03/16/2009 First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
03/16/2009 Motion for Appointment of Psyciatric Expert at County Expense 
03/16/2009 Motion for Apopintment of Fingerprint Expert At County Expense 
03/16/2009 Amended Motion for Appointment of Investigatot at County Expense 
03/16/2009 Motion for Appointment of Legal Expert at County Expense 
03/16/2009 Motion to Take Judicial Notice of court Files 
03/16/2009 Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
0311812009 H.earing Scheduled (Motion 04/21/2009 01 :30 PM) motion to disqualify 
district judge 
03/18/2009 Notice Of Hearing motion for disqualification of district judge 
03/19/2009 Motion to Strike ""First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief'' 
0311912009 Notice of Intent to read reporter's transcript of underlying criminal case 
no. CR03-18200 
03/25/2009 Objection to Motions For Experts 
0312712009 Plaintiffs Response to Strike Motion to Strike First Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief or Alternatively Motion for Leave To Amend 
0410112009 Reply on Motion to Strike "First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief' 
0410312009 Hearing Scheduled (Clerk's Status 04/07/2009 04:59 PM) check for 
objects 
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06/10/2009 States Withdrawal of Objections to First Amended Petition 
06/10/2009 Order granting motion for discovery deposition of Kerchusky & Dunn 
06/10/2009 Order denying Pit's motions for appointment investigator & experts 
0611112009 Objectio~ to proP?sed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Appointment 
of Investigator [sic] and Experts 
06/22/2009 Answer to first Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
06/30/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ariel Hansen/Times News Receipt number: 
0011001 Dated: 6/30/2009 Amount: $7.00 (Check) 
07/10/2009 Notice OfTaking Deposition 
07/10/2009 Notice OfTaking Deposition 
07/10/2009 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
07/14/2009 Acceptance Of Service-Bobby 
07/14/2009 Subpoena Duces Tecum 
07/14/2009 Subpoena Duces Tecum 
07/14/2009 Acceptance Of Service-Robert 
0712912009 Moti~n ?r Lea~e to Amend and File Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conv1ct1on Rehef 
08/06/2009 Objection to Motion for Leave to Amend 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
08/17/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt number: 0011982 Dated: 
8/17/2009 Amount: $15.00 (Cash) 
0813112009 Response to the Biased Idaho Mountain Express Front Page Artide of 
August 19, 2009 
09/15/2009 Order of reassignment 
09/15/2009 Change Assigned Judge 
0912812009 Hearing Scheduled (Status 10/01/2009 10:30 AM) via telephone in Twin 
Falls County 
09/28/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
09/28/2009 Motion to compel discovery 
lO/Ol/2009 Hearing result for Status held on 10/01/2009 10:30 AM: Court Minutes 
via telephone in Twin Falls County 
Hearing result for Status held on 10/01/2009 10:30 AM: District Court 
1010112009 Hearing Held Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey Estimated Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 pages via telephone in TWin 
Falls County 
10/02/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
1010512009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Leave 11/06/2009 09:00 AM) to Amend 
& File Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
1011412009 N_otice of filing exhibits omitted from intitial filing of motion to compel 
discovery 
10/16/2009 Order for scheduling conference & order re: motion practice 
1011612009 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 11/06/2009 09:00 AM) to be 
held via telephone in Twin Falls, Simms to initiate call 
1011912009 Request to obtain approval to video record broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding 
10/19/2009 Order 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on 11/06/2009 09 :00 
11/03/2009 AM: Hearing Vacated to be held via telephone in Twin Falls, Simms to 
Initiate call 
Hearing result for Motion for Leave held on 11/06/2009 09:00 AM: 
11/03/2009 Hearing Vacated to Amend & File Second Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction to be held via telephone in Twin Falls, Simms to initiate call 
11/13/2009 Response To Motion To Compel 
11/23/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
11/23/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/18/2009 09:00 AM) phone 
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11/23/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
11/23/2009 Stipulation Relating to Scheduling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Leave 12/18/2009 09:00 AM) to amend 
11/24/2009 & File Second Amend Petitions for Post-conviction relief and petitions 
Motion to Compel Discovery 
1210412009 Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record Broadcast or Photogragh a 
Court Prcedding 
1210812009 Notice Of Hearing Motion for Leave to Amend & File Second Amended 
Petition for PCR, Motion to Compel Discovery and Status Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Leave 12/21/2009 04:00 PM) to amend 
12/09/2009 & File Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Motion to 
Compel Discovery & Status Conference 
12/24/2009 Amended Stipulation relating to scheduling 
12/24/2009 Memorandum withdrawing motion to compel discovery 
1212812009 Orde~ granting leave to amend & file second amended petition for post 
conviction relef 
12/29/2009 Response to Memorandum Withdrawing Motion to Compel Discovery 
01/12/2010 Second Amended Petition for post conviction relief 
02/08/2010 Petitioners Motion for Summary Disposition 
0210812010 Memo~a_ndum of Law in Support of Petitioners Motion for Summary 
Dlspos1t1on 
0210812010 Respondent's_ t:1otlon for summ~ry dism!ssal of petitioner's second 
amended pet1t1on for post conv1ct1on rehef 
0210812010 Memorandum in support of Respondent's motion for summary dismissal 
of petitioner's second amended petition for post conviction 
0310512010 List of Exhibits in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and In 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal 
Petitioners Memorandum Response to Respondents Motion for Summary 
03/05/2010 Dismissal of Petitioners Second Amended Petitioners Second Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction relief 
0310512010 Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
0311012010 H_eari~~ Scheduled (Motion 04/30/2010 10:00 AM) motion for summary 
d1spos1t1on 
03/10/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
Amended Certificate Of Service Petitioners Memorandum Response to 
03/10/2010 Respondents Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioners Seconf 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
0311912010 Petitioner's Memorandum reply to Respondent's memorandum in 
opposition to Petitioner's motion for summary dismissal 
0311912010 Reply in Support of Respondents Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioners Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
0410912010 Request to ob~ain approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding & Order 
04/13/2010 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
0413012010 Hearing result for Motion held on 04/30/2010 10:00 AM: Court Minutes 
motion for summary disposition to be held in Twin Falls 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/30/2010 10:00 AM: District Court 
0413012010 Hearing Held Court Reporter:Virglnia Balley Estimated Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing: motion for summary disposition to be 
held in Twin Falls less 100 
05/19/2010 Order for Scheduling Conference and ORder Re: Motion Practice 
OS/l 912010 Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 07/19/2010 04:00 PM) In 
Twin Falls 
0512112010 Men_,orandum Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under 
Advisement 
07/13/2010 Notice OfTelephonic Hearing 
07/19/2010 Court Minutes 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on 07/19/2010 04:00 
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07/22/2010 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:Virginia Balley Estimated 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: In Twin Falls - telephonic 
less 100 
07/22/2010 Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 11/30/2010 09:00 AM) In Twin Falls 
0712212010 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 11/08/2010 10:30 AM) In Twin 
Falls 
07/22/2010 Order on Cross Motions for Summary Disposition 
07/22/2010 Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Pre-Trial Order 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
08/04/2010 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ariel Hansen Receipt number: 0005094 Dated: 
8/4/2010 Amount: $6.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
08/09/2010 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Teri Smith Receipt number: 0005166 Dated: 
8/9/2010 Amount: $25.00 (Cash) 
09/13/2010 Amended Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and PRetrial Order 
09/30/2010 Respondents Motion to Reconsider 
09/30/2010 Memorandum In Support of Respondents Motion to Reconsider 
10/05/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
1010512010 Heari~g Scheduled (Motion for Reconsideration 11/08/2010 10:30 AM) 
In Twin Falls 
10/13/2010 Continued (Court Trial 12/07/2010 09:00 AM) In Twin Falls 
ll/Ol/2010 Request to ob~ain approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding 
11/01/2010 Respondent's Pretrial Memorandum 
11/01/2010 Pre-Trial Memorandum 
11/01/2010 Petitioner's Trial Exhibit List 
11/01/2010 Petitioners Trial Witness List 
11/03/2010 Addendum to Petitioners Trial Exhibit List 
11/05/2010 Motion for order to transport petitioner to Twin Falls County Jail 
11/05/2010 Petitioner's Memorandum response to Respondent's motion to reconsider 
11/08/2010 Order to transport petitioner to Twin Falls County Jail 
1110812010 Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 11/08/2010 10:30 AM: 
Court Minutes In Twin Falls 
1110812010 Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 11/08/2010 10:30 AM: 
Hearing Held In Twin Falls 
1110812010 Hearing result for Motion for Reconsideration held on 11/08/2010 10:30 
AM: Case Taken Under Advisement In Twin Falls 
11/09/2010 Continued (Court Trial 12/07/2010 10:00 AM) In Twin Falls 
11/12/2010 Memorandum In support of motion to reconsider 
11/15/2010 Petitioners Amended Trial Witness list 
1111512010 Peti~ioner's Suppl_emental Memorandum in opposition to respondents 
motion to reconsider 
11/22/2010 Petitioners Filing Memorandum 
11/22/2010 Order on Respondent's motion to reconsider 
11/22/2010 Motion for appointment of Interpreter 
1112212010 Motion for order to transport witness for production of testimony at post-
conviction relief hearing, oral argument waived 
11/23/2010 Respondents Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
11/26/2010 Order appointing interpreter for Spanish language witnesses 
1112612010 Order to t_ra~sport_ Burno ~ntonio Santos for production of testimony for 
post conv1ct1on relief hearing 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
11/29/2010 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Johnson, Sarah M Receipt number: 0007675 
Dated: 11/29/2010 Amount: $31.00 (Cash) 
11/29/2010 Petitioner's Trial Brief 
11/30/2010 Respondents witness list 
11/30/2010 Respondents Exhibit List 
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11/30/2010 Petitioners filing memorandum 
11/30/2010 Petitioners restated trial witness list 
11/30/2010 petitioners restated trial exhibit list 
12/01/2010 Certificate Of Service 
1210112010 Request to obtain approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding (KMVT) 
1210112010 Request to obtain approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding (Terry Smith) 
12/02/2010 Petitioners filing Memorandum 
12/03/2010 Memorandum decision granting respondent's motion for reconsideration 
12/03/2010 Petitioner's filing memorandum 
1210612010 Request to o?tain ~pproval to video record broadcast or photograph a 
court proeedmg (Times News) 
1210612010 Request to obtain approval to video record broadcast or photograph a 
court proeedlng (KTVB) 
1210612010 Request to obtain approval to video record broadcast or photograph a 
court proeeding (KIVI-TV) 
12/06/2010 Petitioner's memorandum dismissing claim 
12/07/2010 Order re: cameras In the courtroom 
12/07/2010 Court Minutes 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 12/07/2010 10:00 AM: District 
12/07/2010 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey Estimated Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing: more than 100 pages 
12/08/2010 Court Minutes 
12/09/2010 Court Minutes 
1211012010 Request to o?tain approval to video record broadcast or photograph a 
court proeedmg (Matt Furber) 
12/10/2010 Court Minutes 
1211412010 Motion for order to prepare transcript of post-conviction relief hearing at 
county cost 
1211512010 Order to prepare transcript of post-conviction relief hearing at county 
cost 
1211512010 Motion for order to transport petitioner to Pocatello Women's 
Correctional Center 
12/15/2010 Order to transport petitioner to Pocatello Women's Correctional Center 
12/21/2010 Petitioners Filing memorandum 
01/05/2011 Reporter's Transcript of Court Trial December 7-10, 2010 filed 
01/13/2011 Order regarding post trial briefing and citations to the record 
01/27/2011 Stipulation & Order relating to briefing schedule 
02/14/2011 Petitioner's proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and Order 
0211412011 Respondent's Post-Evidentiary hearing proposed Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law 
0212812011 Petition reply to respondents proposed findings of fact and conclusion of 
law 
0212812011 Response to petitioner's proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law 
and order 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
03/03/2011 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt.number: 0001410 Dated: 
3/3/2011 Amount: $16.00 (Cash) 
04/05/2011 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
04/05/2011 no longer u/a 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
04/06/2011 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Times News Receipt number: 0002265 Dated: 
4/6/2011 Amount: $94.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Times News 




04/08/2011 STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
0410812011 Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Other Party; Johnson, Sarah 
M, Subject. Filing date: 4/8/2011 
04/29/2011 Notice Of Appeal 
04/29/2011 Appealed To The Supreme Court 
04/29/2011 STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
04/29/2011 Motion for appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
05/03/2011 Order for appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
0510412011 Motion for order to pay for clerk's record & transcript on appeal at County 
cost 
05/05/2011 Order for Blaine County to pay for clerk's record & transcript on appeal 
05/26/2011 Motion to proceed in forma pauperls and supporting affidavit 
06/06/2011 Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal 
12/20/2011 Order Granting Motion to Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule 
12/22/2011 Notice of supplemental transcript Malled/Lodged 
02/15/2012 Order granting second motion to augment the record & motion for stay 
04/05/2012 Notice Of Withdrawal Of Attorney 
04/09/2012 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis and affidavit in support 
04/09/2012 Motion for appointment of counsel 
04/09/2012 Motion for relief from judgment 
04/09/2012 DNA and successive petition for post-conviction relief 
04/11/2012 Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Appearance Dennis A. Benjamin 
0411312012 Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in support of DNA and successive petition 
for post-conviction relief 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
04/16/2012 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terri Receipt number: 0003033 Dated: 
4/16/2012 Amount: $47.00 (Cash) 
0411612012 Response to "Motion for Relief from Judgment" and supporting 
documents 
0411812012 Response to "motion for relief from judgment" and supporting 
documents 
Reply to "Response to 'Motion for Relief from Judgment' and supporting 
04/20/2012 Documents" and alternative motion to correct clerical error pursuant to 
IRCP 60(a) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
04/30/2012 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt number: 0003377 Dated: 
4/30/2012 Amount: $14.00 (Cash) 
05/10/2012 Petitioners motion for summary disposition 
05/15/2012 Objection to "petitioners motion for summary disposition" 
05/23/2012 Notice Of Hearing on motion for appointment of counsel 
0512412012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/04/2012 11 :45 AM) Appointment of 
counsel In twin falls-telephonically 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
05/31/2012 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry/ mtn express Receipt number: 0004303 
Dated: 5/31/2012 Amount: $10.00 (Cash) 
06/04/2012 Court Minutes 
0610412012 District Court Hearing Held in Twin Falls Court Reporter: Virginia Balley 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/04/2012 11 :45 AM: District 
0610412012 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey Estimated Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing: Appointment of counsel in twin falls-
telephonlcally less 100 pages 
06/06/2012 Order appointing new counsel 
06/25/2012 Amended Order Appointing New Counsel 
06/29/2012 Notice of conflict of Interest 
07/03/2012 Motion to stay successive post-conviction proceedings 
07/03/2012 Brief in support of motion to stay successive post conviction proceedings 
Objection to states motion to stay successive post-conviction 
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07/06/2012 proceedings 
07/06/2012 Affidavit in support of motion to amend and/or augment brief 
0710612012 Brief in ~upport of objection to states motion to stay post-conviction 
proceedings 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
07/09/2012 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt number: 0005395 Dated: 
7/9/2012 Amount: $5.00 (Cash) 
07/17/2012 Court Minutes 
0711712012 District Court Hearing Held in Twin Falls Court Reporter: Virginia Balley 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
07/19/2012 Second Amended Order Appointing new counsel 
07/19/2012 Stipulation for substitution of counsel 
07/19/2012 Subject: Johnson, Sarah M Appearance Keith Roark 
07/20/2012 Stipulation for substitution of counsel 
10/10/2012 Further Order Appointing Counsel 
01/22/2014 Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
0211212014 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
0212012014 Order for exte~:lon of time to fil~ r.espon7e to amended DNA and 
successive pet1tron for post conv1ct1on rehef 
02/20/2014 2014 Opinion No. 21 
0311212014 Motion for Second Extension of lime to File Response to Amended DNA 
and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
0311412014 Order for Extension of Time to File Response to Amend DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Convlciton Relief 
0312112014 Motion for additional one-day extension of time to file response to 
amended DNA and successive petition for post conviction relief 
Motion for ruling on Johnson's 60(b) motion and request for summary 
03/24/2014 dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and successive petition for post 
conviction relief or, alternatively, to stay 
Brief In support of Motion for ruling on Johnson's 60(b) motion and 
03/24/2014 request for summary dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and 
successive petition for post conviction relief or, alternatively, to stay 
03/26/2014 Remlttitur 
03/26/2014 Remanded 
03/26/2014 STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
03/31/2014 Motion for State to appear by telephone 
03/31/2014 Notice Of Hearing 
04/01/2014 Order denying State's motion to appear by telephone 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/22/2014 04:00 PM) Respondent's Motion 
0410112014 for Ruling on Johnson's 60(b) motion and request for TO BE HELD IN 
TWIN FALLS VIA PHONE summary dismissal of petitioner's amended 
DNA and successive petition for post conviction relief or alternatively stay 
04/01/2014 amended notice of hearing 
Continued (Motion 05/05/2014 01 :30 PM) Respondent's Motion for 
0410112014 Ruling on Johnson's 60(b) motion and request for TO BE HELD IN TWIN 
FALLS VIA PHONE summary dismissal of petitioner's amended DNA and 
successive petition for post conviction relief or alternatively stay 
05/19/2014 Order on Pending Motions 
05/20/2014 STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/05/2014 01 :30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Respondent's Motion for Ruling on Johnson's 60(b) motion and 
05/22/2014 request for TO BE HELD IN TWIN FALLS VIA PHONE summary dismissal 
of petitioner's amended DNA and successive petition for post conviction 
relief or alternatively stay 
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04/08/2009 Plaitiffs Response to States Objection to Motion for Experts Request for 
Argument 
0410912009 Notice of intent to decide motion for disqualification & motion for order of 
discovery without oral argument IRCP 7(b)(3)(D) 
0411012009 Notice Of Hearing on motion for order of discovery relating to 
independent judicial investigation 
0411012009 Amended Notice Of Hearing on motion for disqualification of District 
Judge 
04/10/2009 Stipulation to depose trial counsel & extend discovery deadline 
0411512009 ~ontinued (Motion 05/19/2009 01 :30 PM) motion to disqualify district 
Judge 
0411512009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/19/2009 01:30 PM) motion for order of 
discovery relating to independent judicial investigation 
0411512009 Request to ob~ain approval to video record, broadcaste or photograph a 
court proceeding & Order 
0411612009 Orders re: motion for dlsquallflcation of District Judge & Motion for order 
of discovery relating to independent judicial investigation 
Hearing result for Motion held on 05/19/2009 01:30 PM: Hearing 
04/16/2009 Vacated motion for order of discovery relating to independent judicial 
investigation 
0411612009 Hearing result for Motion held on 05/19/2009 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated motion to disqualify district judge 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
04/20/2009 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Terry Smith Receipt number: 0009555 Dated: 
4/20/2009 Amount: $10.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any FIie Or Record By The 
04/22/2009 derk, Per Page Paid by: Ariel M. Hansen Receipt number: 0009616 
Dated: 4/22/2009 Amount: $10.00 (Check) 
05/08/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
0510812009 ~earing_ Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2009 01 :30 PM) Pending Motions Held 
in Gooding County 
05/08/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
05/08/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/04/2009 01 :30 PM) Pending Motions 
05/14/2009 Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Mark Stephen Rader 
05/14/2009 Stipulation to provide criminal records from counsel 
05/15/2009 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Summary Disposition 
05/18/2009 Notice Of Taking Deposition of Bobby Eugene Pangburn 
05/19/2009 Order to provide criminal records from counsel 
05/19/2009 Continued (Status 06/16/2009 01:30 PM) 
05/19/2009 Notice Of Hearing 
0610212009 Request to ob~aln approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a 
court proceeding & Order 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2009 01:30 PM: Court Minutes 
Pending Motions-Pits motion for leave to amend, motion take judicial 
0610912009 notice files, amend motion for investigator, motion appt legal expert, 
appt psychiatric expert, appt fingerprint expert; respondents motion to 
reconsider/clarify re: experts, motion strike 1st amend petition post 
conviction Held In Gooding County 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held Court Reporter: Linda Ledbetter Estimated Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing: Pending Motions-Pits motion for leave 
0610912009 to amend, motion take judicial notice files, amend motion for 
investigator, motion appt legal expert, appt psychiatric expert, appt 
fingerprint expert; respondents motion to reconsider/clarify re: experts, 
motion strike 1st amend petition post conviction Held in Gooding County 
less 100 pages 
0610912009 Hearing resu It for Status held on 06/16/2009 O 1 :30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
0610912009 Memorandum relating to the filing date of petitioner's first amended 
petition for post conviction relief 
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R. Keith Roark, ISB No. 2230 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
208-788-3918 
keith@roarklaw.com 
Attorneys for Sarah Johnson 
DEC O 3 2014 
Jot.Cornn Drags, Clerk District 
urt Blaine Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner~ 
v. 











CASE NO. CV-2014-00353 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, the Idaho 
Attorney General, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTI1LED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Sarah Johnson, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment summarily dismissing 
Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief filed on the 271h day of October, 2014, the 
Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l) 
I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
• Did the Court err in failing to permit DNA testing of requested items? 
1 • NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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• Did the Court err in dismissing the Eighth Amendment claim? 
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions 
of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
• 10/20/2014 Motion Hearing 
Reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages: less than 100 
HELD IN TWIN FALLS 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included Rule 28, I.A.R: 
• 04/09/2012 DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 04/09/2012 Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in support of DNA and successive 
petition for post-conviction relief 
• 01/22/2014 Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 05/19/2014 Order on Pending Motions 
• 06/18/2014 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 06/27/2014 Order for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 07/18/2014 Motion to Take Judicial Notice 
• 07/18/2014 Briefin Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 07/18/2014 Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 08/25/2014 Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
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• 09/03/2014 Second Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian 
• 09/16/2014 Motion to Continue Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amend DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 09/16/2014 Order Continuing Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 10/10/2014 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 10/27/2014 Order Granting Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended 
DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 10/27/2014 Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: None. 
8. I certify: 
( a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Virginia Bailey 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
the Court has previously found her to be indigent and a motion for appointment of 
the State Appellate Public Defenders will be filed along with this Notice of 
Appeal. 
( c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record for the reasons set forth above. 
3 • NOTICE OF APPEAL 
317 of 352
{ d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is 
no filing fee for post-conviction petitions. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho 
Code). t 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of D~mt> 
1 
Attorney for Sarah Johnson 
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... 
CERTIFICAl OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of December, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Virginia Bailey 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
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R. Keith Roark, ISB No. 2230 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
208-788-3918 
keith@roarklaw.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
ORIGINAL 
DEC O 3 2014 
JoLynn Dra@e, Clerk District 
Court Blolne Coun~!!!Jri<::·--· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 















CASE NO. CV-2014-00353 
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Sarah Johnson asks this Court to issue an order appointing the Office of the State 
Appellate Public Defender to represent her on appeal. Good cause exists to grant this motion 
because Ms. Johnson has previously been found to be indigent by this Court and she has filed a 
Notice of Appeal in this case. 
This motion is brought pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 19-4904 and is based 
upon the Court's previousiding of indigence. 
DATEDthis~yofDecem , 14. 
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CERTIFlfATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on Decembet;;5~t4, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
\ 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Chief, Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Fae.simile: (208) 854-807 4 
NO. 56 7 ~·. 2 
FILED ~~· ,; v· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2014-0353 
) 
) RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S 
) MOTION TO ALTER OR 





COMES NOW, Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General and Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby files this response to 
Petitioner's ("Johnson") Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and the 
memorandum filed in support thereof ("Memorandum"). 
Johnson asks this Court to alter or amend the judgment only with respect to 
her DNA Claim - Claim 1 of her Amended Successive Petition. "Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 59(e), a district court can correct legal and factual errors occurring in 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
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proceedings before it." Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 883, 318 P.3d 646, 652 
(Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). 
Johnson contends this Court's Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Dismissal of Petitioner1s Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief ("Order") must be corrected because, according to Johnson, the 
Court "misconstrued the legal meaning" of I.C. § 19-4902(e)(1). (Memorandum, 
p.2.) Johnson is incorrect. 
Section 19-4902(e)(1) provides that the Court must permit testing only if it 
determines that "The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, 
noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the 
petitioner is innocent." As an initial matter, it is important to note that the Court 
correctly found that "[m]any of Johnson's DNA requests do not involve testing 
samples too small to be tested under technology existing at the time of trial." 
(Order, p.7.) Any request by Johnson to "compare a number of already analyzed 
but unidentified DNA samples with Christopher Hill's DNA profile and with an 
updated DNA database'' do not properly fall within the purview of I.C. § 19-4902(b) 
and are, therefore, irrelevant to the question of whether the result of testing 
theoretically authorized by the statute "has the scientific potential to produce new, 
noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that 
[Johnson] is innocent.'' (See Order, pp.7-8 (footnote omitted, emphasis original).) 
As to Johnson's burden to show that the proposed "testing has the scientific 
potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
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probable than not that [she] is innocent," the Court correctly concluded she has not 
satisfied this requirement. (Order, p.9.) The Court stated: 
At trial, a considerable amount of evidence was presented that 
placed Johnson at the scene and that linked her to the murders.CFN5J 
Her stories were inconsistent and conflicted with the evidence. Her 
DNA was found in a latex glove, found wrapped in her blood 
splattered robe, and discarded in a trash can on the property. She 
knew where the murder weapon was kept (in the guest house safe) 
and had requested the key a few days earlier. See a/so this court's 
opinion in Johnson v. State, CV-2006-0324, pp.89-92 (Outlining the 
"mountain of evidence" against Johnson and quoting Judge Wood as 
stating at trial that the amount of evidence against Johnson was 
"overwhelming."). 
Evidence was also presented that suggested the possible 
involvement of another party, in the form of unidentified fingerprints 
and unidentified DNA. The defense argued Johnson's innocence 
under the theory that a stranger entered the house and murdered 
Johnson's parents. The jury considered this evidence and heard 
these arguments and still convicted Johnson of first degree murder. 
Therefore, the possibility of identifying a third party DNA 
source from previously untestable samples will not make it more 
probable than not that Johnson is innocent, just as the post-trial 
discovery that the fingerprints on the murder weaF)on belong to 
Christopher Hill did not entitle Johnson to a new trial. CFN 61 The jury 
was aware that DNA that did not belong to Johnson was present at 
the scene of the murders, just as they were aware that the 
fingerprints on the rifle were not hers. Even with that knowledge, the 
jury convicted Johnson, deciding that Johnson either (1) fired the 
murder weapon herself while wearing gloves or (2) aided and abetted 
the actual shooter. Either theory was sufficient for a conviction. 
Given that the fact that the possibility of a third party shooter, as 
evidenced by the presence of unidentified fingerprints and DNA, 
failed to convince the jury that Johnson was innocent of murdering 
her parents, the slim possibility1FN7J that a name or face might now be 
given to that shooter adds little to the mix. 
[FN 51 The court uses the term "linked" because the jury 
could have convicted Johnson if they believed that she 
was the shooter or if they believed that she aided and 
abetted the shooter. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT 3 
324 of 352
DEC. 8. 2014 2: 14PM ID ATTY GEN - CRIM DIV 
(FN 61 The Idaho Supreme Court held that the post-trial 
identification of these fingerprints as Hill's would not 
likely produce an acquittal because the jury knew at 
trial that the prints did not belong to Johnson and still 
convicted her. Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 319 P.3d 
491 (2014) (affirming the district court's order denying 
Johnson post-conviction relief on newly discovered 
evidence claims). 
[FN 71 The court uses the term "slim possibility" because 
this previously unidentifiable DNA could just as likely 
remain unidentifiable, could turn out to be Johnson's 
DNA. or the DNA of an unknown individual, whereupon 
we would be left in the exact same position as before. 
Additionally, merely establishing the source of this 
unidentified DNA does nothing to show that the DNA 
actually came from the killer. 
(Order, pp.10-11.) 
NO. 5 6 7 F'. 5 
Johnson disagrees with the Court's analysis, contending that the "DNA 
testing has the scientific potential to identify the person who fired the murder 
weapon." (Memorandum, p.4.) Johnson also rejects the Court's statement that 
there was a "mountain of evidence" against her and claims the "state's theory of the 
case was far-fetched." (Memorandum, p.4.) Certainly 12 jurors did not find the 
state's theory far-fetched, nor was the trial court's conclusion, or this Court's 
conclusion both now and in Johnson's prior post-conviction case, which the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed, that there was substantial evidence of Johnson's guilt 
erroneous. In the end, Johnson's Memorandum merely rehashes her spin on the 
evidence presented at trial. (Memorandum, pp.6-13.) Johnson's disagreement 
with this Court regarding the weight of the evidence does not demonstrate a factual 
error that requires correction under Rule 59(e). 
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Johnson also challenges this Court's reliance on Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 
18, 253 P .3d 692 (2011), arguing such reliance "is misplaced" because "[t]his case 
is in a totally different procedural posture because, unlike Fields, the Court has not 
permitted the evidence to be tested." (Memorandum, p.13.) This Court, however, 
specifically noted that procedural distinction, but that difference has no bearing on 
the analysis or the Court's reason for citing Fields. (Order, pp.11-12.) 
In Fields, the Supreme Court noted DNA "test results themselves will never 
show that the petitioner is not the person who committed the offense." 151 Idaho at 
23,253 P.3d at 697. The Court elaborated: 
For example, in this case the DNA test results do not show who was 
the source of the biological material tested. In order to prove that the 
DNA test results demonstrate that the petitioner is not the person who 
committed the offense, there will have to be admissible evidence 
showing that the material tested came from the person who 
committed the crime. Under Idaho Code § 194902(f), it is the 
fingerprint or DNA test results that must demonstrate that the 
petitioner is not the person who committed the offense. In this case 
there would have to be admissible evidence showing that the hairs or 
fingernail scrapings tested came from the murderer. Without such 
admissible evidence, the test results could not show that Fields was 
not the murderer. 
Fields, 151 Idaho at 24, 253 P.3d at 698. 
The Court then rejected Fields' argument that the Court "should assume that 
the fingernail scrapings came from the murderer based upon the testimony of the 
pathologist that the victim had a cut on the top of the ring finger of her left hand that 
appeared to be a defensive wound." Id. The flaw in Fields' argument was that 
'1here is no evidence that the victim scratched or even touched her attacker with 
her hands. There is not even any evidence that she struggled with her attacker." 
&_ Although Fields thought he was "entitled to the inference that the victim 
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scratched her attacker because the attacker was close enough to stab her multiple 
times, because she apparently raised her hand to ward off the attack, and because 
she was still alive when she was discovered by a customer coming into the store,'' 
the Court disagreed because Fields' argument was premised on "nothing but 
speculation ... that the scrapings from the victim's fingernails or the hairs from her 
clothing came from the attacker." Id. 
This Court correctly relied on Fields because the foregoing analysis applies 
in this case. Johnson, like Fields, failed to establish any link between the possibility 
that previously unidentified DNA, even if matched to an individual, would show that 
Johnson was not the murderer. As this Court explained, while "[f]urther testing 
might reveal the source of DNA samples found on Johnson's robe, on the gun, and 
elsewhere, ... that knowledge does nothing to establish that the source of those 
samples was present in the Johnson's home on the morning of the crime, that the 
source of those samples was the shooter, or that Johnson didn't aid and abet the 
murderer of her parents." (Order, p.12.) This evidentiary failure is evident even in 
Johnson's Memorandum, which is predicated solely on a series of speculative "ifs." 
(Memorandum, p.14.) Moreover, as the Court already noted, the jury was already 
aware of the unmatched DNA at trial and found Johnson guilty regardless. The jury 
was also well aware of the implications, Johnson reasserts now, that "Matthew 
Johnson, Janet Sylten or even Bruno Santos" could be the real killer. 
(Memorandum, p.15.) The jury also rejected these possibilities as well and, 
notably, Johnson's attempt to rehabilitate suspicion towards Sylten and Santos 
ignores that they were excluded as contributors to the DNA that was tested. 
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Johnson also disregards what the bulk of the DNA evidence showed. First, 
most of the 30 stain samples taken from the robe matched Diane and others were 
consistent with Johnson's profile and Diane and Alan could not be excluded as 
contributors. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3115-3117, 3439-3455.) The fact that there were 
a few "unknown" stains out of the 30 stains tested from the robe pales in 
comparison to the volume of positively identified DNA. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3446, 
3454-3455.) Also notable is that the unknown DNA from the top of the gun barrel 
did not match the unknown DNA from the robe, and the stains on the gun barrel 
that were positively identified matched Alan's DNA. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3461-
3465.) This is notable for at least two reasons. First, Johnson's continued attempt 
to impugn Christopher Hill (or anyone else) seems to rely, in part, on the DNA from 
the gun matching the DNA on the robe, but we already know the samples don't 
match. (Memorandum, p.14.) Second, Johnson's repeated assertion that the real 
murderer would have been soaked in blood is inconsistent with the fact that the gun 
barrel itself was not soaked in blood and, for that matter, neither was the robe. 
While those two objects had small spatter stains on them, they were not covered in 
blood, which explains why Johnson wasn't blood soaked either and whatever drops 
she may have gotten on her skin were easily washed off in the manner suggested 
by the st.ate, and supported by the evidence. In addition, Johnson's implication that 
the murderer deposited blood on the gun barrel is entirely speculative. As in Fields, 
there is no reason to conclude the murderer suffered any injury that would cause 
her to bleed and Johnson is certainly not entitled to a contrary inference. 
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Other positively identified DNA that implicated Johnson included DNA from 
the bottoms of Johnson's socks, which matched Diane, and the major DNA profile 
from the first cutting from the leather glove matched Diane and neither Alan nor 
Diane could be excluded as possible contributors of the minor DNA; however, 
Santos and Sylten were eliminated as contributors. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, pp.3121-
3122, 3124-3127.) The profile from the second cutting from the leather glove 
contained a mixture of DNA with both Diane and Johnson as possible contributors 
and the other known profiles (such as Santos and Sylten) were excluded. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. V, pp.3127-3128.) In fact, comparisons to Sylten's DNA were "negative aH the 
way through." (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3151; see also p.3159.) Johnson's attempt to 
impugn her brother at this point is also completely inconsistent with the evidence. 
In short, this Court's conclusion that Johnson has not met her burden under 
I.C. §19-4902 is supported by the evidence, the facts, and the law. Johnson has 
offered no legitimate reason for this Court to amend its Order. Johnson's motion 
should therefore be denied. 
DATED this ath day of December 2014. 
E SICA M. LORELLO 
e uty Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE O.F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of December 2014 I caused to be 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Petitioner's Motion 
to Alter or Amend the Judgment to: 
Blaine County Court Clerk 
Fax (208) 788-5527 
R. Keith Roark 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
_1L Facsimile 
L U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
~<_;?~'-~~ Man yr{ Ger rd, Legal Secretary 
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JoLynn Drags, Cl6rt District 
...,........c.Co.;..c_urt Bin Countv. Idaho 
CASE NO. CV.;2014-353 -.· • --
STAT.BOP IDAHO, 
NOTICE AND O'RI>BR. 
APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBuc·· 
DEFENDER IN DIRECI' 
APPEAL 
TO: The Office of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender: 
Tho above named I>ofeildant/Appelwit has; filed a notice of appeal on Dcmnber 3 • .,: 
2014, and has moved the Comt tor appoiatmmt of aA appellate public detesuler in··dkect· · 
appeal of the Honorable O. Ridwd Bevan, District Jud.ge, special judge for Blaine, Coul)ty. 
This Court ~ smsficd du¢ said defeadant-,q,pellant is a nt.edy ~n entitled to, 
the services of the State Appellate Public Defeader per U9-863A. .Idaho Code. 
rr JS HEREBY ORDERED, that you ·are appointed to rcpieseat tbe,plaintiff .. , 
appellant in all matm as indicated herein. or until relieved by further ordat of the' court 
IT IS HBREBY ORDERED, pursuant to LA.R. Rwo l. tho parties, the Clede of the. 
Court and the Court Reporta', shall follow ~ established Idaho Appellate ruaies in the · 
proparation of this appeal recoid. 
IT IS PUR.THER ORDERED, Court Report.ea(s) transcripts and the dett's record 
shall be ptepared at County expense. 
rr IS FUR.THD OlU>ERED that the State A.ppel1llfe Public Deftmda's. Office is. ' 
pmvided tho following information by the Court 
l) The pJ,drm«is in 1he custody otthe Idaho State Board of Coustia/ 
' . 
2) A copy of tho Notice of Appeal or Application. 
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3) A copy oftbe Register of Actions in this matter. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, 
DATEDtit ~-of~J>er,~"4//J. 1 
. '{lt/./n1, ---------District Judp 
I' ' 
NOffCE AND ORDER. APPOJNTJNG STJaE ~BI.J.ATEJ»UBUC t>IFBNOER. 
IN t>JRECT APPEAL• 2 ' 
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CBRTJFICATB OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /tJ day ofD~ber. 2014, a true and oorrect copy 
of the foregoing Order w11& mailed, 'postage paid. e-mailed and/or lwid-delivered. to the 
following persons; 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 North Lake Harbor Lane 
Suite 100 
Boise. Idaho 83703 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attom~ GCDeJ'll 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720.0010 
R. Keith Roark 
The Roark Law Firm 
409 North Mam Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Idaho Sllpl'Cme c.ourt 
Atbi: Appeals 
451 W. State St. 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
NOTICE AND OIU)BR APPOJNTJNO STA.'IE APPELLATE Pt.1BUC l)BPENl)ER. 
.IN DlRBCr APPl!AL - 3 
' '' 
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R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
FAX No. 2087883318 P. 00 l .1002 
FILE 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
TEL: 208/788-2427 DEC 1 0 2014 
FAX: 208/788-3918 
.lgqnn ~. a.rlc District 
Court 8/IJlne Coun , leJaho 
Attorneys for Petitioner Sarah Marie Johnson 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
VS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-353 
) 






YOU WlLL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 20th day of February, 2015, at 3:00 
o'clock p.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, at the above named court at 
the TWIN FALLS COUNTY COURTHOUSE, in the City of Twin Falls, Cotmty of Twin Falls, 
State of Idaho, the above named Petitioner will call up her MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT. JJ__ 
DATED th.is ../6- day of December, 2014. 
TH 
NOTICE OF HEARING- I 
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTJFY that on the __ day of December, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attomey(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Jessica Lorello 
Keru1eth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Judge Bevan ( courtesy copy) 
Via Facsimile: 208-736-4155 
Sarah Johnson 
Via US Mail 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
local post office. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s). 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number(s): 208-
854-8074. 
R ~'J. -e 1 t:vv £.ix:P---M') 1 to0 l+f> s. 
R. KEITII ROARK 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
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, " 
R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
TEL: 208/788-2427 
FAX: 208/788-3918 
DEC 1 7 2014 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
Attorneys for Petitioner Sarah Marie Johnson 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FJFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
1HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
) 









YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE tbat the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
cUITently set for the 20th day of February, 2015, at 3:00 o'clock p.m. has been VACATED and reset 
for the 200 day of March, 2015 at 3:00 o'clock at the TWIN FALLS COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 
in the City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofldaho 
DATED this $y of December, 2014, 
T Re.~~-~-
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 7fL-1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -{--f- day of December, 2014, I served a true and correct 




Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Judge Bevan ( courtesy copy) 
Via Facsimile: 208-736-4155 
Sarah Johnson 
Via US Mail 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
local post office. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s). 
1,/ By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number(s): 208-
854-8074. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
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Feb 23 2015 10:45AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274 
.--- ----. 
Deborah Whipple ISB No. 4355 
Dennis Benjamin ISB No. 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 




Attorneys for the Petitioner 
page 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 












NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF 
COUNSEL 
Deborah Whipple, Dennis Benjamin and Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP hereby 
associate with R. Keith Roark and The Roark Law Firm as counsel for Petitioner, Sarah Johnson. 
Ms. Whipple and Mr. Benjamin have been appointed as conflict attorneys by the State Appellate 
Pub1ic Defenders in this case. 
"')_:.')~~ 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of February, 2015. 
l • NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL 
' --------~ -·---- -------·---~--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_:;!rlay ofFebruazy, 2015, I caused J true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage prtpaid to: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
R. Keith Roark 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
409 Main Street 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Dennis Benjamin 
' 
2 . • NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL f 
. . - - -- ----. ·-·--·· ·---· -- -\. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR lliE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV 2014-0353 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT 
This matter is before the court on the petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment, filed on 11/06/14. The state filed a Response to petitioner's Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Judgment on 12/08/14. A hearing on the motion was held on 03/02/15. At 
the hearing, Jessica Lorello represented the State. The petitioner, Sarah Marie Johnson, 
was not in attendance, but her counsel, Deborah Whipple and Dennis Benjamin, were 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 1 
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present. After reviewing the briefs, hearing oral arguments, and researching the 
applicable law, the Motion is DENIED. 
L LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion brought under I.R.C.P. 59(e), if brought within fourteen days after 
entry of judgment, provides a trial court the mechanism to correct legal and factual 
errors occurring in the proceedings before it and thus, as long as the trial court 
recognizes the matter as discretionary and acts within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion, reaching its conclusions through an exercise of reason, the decision will not 
be disturbed on appeal. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P .2d 107, 
109 (1999). Given their procedural nature, Rule 59(e) motions must be directed to the 
status of the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the 
judgment is based. City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 837, 275 P.3d 845, 852 (2012). 
Therefore, such a motion may not be used to raise new arguments, information, 
or present evidence for the first time when such matters could reasonably have been 
raised earlier in the litigation. Id; see also Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that F.R.C.P 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy, to be 
used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources and 
should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the court is 
presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 
intervening change in the controlling law). Where such a motion attempts to present 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 2 
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new information not addressed to the court prior to the decision resulting in the 
judgment, the proper motion is for relief from the judgment under I.RC.P. 60(b). Lowe 
v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Il. ISSUES 
A. Petitioner's Interpretation of the Burden Imposed by§ 1.9-4902(e)(1) is not 
Supported by a Plain Reading of the Statute. 
Petitioner contends that this court erred by misconstruing the legal meaning of 
LC. § 19-4902(e)(l), incorrectly expecting petitioner to prove in advance what the results 
of the proposed DNA testing will be. Petitioner seems to argue that the word 
'
1potential" in I.C. § 19-4902(e)(l) requires a court to order DNA testing whenever the 
evidence could potentially produce evidence of actual innocence.1 
This interpretation of§ 19-4902(e)(l) was advanced by the petitioner in her 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on 01/22/14, 
and was argued by the petitioner at the 10/20/14 hearing on the State's motion to 
dismiss. This court rejected that interpretation, finding that the standard contained in 
LC.§ 19-4902(e)(l) requires a showing by the petitioner that the requested testing has 
the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that would show that 
it is more likely than not that she is innocent, and that based on the overwhelming amount 
1 It should be noted here, as this comt pointed out in its Order Granting Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Am.ended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relie( that many of plaintiff's DNA 
requests fall outside of the scope of§ I 9-4902(b) because they seek to merely compare previously tested but 
unidentified DNA samples with newly acquired DNA profiles and an expanded DNA database. As conceded by 
plaintiff's counsel at the hearing on the current motion, such requests are not cognizable under the statute. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 3 
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of evidence presented against the petitioner at trial, that burden has not been met. To 
find that the statute requires a showing lower than "more probable than not," or one of 
"could," as argued by the petitioner, is unsupported by either case-law or the plain 
language of the statute itself. 
B. A Rule 59(e) Motion is Not the Proper Avenue Through Which to Collaterally 
Attack Previous Findings of Fact. 
In support of petitioner's argument, her motion goes to considerable length 
attempting to counter this court's reliance on the overwhelming amount of evidence 
presented against her at trial. For this purpose, petitioner's motion makes numerous 
citations to the trial transcript. 
However, a motion under I.R.C.P. 59(e) only provides a trial court the 
mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in the proceedings resulting in 
the judgment over which amendment is sought. Slaathaug, 132 Idaho at 707, 979 at 109. 
Such a motion is not the proper device through which to collaterally attack findings of 
fact entered in the first post-conviction relief case (Blaine County Case No. CV 2006-
0324), on which the court relied in this case, and thereby re-litigate the underlying trial. 
The petitioner had the opportunity to contest those findings of fact subsequent to the 
trial and in her appeal in the first post-conviction relief case. Having failed to do so, or 
failing to convince the Idaho Supreme Court in that regard, those findings and 
conclusions establish the law of the case and are therefore not subject to relitigation 
now, particularly in the form. of a Rule 59(e) motion. See State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT 4 
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n. 1, 966 P .2d 1, 9 n. 1 (1998) ("[t]he decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a 
proceeding becomes precedent to be followed in successive stages of th.at same 
litigation.") (quoting Sun Val.ley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Coup., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 
856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ct.App.1993)). The amount of evidence against Johnson, and the 
weight to be given to that evidence has been established at trial and in Johnson's first 
post-conviction case. Therefore, the court will not revisit those matters here.2 
ID. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and understanding that denying or granting a motion 
under I.R.C.P. 59(e) is a matter of the court's discretion, the petitioner's Motion to Alter 




G. RICHARD BEV AN 
District Judge 
2 The court is aware that the murder weapon was kept in the guest house closet and not in a safe, as pointed out in 
the plaintiff's motion. See Findings of Fact, W 32-33, Blaine County Case No. CV 2006-0324 (1st Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief) (April 5, 2011). This fact does nothing to reduce in any way, the court's conclusion, based 
on the record before it, that the evidence presented at trial placing Johnson at the scene and linking her to the 
murders was considerable. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the .:/._ day of t-,\ Y\'f.(.,~ , 201 Sa true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was mailed, postage paid, faxed and/or hand-delivered to the 
following persons: 
Mr. R. Keith Roark 
The Roark Law Firm 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, ID 83333 
fav.. 7'ii--~fi 
Mr. Dennis Benjamin 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY 
& BARTLETT, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 , l 
.r;o.~?,45 ... <tt1-1'1' 
Ms. Jessica M. Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 +a~ ~54-~01l{ 
Deputy· Clerk 
JUDGMENT-2 






., _ _j 
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R. Keith Roark, ISB No. 2230 
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409 Main Street 
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Jolynn Drage_ Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coiint ·. 1m,ho 
Hailey, ID 83333 
208-788-3918 
keith@.roHrklaw.com 
Deboral1 Whipple ISB No. 4355 
Dennis Benjamin ISB No. 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McK.A Y & BAR1LETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
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Attorneys for Sarah Johnson 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SAR.AH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
"· 











CASE NO. CV-2014'-00353 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
-.. .._..._ 
TO: -THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, the Idaho 
Attorney General, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
L The above named Appellant, Sarah Johnson, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment summarily dismissing 
Appellant)s petition for post-conviction relief filed on the 27'" day of October, 2014, and from 
thJd'.irder-PewinrtMotionto-Alter or Amendlh;uudgmeM f1Jed ontheW11 day of,Mareh.-2015 
1 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders m1der and pursuant to Rule l l(a)(l) 
and (p,)(7) l.A.R. 
3. A preliminary stateme1lt of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
• Did the Court err in foiling to permit DNA testing of requested items? 
• Did the Court err in dismissing the Eighth Amendment claim? 
• Did the Court err in denying the Motion to Alter or Amend'l. 
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's tr8Jlscript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions 
of the l'eporter'stranscl'ipt in boih hard copy and electronic format: 
• 10/20/2014 Motion Hearing 
Reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages: Jess than 100 
HELD IN TWIN FALLS 
• 3/2L2015 Motion 1-!earing 
Reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages: less than lQ.Q 
.. HELD IN TWIN FALLS. 
6 .. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included R11le 28, I.A.R; 
• 04/09/2012 DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 04/09/2012 Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian in support of DNA and successive 
petition for post-conviction relief 
2 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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• 01/22/2014 Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 05/19/2014 Order on Pending Motions 
• 06/18/2014 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 06/27/2014 Order for Extension of Time to File Response to Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 07/18/2014 Motion to Take Judicial Notice 
• 07/18/2014 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's 
Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 07/18/2014 Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended DNA and 
Successive Petition for Post.Conviction Relief 
• 08/25/2014 Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
• 09/03/2014 Second Affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian 
• 09/16/2014 Motion to Continue Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amend DNA and Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 09/16/2014 Order Continuing Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petitioner's Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 10/10/2014 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's 
Amended DNA and Successive.Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
• 10/27/2014 Order Granting Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Amended 
DNA and Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 10/27/2014 Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
• 11/06/2014 Renewed Motion to Take Judicial Notice 
• 12/03/2014 Notice Of Ap_peal 
3 • AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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• 12/03/2014 Motion to Appoint Stat" AJwellate Public Defender 
. •, ,12/08/2014 Res9onse to ,Petitioner'§ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
• 12/09/2014 Notice mid Qrd.er &muJ,iotini:.tS:t~t~ 6DJ2~1lutv Public Defend~ in Direct 
Appeal 
• 02[23/2015 Notice of Association, QfCounsel 
• 03/04/2015 Order Denying Motion to Alter or Ame;nd the Judgment 
• 03/--/2015 Qrdc;;r Granting Request for Judicial Notice 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Exhibits 1 to 3 of the Affidavit 
of Kristin ·Brown 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcripthas been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Virginia. Bailey 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Roxanne Patchell 
Official Court Reporter 
1559 Overlan<j .t,.ve. 
!3urley, ID 8JJ 1 & 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
the Court has previously found her to be indigent and a motion for appointment of 
the Sta.te Appellate Public Defenders will be filed along with this Notice of 
Appeal. 
(c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparntion of the record for the reasons set forth above. 
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is 
llO filing fee for post-conviction petitions. 
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(e) That service has been made upon all pruiies required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho 
Code). 
Respectfully submitted th~ of March. 2015. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
1:>eAA~~rs:~~'."'. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorneys for Sarah J ohuson 
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CER'I1FICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tlli6~ day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be deposited in the United States Mail postage pre-paid to: 
Jessica Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Virginia Bailey 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Roxanne Patchell 
Official Court Reporter 
1559 Oysrland Ave. 
ByrJey, ID 83318 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON, 
Petitioner / Appellant, 
vs. 











Supreme Court No. 42857 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
---------------- ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the 
pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause 
and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
along with the Clerk's Record and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS W~REOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this day of /tft!,L/. ::,--2015. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON, 
Petitioner / Appellant, 
vs. 











Supreme Court No. 42857 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
_______________ ) 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Supplemental Clerk's 
Record and Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause 
as follows: 
Idaho State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane Ste 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Attorney for DefendanUAppellant 
Attorney General's Office 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 o 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
IN WITN~S WHEREOF, I qa~e hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this . _ day of lfHz.ll . : ...... , 2015. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
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